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This dissertation will reread the intellectual history of the Japanese empire from the 
perspective of sekaishi or “world history.” World history was an idea that was 
discussed by a number of scholars, intellectuals and writers intending to create a “new 
world order” in the Asia-Pacific region when the empire was faced with the crisis of 
total war since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In this dissertation, I argue that 
modern Japan was a colonial empire and equipped with a universalist mode of 
legitimization for its system of rule and integration of its multiethnic populations. By 
discussing the Japanese Romantics and the Kyoto school of philosophy, I will show 
how they sought to integrate and mobilize the nation and the imperial subjects in the 
colonies through the idea of world history. First of all, I will thematize the Japanese 
Romantic writer Yasuda Yojūrō in order to show that Yasuda, contrary to his 
established image as an anti-modern, aesthetic and ethnic nationalist, in fact advocated 
the idea of world history. To this end, I will seek to demonstrate how his notion of 
world history was consistent with, and derived immanently from, his important literary 
notion of “romantic irony” by looking at his discussions of the German Romantic 
writer Friedrich Schlegel. Moreover, I will closely examine his narrative of world 
history and his rhetorical practice of romantic irony in his encounter with the colonial 
intellectual Hyun Yong Sup in his travelogues on colonial Korea. In turn, I will 
suggest the critical stakes in Hyun’s ironic response to the imperial universalism. 
Second, I will examine the wartime discussions of “philosophy of world history” by 
 the second generation of the Kyoto school such as Kōyama Iwao and Nishitani Keiji. 
By focusing on their conception of sōryokusen or “total war,” I will aim to reveal 
internal contradictions of the notion of world history, which I describe as antinomies. 
Through these treatments, I will intend to demonstrate how the universalist idea of 
world history served for Japan’s imperial formation in both the metropole and the 
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Introduction:  
World History, Universality, and the Aporias of Empire 
 
In a way, the “Overcoming Modernity” symposium represented a condensed 
version of the aporias of modern Japanese history. Faced with the urgent task 
of interpreting the idea of eternal warfare at a time of total war, the symposium 
marked the explosion of such traditional oppositions as those of reactionism 
and restoration, reverence for the Emperor and exclusion of foreigners, 
isolationism and the opening of the country, ultranationalism and ‘civilization 
and enlightenment,” and East and West. 
—Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Overcoming Modernity” (1959)1 
 
This dissertation will reread the intellectual history of the Japanese empire from the 
perspective of sekaishi or “world history.” World history was an idea that was 
discussed by a number of scholars, intellectuals and writers intending to create a “new 
world order” in the Asia-Pacific region when the empire was faced with the crisis of 
total war since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In this dissertation, I argue that 
modern Japan was a colonial empire and equipped with a universalist mode of 
legitimization for its system of rule and integration of its multiethnic populations. By 
discussing the Japanese Romantics and the Kyoto school of philosophy, I will show 
how they sought to integrate and mobilize the nation and the imperial subjects in the 
colonies through the idea of world history. First of all, I will thematize the Japanese 
Romantic writer Yasuda Yojūrō in order to show that Yasuda, contrary to his 
established image as an anti-modern, aesthetic and ethnic nationalist, in fact advocated 
the idea of world history. To this end, I will seek to demonstrate how his notion of 
world history was consistent with, and derived immanently from, his important literary 
notion of “Romantic irony” by looking at his discussions of the German Romantic 
writer Friedrich Schlegel. Moreover, I will closely examine his narrative of world 
                                                 
1 Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Overcoming Modernity" in What Is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi, 
trans. and ed. Richard F. Calichman (New York Columbia University Press, 2005), 145-6. 
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history and his rhetorical practice of Romantic irony in his encounter with the colonial 
intellectual Hyun Yong Sup in his travelogues on colonial Korea. In turn, I will 
suggest the critical stakes in Hyun’s ironic response to the imperial universalism. 
Second, I will examine the wartime discussions of “philosophy of world history” by 
the second generation of the Kyoto school such as Kōyama Iwao and Nishitani Keiji. 
By focusing on their conception of sōryokusen or “total war,” I will aim to reveal 
internal contradictions of the notion of world history, which I describe as antinomies. 
Through these treatments, I will intend to demonstrate how the universalist idea of 
world history served for Japan’s imperial formation in both the metropole and the 
colony and how it was entangled with ironies and antinomies. 
In this introduction, I will first clarify the historical background in which the 
discussions of world history emerged. The outbreak of the so-called China Incident 
(Sino-Japanese War) marked the critical point for this discourse. As a number of 
scholars have pointed out, what was especially path-breaking was the idea of Tōa 
kyōdōtai or the East Asian Cooperative Community that was launched by major 
intellectuals, journalists, and bureaucrats, such as Miki Kiyoshi, Rōyama Masamichi 
and Ozaki Hotsumi, who participated in Shōwa kenkyūkai (the Showa Research 
Association), a brain trust for the then Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro.2 Among 
them, a Kyoto philosopher Miki Kiyoshi was most influential in this discussion. He 
decided to commit himself to this agenda, giving a talk entitled “the World Historical 
                                                 
2 For Miki Kiyoshi and his involvement in the Showa Research Association, see Iwasaki Minoru, 
“Desire for a Poietic Metasubject: Miki Kiyoshi’s Technology Theory,” trans. J. Victor Koschmann in 
Total War and ‘Modernization,’ ed. Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann and Ryūichi Narita 
(Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Program, 1998), 159-80; Yonetani Masafumi, “Miki Kiyoshi no ‘sekaishi no 
tetsugaku’” [Miki Kiyoshi’s philosophy of world history] in Hihyō kūkan [Critical space] no. 19 (1998), 
40-68; Nakano Toshio, “Sōryokusen taisei to chishikijin: Miki Kiyoshi to teikoku no shutai keisei” [The 
regime of total war and intellectuals: Miki Kiyoshi and the subject formation of empire] in 
Sōryokusenka no chi to seido [Knowledge and institutions under the total war], ed. Naoki Sakai et al. 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002), 173-209; J. Victor Koschmann, “'Tekunorojii no shihai, shihai no 
tekunorojii'" [Rule by technology, technologies of rule], trans. Kasai Hirotaka in Sōryokusenka no chi to 
seido [Knowledge and institutions under the total war], ed. Naoki Sakai et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
2002), 139-72. 
3 
Significance of the China Incident” on July 7, 1938, the first year anniversary of the 
Incident.3 As the title shows, he sought to solve the conflict by providing a universal 
purpose for the current engagement, that is, construction of a true regional community. 
He begins his talk by discussing the consequences of the World War I, which, first and 
foremost, brought about the end of the Eurocentrism that has dominated the modern 
world. It means nothing less than that the world is now divided with three major 
ideologies competing with each other: liberalism, communism and fascism. These 
ideas, however, cannot be a real world principle: the current crisis has already proved 
the bankruptcy of liberalism as a modern principle; fascism as a nationalist principle 
cannot represent the world, which is increasingly more global in terms of intercourse, 
economy, and culture; communism could have become a candidate, but lost its 
hegemony after the failure in Germany. Therefore, what is lacking and needs to be 
sought for is “the idea unifying world history.”4 He then turns to the situation in East 
Asia, i.e., Japan, China, and Manchukuo, which has thus far never formed a regional 
unity. Although it is not yet certain which country—Japan or China—takes the lead, 
he is convinced that unification itself is on the horizon. This, he insists, represents a 
“world historical” task. “The day when the East is formed must be the day when the 
world is formed in the true sense at the same time.”5 In order to hold hegemony, Japan 
must accomplish this “world historical mission.” Moreover, Miki argues that solution 
                                                 
3 See Miki Kiyoshi, “Shina jihen no sekaishi teki igi” [The world historical significance of the China 
Incident], ed. Yonetani Masafumi in Hihyō kūkan [Critical space] no. 19 (1998), 32-39. It is important 
to point out that his project was motivated by his conception of historical time that tired to radicalize 
Hegelian dialectical philosophy of history by both temporalizing it based on the time of the present 
moment of decision and spatializing it from a more global perspective. This philosophy of history 
derives from his active confrontation with the impact of Heidegger’s Being and Time. For a more 
detailed discussion of Miki’s notion of temporality, Naoki Sakai, “Hiteisei to rekishishugi no jikan: 
1930 nendai no jissen tetsugaku to Ajia Taiheiyō sensō ki no Ienaga, Maruyama shisōshi” [Negativity 
and historicist time: the practical philosophy in the 1930s and the intellectual histories of Ienaga and 
Maruyama] in Marukusushugi toiu keiken: 1930-40 nendai Nihon no rekishigaku [The experience of 
Marxism: Japanese historiography in the 1930s and the 1940s], ed. Isomae Junichi and Harry 
Harootunian (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 2008), 261-308. 
4 Miki, “Shina jihen no sekaishi teki igi,” 34. 
5 Ibid., 35. 
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of the problem of capitalism must accompany this mission. Otherwise, it cannot be 
world historical, he emphasizes. Thus, he concludes: “Japan’s world historical mission 
is to grasp the fundamental principle on its own that competes with communism. 
Spatially, it means the unification of East Asia, and temporally, the resolution of 
capitalism society.”6 In this way, the term “world history” pointed to the dimension of 
a universal principle for a new social formation. 
Miki’s thesis laid out in this talk was later formulated through the group 
discussion into its official manifesto entitled Principles of Thought for a New Japan.7 
If many progressive bureaucrats and technocrats, as well as former leftist intelligentsia, 
were attracted by this East Asian Cooperative Community, as they actually were, it 
was because they had the high expectation that the project, especially the resolution of 
the problem of capitalism, would rationalize and modernize the social system.8 In this 
way, these intellectuals made a dangerous gamble of seeking for social transformation 
through wartime mobilization. It meant that they were getting involved in Japanese 
imperialism. What was ironic, however, is that the East Asian Cooperative 
Community itself failed because of the prolongation of the Sino-Japanese War and the 
reactions from the conservatives and rightist at home. By 1940, as Japan expanded the 
frontline to the South East Asia, the agenda was replaced by Dai Tōa kyōeiken or the 
“Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” a more openly imperialist policy.   
                                                 
6 Ibid., 36. 
7 See Miki Kiyoshi, Shin Nihon no shiō genri [Principles of thought for a new Japan] in Miki Kiyoshi 
zenshū [Collected works of Miki Kiyoshi], vol. 17 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968), 507-533. 
8 In fact, during this wartime period, the implementation of various social policies enhanced national 
integration and social equality (Gleichschaltung or enforced homogeneity) in terms of class, gender and 
ethnicity; otherwise, the government could not have mobilized and motivated the socially marginal or 
excluded populations into the total war. At the same time, the mobilization promoted rational and 
functional deployment of the human and natural resources. Yamanouchi Yasushi describes this 
functionalist reorganization as “a shift from a class to a system society.” It is important to note that this 
shift also represents an international trend in both fascist and the New Deal type countries. In addition, 
it also prepared for the postwar Japanese national society. See Yamanouchi Yasushi’s and other essays 
included in Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann and Ryūichi Narita ed., Total War and 
‘Modernization’ (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Program, 1998). 
5 
However, the discourse of world history did not cease to exercise its influence. 
It was right before the outbreak of Japan’s war with the United States and other allied 
countries in December 1941 that the other Kyoto philosophers Kōyama Iwao, 
Nishitani Keiji, and Kōsaka Masaaki, and the Kyoto historian Suzuki Shigetaka gave a 
round-table discussion entitled “Sekaishi teki tachiba to Nihon” or “The World 
Historical Standpoint and Japan.” Repeating Miki, perhaps unwittingly, they pointed 
to the crisis of European universality and identity, and claims that Japan should come 
and represent a new world history. World history, they argued, does not contradict 
nationality, but derives from profound national subjectivity that they describe as 
moralische Energie (moral energy), using a term by the German historian Leopold von 
Ranke. Here one can see one of the central claims of the orthodox Kyoto philosophy 
that nationalism and universalism are not two opposite principles, but tied together. 
This universalized nationalism can be taken as defining imperialism or imperial 
nationalism.9 If this is the case, the world history represents the aspect of universalism 
of this nationalism. Because of its timely publication of this symposium, however, the 
word sekaishi gained currency. Moreover, there was a psychological background to 
this popularity. As Takeuchi Yoshimi noted, the war with the “West” and Japan’s 
initial victory in the battles released intellectuals from the moral guilt they had felt 
about Japan’s invasion against China, making them idealize the Pacific War as a just 
war.10 One might add that it also liberated them from the inferiority complex against 
the “West.” In this way, “The World Historical Standpoint and Japan,” along with 
another famous symposium Kindai no chōkoku, or “Overcoming Modernity,” held in 
                                                 
9 For an incisive critique of this standpoint of the Kyoto philosophers, see Naoki Sakai, “Modernity and 
Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism” In Translation and Subjectivity: On 
“Japan” and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 153-76. 
10 Takeuchi, “Overcoming Modernity,” 121. 
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the summer of 1942, became symbolic events.11 Thus, the phrase “overcoming 
modernity” came to be associated with the “world historical standpoint” and, in fact, 
two of the Kyoto scholars, Nishitani and Suzuki, also participated in the latter 
symposium. The Kyoto scholars gave two more sessions in which they legitimated by 
their notion of world history the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and the total 
war that would emancipate Asia from Anglo-Saxon capitalism, colonialism, and 
racism. In other words, their philosophical conception of “total war” represented an 
ultimate form of their world history that justified the current engagements as serving 
for a future purpose of the new world order. As I discuss in the fourth chapter, it does 
not mean, however, that their standpoint served as an official ideology of the Japanese 
government. On the contrary, the Kyoto scholars were under the constant threat from 
the Army and the fanatic rightist camp who considered their “world historical” 
standpoint as too much too liberal, Western, and therefore anti-Japanese. As recently 
discovered documents testify, they held secret meetings with the Japanese Navy; they 
intended, as the discoverer interprets, to discuss how to end the war at the earliest 
point and to change the regime of the Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki of the Army.12 
However, I will argue that this interpretation is not fully supported by the documents 
or the public discussions of the philosophers. Above all else, from whatever good 
intentions they acted, it does not alter the fact that their basic argument indeed 
endorsed Japanese empire. Rather, I will interpret their discussion of total war as 
revealing the internal contradictions of their very idea of world history.    
                                                 
11 See Richard Calichman, ed. and trans., Overcoming Modernity (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008). For a thick description of this symposium, see Harry Harootunian, Overcome by 
Modernity: History: Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2000), 34-94. 
12 See Ōhashi Ryōsuke, Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun: Shin shiryō ‘Ōshima memo’ wo megutte [The 
Kyoto school and the Japanese Navy: on the newly discovered ‘Ōshima memorandum’] (Tokyo: PHP, 
2001). For an appropriate criticism of Ōhashi’s interpretation, Iwasaki Minoru, "Sensō no shūji, 
sekaishi no kyōhaku" [The rhetoric of war and the coercions of world history] in Sōryokusenka no chi to 
seido [Knowledge and institutions under total war], ed. Naoki Sakai et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2002),111-38. 
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In this thesis, I will claim that the idea of world history was an instrumental 
notion for the wartime Japanese empire without which it could not have fully justified 
its war efforts. To be sure, there are different versions and conceptions of “world 
history”; the one that Miki proposed and the other that Kōyama and other advocated 
had distinctive political and historical meanings in different contexts. Some scholars in 
the postwar described the former as the left-wing Kyoto school, and the latter as the 
right-wing. They often evaluated the East Asian Cooperative Community as a more 
critical intervention to the situation; Miki’s death in prison in September 1945, that is, 
after Japan’s defeat—he had been arrested and put in jail in the spring of 1945 on 
suspicion of violation of the Peace Preservation Law—would have aroused sympathy 
for, and, in a sense, mythified, this tragic philosopher. However, both parties do not 
differ very much in that they sought to rationalize (in the double sense of reforming 
and idealizing) Japanese imperialism. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that the 
discourse of world history was officially sanctioned doctrine of the empire. In fact, as 
I have suggested, both had to face tremendous resistance and attacks from the 
conservative forces. Nevertheless, it is also important to point out that the notion of 
world history was not the monopoly of the Kyoto school of philosophy, left or right. 
The Japanese Romantic writer Yasuda Yojūrō is a case in point, as I argue in my 
chapters. Although he has been regarded as a quintessentially traditionalist thinker, he, 
too, made a strong appeal to the notion of world history by April 1938, independently 
of the Kyoto school. This fact suggests that the term world history was one of the 
influential phrases circulating in the discursive space of the Japanese empire.    
In general, the discussions of world history sought to show a vision of a new 
world order with imperial Japan at its center, while criticizing the problems and 
contradictions of Eurocentrism. Based on the descriptions so far, it is possible to point 
out several important characteristics common to different versions. First, the 
8 
proponents of world history addressed the issue of universality. In the present as the 
time of crisis and world wars, they claimed, the so-called “West” cannot be universal 
anymore. Yet, this does not mean the same thing as anti-Western pan-Asianism. But 
rather, the discussions of world history performatively showed that universality is a 
form of hegemony and conflict.  Second, world history represented a call for creating 
a new world order. In other words, it is not limited to serving as a regulative 
framework for objectively narrativizing a story of the nations in the world based on 
past facts and events, but involves a subjective, practical movement towards the future. 
This is the reason why the question of temporality becomes a decisive problem in the 
discussions of world history. I will seek to show the aporias inherent in this world 
historical temporality in the fourth chapter. And third, world history intended to 
integrate and mobilize the nation(s) as the subjects that practice this world historical 
mission. It meant organizing the nation into the total war domestically, and a call for 
other Asian nations to participate in this mission externally; it especially aimed to 
mobilize the populations in the colonial possessions as new national subjects. With 
these three features, the discourse of world history could serve for the empire.    
Until recently, the discussions of world history by the Japanese intellectuals 
have not been paid adequate attention and put to thematic considerations as a form of 
universalism. The major reason for this, I argue, was that Japan’s claim for the world 
history implied a challenge to the existing economy of the Eurocentric knowledge 
system. The discourse that distinguishes the “West” as universal and the “non-West” 
as particular has been accepted as the axiomatic epistemology of the modern world not 
only by the West, but by the non-West as well.13 According to this schema of 
knowledge, the West is supposed to be the observing and analyzing subject of theory, 
                                                 
13 Naoki Sakai, “The Dislocation of the West and the Status of Humanities” in Traces, vol.1 (Ithaca: 
Traces Inc., 2001), 71-94. 
9 
while the non-West represents the empirical object of observation. This was the 
discursive implication of the duality of Kantian subjectivity as the transcendental and 
empirical subjects. The universal claim of “world history” on the part of the “non-
West” was something that, by definition, defied perception and understanding through 
the existing framework.  It means that the claim for universality on the part of what is 
in the particular position essentially implies a conflict and even violence, because it 
will put into question the authority of the existing universality and make a demand for 
re-articulating the hierarchy between the universal and the particular. The true 
meaning of what Takeuchi Yoshimi once described as the “aporias of modern 
Japanese history” must lie in this recognition. Although he seemed to presuppose a 
rather substantial difference between the West and the non-West when he mentioned 
the “traditional oppositions” between “reactionism and restoration” and so forth, the 
so-called “aporias” can be taken as pointing to the conflict implied in the dimension of 
universality.   
However, the claim of Japanese world history failed because, as Takeuchi said, 
“[Western] imperialism cannot be overthrown by [Japanese] imperialism.”14 “[It] is 
nevertheless also true,” he continues, “that [Japanese] imperialism cannot be judged 
by [Western] imperialism.”15 While he may seem to try to defend Japanese 
imperialism, his point is that this conflict is the one between two particulars that 
assume the title of the universal. In other words, he is saying that Japanese imperial 
world history repeated the same imperial, that is, particular universalism as the West, 
while criticizing the latter’s contradictions. Nevertheless, the demand of the defeated 
particular universalism would not disappear unless its claim for universality is 
examined as such. In fact, the Kyoto philosophers, for instance, were convinced that 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 124. 
15 Ibid. 
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the idea of world history was defeated as a matter of fact, but not defeated as an idea. 
Such conviction, as I show in the fourth chapter, has been transmitted to their students 
and is still alive as deeply repressed resentment, like a specter. At times, it manifests 
itself as a demand for the rehabilitation of the former claim as it was. To be sure, such 
a revisionist phenomenon of “acting-out” is quite ordinary among defeated and 
traumatized nationalisms, but this sentiment among the heirs of the Japanese empire 
would be reinforced because it proposed a world historical, universal claim. For this 
reason, the profoundly self-deceptive notion that Japan’s “Greater East Asian War” 
sought to liberate Asia from the West is still persistent among Japanese conservatives. 
When he wrote the piece on “overcoming modernity,” Takeuchi was acutely aware of 
such a problem. In this sense, his writing can be said to represent a form of “working-
through.”16  
In the world after the WWII, however, in spite of decolonization and the rise of 
the Third World-ism, the discursive economy of the West and the non-West seems to 
have been restored and reorganized under the regime of the Cold War. As Harry 
Harootunian argues, it was precisely in this period that “area studies” was established 
as knowledge institutions in US academia.17 Under the framework of the 
modernization theory, which was dominant until the 1970s, non-Western societies in 
question were simultaneously homogenized according to the stages of linear 
development and made to be heterogeneous because of the core cultural values that 
were considered different from the Western observer. As a result, the claim for 
universality of the non-Western world history was not recognized. As long as one puts 
                                                 
16 For a historical use of the psychoanalytic notions of “acting-out” and “working-through,” see 
Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University, 2001). 
17 For a critical history of the area studies and an alternative practice to it, see Harry Harootunian, 
History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000). 
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oneself in the position of the universal, it is difficult to recognize the claim of 
universality by the other. In addition, addressing the issue of Japan as a multiethnic 
empire would necessarily invite a self-reflexive question of whether or not one’s own 
universal standpoint is imperial. For these reasons, the Kyoto school of philosophy 
was understood first and foremost in terms of the “Oriental” thought such as Buddhist 
philosophy, while the Japanese Romantics were regarded predominantly as aesthetic 
and ethnic culturalism, i.e., particularism. Such views in part stem from the now-
questionable paradigm that looks at German Romanticism and Idealism as reactionary 
cultural forms of the late developer. At the same time, the framework that divides the 
world into the West and the non-West and regards them in terms of a binary 
opposition between universal and particular was shared by most of the progressive 
scholars in the postwar Japan: Marxists and the civil society school such as Maruyama 
Masao alike interpreted prewar Japan as the emperor system fascism dominated by 
pre-modern feudal remnants, and this view was predominant until the 1970s.18  Thus, 
a view that understands wartime Japan as a time period of particularistic, irrational 
ethnic nationalism was continually reproduced in the postwar Japan quite for a long 
time. As a result, the prewar history of the colonial empire was forgotten, and the 
myth of a homogeneous Japanese nation was created in which academic discourse was 
also involved. In creating such a view, both Japan and the United States were 
complicit in an asymmetrical manner.19    
In this way, the problematic of imperial world history as discussed by Japanese 
intellectuals has long been made obscure. What was most invisible, however, was the 
                                                 
18 For a more nuanced and fair view of the multiple meanings and emancipative potentials of the 
immediate postwar debates on shutaisei (subjectivity) in which these scholars participated, see J. Victor 
Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
19 For a fundamental strategy, as well as diverse approaches, to problematize this traditional image, see 
Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary and Toshio Iyotani, ed., Deconstructing Nationality (Ithaca: Cornell East 
Asia Program, 2005). 
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Romantic world history. Yasuda Yojūro was considered an exemplar of irrational anti-
modernist. In this sense, his writing represents a case that best conforms to the binary 
scheme of the dominant discourse that was practiced in both Japan and the United 
States. As I discuss in detail in the first chapter, this view interpreted Yasuda 
according to the binary opposition between universalism and particularism, assigning 
him the latter. His elusive Romantic irony also obscured his project, because it 
constantly invalidates a univocal meaning. “The intellectual role played by Yasuda,” 
Takeuchi maintained, “was that of eradicating thought through the destruction of all 
categories.”20 Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, Takeuchi saw some potential 
in Yasuda’s irony. He first evaluated the entire symposium in terms of the question of 
the “aporias”:  
That the symposium produced such poor results…stems from the symposium’s 
failure to dissolve the war’s double nature, that is to say, its failure to objectify 
the aporias of modern Japanese history qua aporias. 21  
 
What he meant by the “double nature” of war is the duality that Japan’s Pacific War 
was imperialist and anti-imperialist at once. He then went on to say that the 
symposium could not “exploit Yasuda’s destructive force toward other ends.”22 In 
other words, Takeuchi was saying that Yasuda’s irony might have helped identify the 
aporias as aporias. While this statement itself is somewhat ambiguous, it can be said 
that Takeuchi was bestowing high praise on Yasuda by this comment. As I have said, 
an aporia refers to a conflict that is generated when the relationship between the 
universal and the particular is re-articulated; when the particular puts the existing 
universal in question, the universal becomes potentially absent; the particular, 
however, is not yet recognized as the universal. In so doing, an aporia as an aporia 
                                                 
20 Takeuchi, "Overcoming Modernity," 143. 
21 Ibid., 146. 
22 Ibid. 
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reveals the universal as conflictive and yet amorphous and indefinite. This is the very 
structure of irony. As I discuss in the second chapter, irony, as Yasuda conceived of it 
through his reading of the German Romantic writer Friedrich Schlegel, is a continual 
alternation of the opposite poles, which deconstructs any binary oppositions. Irony 
makes it possible to keep the tension, and suspend the dichotomy, between the 
universal and the particular, without reducing them into each other or creating a 
hierarchy between them. Takeuchi recognized this potential of irony in discussing the 
universal claim, but not universalism per se, of wartime Japanese thought. However, 
Takeuchi did not mention Yasuda’s project of Romantic world history. Nor did he 
notice how Romantic world history emerged from such an irony. In the third chapter, 
however, I will claim that this very indefinite universality of irony that derives from 
suspension of the binary oppositions could be, and actually was, imperial.   
 Interestingly enough, the Kyoto school’s notion of world history seems to 
show a contrastive case. By seeking to represent the universal standpoint, their 
discussion fell into unsolvable contradictions which I describe “antinomies.” If irony 
refers to a continual alternation of one meaning and the other, antinomy represents a 
coexistence of mutually contradictory statements that correspond to the finite and 
infinite standpoints respectively. Therefore, while irony undermines the very notion of 
identity and distinction, antinomy derives from the logical category of contradiction. 
At the same time, however, both antinomy and irony virtually destruct the distinction 
between one thing and its other. I will claim that these features characterized the 
writings and discussions by Yasuda Yojūrō and the Kyoto philosophers respectively, 
producing enormous consequences in their notions of world history. In the following 




Polemics of Reading: 
Yasuda Yojūrō and the Question of Imperialism 
 
In this sort of irony, everything should be playful and serious, guilelessly open 
and deeply hidden...It contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble 
antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility 
and the necessity of complete communication. It is the freest of all licenses, for 
by its means one transcends oneself; and yet it is also the most lawful, for it is 
absolutely necessary. 
—Friedrich Schlegel, “Lyceum Fragments 108”23 
 
Literary critic Yasuda Yojūrō (1910-1981) was the leading figure of Nihon romanha 
or Japanese Romantics. Nihon romanha was the title of a journal published by a group 
of young writers and critics who were influenced by German Romanticism. Nihon 
romanha was their Athenaeum, that is, a Japanese analogue of the late-eighteenth 
century journal of German Romanticism. The members included Yasuda and former 
proletarian writers such as Kamei Katsuichirō and Hayashi Fusao. These writers, 
especially Yasuda, appealed to young readers in the late 1930s and the early 1940s, 
who, after the demise of the leftist movements, found themselves in the desperate 
situation of total war and mobilization that began with the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937.  
Yasuda studied German literature, especially Friedrich Hölderlin and early 
German Romanticism such as Friedrich Schlegel at Tokyo Imperial University. While 
he wrote several pieces of fiction as well as novels at the beginning of his career, his 
major field was literary criticism. From early on, his essays were characterized by his 
use of “Romantic irony.” Yasuda became well-known for his award-winning 1936 
                                                 
23 Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, Trans. Peter Firchow 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 156. 
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essays, Nihon no hashi (Japanese bridges). In particular, the essay with the same title 
reflected upon the artifice of Japanese bridges both in actual history and in literary 
representation, and discussed their symbolic cultural meaning by comparing them with 
foreign bridges. It tends to be interpreted as a work that pursues the aesthetic 
authenticity of Japanese culture. In the wartime period he became one of Japan’s most 
popular writers as he perhaps not coincidentally became more obsessed with Japanese 
classical literature and the cultural heritage of Japanese emperors in history, for 
instance, in Gotobain (the ex-emperor Gotoba, 1939) or in Man’yōshū no seishin (the 
spirit of Man’yōshū, 1942).  
In the postwar, his wartime literary activity naturally created much controversy 
because Yasuda was regarded as having justified and supported Japan’s Asia-Pacific 
War. The debate still continues to the present day, and studies of Yasuda’s politics 
have been deeply divided and polemical in nature. However, there is one basic 
premise shared by most of the existing studies, i.e., Yasuda as an ethnic nationalist. 
Due to this view, the Yasuda scholarship lacks or is made blind to the context of 
Japan’s colonial empire.  
As I show in the next chapters, Yasuda made a trip to the Korean Peninsula 
and the Chinese Continent in 1938 at the time of the Sino-Japanese War. His 
travelogues clearly attest to Yasuda’s deep involvement in Japanese imperialism. As a 
matter of fact, this text is notorious and often cited as the very evidence for Yasuda’s 
collaboration with the wartime regime. Curiously enough, however, despite the fact 
that the question of Yasuda’s war guilt has been much debated, the narrow focus on 
this issue tends to make Yasuda’s imperial nationalism invisible and prevent from 
analyzing its structure. This is the reason why it is crucial to critically anatomize the 
existing studies as such. In the following, in order to clarify what is at stake in my 
rereading, I will display the basic traits and limitations of the existing paradigm as 
16 
exemplified by Hashikawa Bunzō and others. I will then thematically discuss Kevin 
Doak and Alan Tansman in particular, because their interpretations are considered to 
be definitive studies on Yasuda Yojūrō and the Japanese Romantics in English 
literature.  
  
A Polemical Legacy: the Paradigm and the Debates in the Yasuda Yojūrō Studies  
It was political scientist Hashikawa Bunzō (1922-1983) that took the initiative in 
discussing the role of Yasuda and the Japanese Romantics in his pioneering work, 
Nihon romanha hihan josetsu (Introduction to a critique of Japanese Romantics).24 As 
a college student in the wartime period, Hashikawa, like many of his peers, was an 
enthusiastic reader of Yasuda Yojūrō. Therefore, in writing his critical essays, he was 
first and foremost motivated by his desire to understand and objectify his generational 
experience and the secrets of such enormous influence of Yasuda’s writings. It not 
only provides his first-hand testimony about Yasuda reception during wartime, but 
proposes a set of important theses on the Japanese Romantic movement, which he 
points out was represented by Yasuda Yojūrō, not by other members such as Kamei 
Katsuichirō.  
While pointing to three sources of Yasuda’s thought, i.e., Marxism, National 
Studies, and German Romanticism, Hashikawa characterizes Yasuda’s writings as 
“aesthetic patriotism” (tanbi teki patorioteizumu) whose literary and apolitical 
standpoint paradoxically addressed the relationship between “beauty and politics.” 
(57) However, how can the three sources as diverse as these lead to “aesthetic 
patriotism”? A common thread of these currents seems to be anti-modernism. With his 
ethics of conviction and feeling modeled on kokugaku or the National Studies, Yasuda 
                                                 
24 Hashikawa Bunzō, Nihon roman ha hihan josetsu [Introduction to a critique of Japanese romantics] 
(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1995 [1960]). 
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negated, Hashikawa claims, the “logic of the Civilization and Enlightenment” as the 
keynote of the modern Japanese state. While distancing himself from the so-called 
“Japanism” as another ideology of the “situation theory” (jōsei ron) base on 
calculation and instrumental reason, Yasuda became more and more inclined toward 
“absolute piety” and “agrarianism” throughout and after the wartime period. (33) At 
the same time, however, Hashikawa emphasizes that Yasuda’s anti-modernism 
represented “a depoliticized and emotionalized revolutionary thought,” and therefore 
was not a form of traditionalism that would advocate a return to the past. (33) On the 
contrary, Japanese Romanticism emerged out of a desperate situation in which the 
leftist movements had been suppressed with the socio-economic crisis only deepening. 
Pointing out the fact that Yasuda himself was exposed to Marxism at the Osaka 
Higher School, Hashikawa claims that Japanese Romantics as a “revolutionary 
resonance that accompanied the early communist theories and movements from the 
beginning.” (33) He continues: 
While accompanying the actual revolutionary movement, Japanese Romantics, 
I think, crystallized itself as a sort of equally radical anti-imperialism by 
mediating and transitioning its inner necessity of failure to an apolitical figure. 
(33)  
 
In a situation like this where one cannot publicly express social criticism, a sense of 
crisis becomes that of despair, and negation both radicalized and introverted. It was all 
too natural that “irony” determined the basic tone of his writing. It is precisely here 
that all the elements of Yasuda’s thought—the National Studies, Marxism, and 
German Romanticism—converge. “If these heterogeneous ideas found a moment of 
unity in Yasuda,” Hashikawa says, “what constitutes its integrity is nothing but the 
idea of “irony.” (38) 
To explain “Romantic irony,” Hashikawa employs G. W. F. Hegel’s and Carl 
Schmitt’s critical accounts of German Romanticism. Put simply, their understanding 
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of Romantic irony is that it relativizes and annihilates every substantial matter such as 
truth and morality into mere artistic semblance, while preserving absoluteness for the 
ironizing I.25 In Introductory Lectures on Aesthetic, Hegel relentlessly criticized 
Friedrich Schlegel for his empty “self-conceit” (Eitelkeit) that is futile, arbitrary and 
morally irresponsible. Likewise, Schmitt’s Political Romanticism rejected political 
philosophy of Romanticism in Schlegel, Adam Müller, and others. “He [a romantic] 
ironically avoids,” Schmitt says, “the constraints of objectivity and guards himself 
against becoming committed to anything. The reservation of all infinite possibilities 
lies in irony.”26 He famously describes the metaphysical and rhetorical structure of 
romantic thinking as subjectified “occasionalism,” which had two consequences.27 
First, it led to a tendency for “conflation of concepts” and “suspension of antithesis by 
a higher third.” Second, the greatest events, like a war or a revolution, were made into 
a mere “occasion” for aesthetic poeticizing for the Romantics. “Political activity,” 
Schmitt claims, “is not possible in this way. But criticism is, which can discuss 
everything and inflate ideologically, revolution as well as restoration, war and peace, 
nationalism and internationalism, imperialism and its renunciation.”28 Political 
Romanticism, therefore, would cause passivity and lack of commitment. While such 
an interpretation of Romanticism is certainly debatable, Schmitt betrays that his own 
                                                 
25 See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetic, trans. Bernard Bosanquet 
and ed. Michael Inwood (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 69-75. The negativity of irony on the one 
hand, ends up with “the futility of all that is matter of fact, or moral and of substantive import in itself; 
the nothingness of all that is objective, and that has essential and actual value” (72); and on the other, it 
leads to “a craving for the solid and substantial, for determinate and essential interests” (ibid.), which 
constitutes “the source of morbid saintliness and yearning” (73). This traditional view presupposes that 
the Romantics were dependent upon Fichte’s transcendental philosophy of the self-creating and self-
annihilating I.  
26 Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism, trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986), 
73. 
27 Occasionalism is a notion used by the philosophers in the seventeenth to eighteenth century such as 
Nicolas Malebranche who explained the opposition and interaction between the Cartesian substances, 
i.e., res cogitans and res extensa, as a mere occasio of a higher cause that is God. See Schmitt, ibid., 78-
108. 
28 Ibid., 159. 
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stakes are involved here.29 That is, Schmitt warned against Romanticism so 
vehemently, because it would undermine his own standpoint of “decisionism.” In fact, 
what he described as “suspension of antithesis” and “conflation of concepts” evades 
stark binary oppositions required for distinguishing friend and enemy, a distinction 
that Schmitt claims constitutes “the political.”30 In this regard, the recent studies of 
early German Romanticism have revealed its remarkable resemblance with 
contemporary perspectives such as deconstruction. 
Hashikawa obviously had a critical intent in deploying these refutations of 
Romanticism. Especially, Schmitt’s account of occasionalism, Hashikawa thought, 
explains equivocity of Yasuda’s politics well. Yet, his mode of “criticism” was 
somewhat different from the sweeping, even prosecutorial denunciations. In fact, his 
attitude is deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, he admits that in a desperate situation 
like the so-called Fifteen-Year War, there were few other political alternatives than 
aesthetic resistance. On the other, however, he claims Yasuda’s aestheticization of 
decadence, catastrophe and death into the wartime period attracted his generation the 
most and therefore was one of the most effective ideologies in mobilizing the youth.  
While Hashikawa’s interpretation, which captures well the complexity of 
Yasuda’s thought, set the horizon for later interpretations, the profound elusiveness 
and equivocity of his literary politics has invited various attempts at explicating it. In 
particular, since the 1980s in which Yasuda passed away and his Collected Works 
                                                 
29 Intellectual historian Frederick Beiser criticizes such an interpretation. “Schmitt holds, for example, 
that aestheticism is definitive of the romantic attitude. Yet it characterizes only the initial stages of the 
romantic movement; after 1799 the leading romantics abandoned their aestheticism in favor of religion. 
Schmitt also presupposes that the romantics’ aestheticism was apolitical, as if it were entirely 
unmotivated by social and political concerns. A more careful examination of their early writings reveals, 
however, that their aesthetics was primarily dictated by their social and political objectives.” Beiser 
further suggests that “such an enterprise reveals his [Schmitt’s] implicit belief that it is a political 
threat.” See Frederick Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern 
German Political Thought, 1790-1800 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
225.  
30 See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 26.  
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were published, it can be said that Yasuda Yojūrō has been rehabilitated. His writings 
were in a sense rediscovered as having anticipated “postmodernism” rather than 
simple anti-modernism. It is also important to note that this revival coincided with 
Japan’s mainstream society becoming increasingly conservative. At the same time, 
however, Yasuda studies have inevitably brought about a number of polemics, because 
the topic often remained centered on the question of his involvement in the wartime 
regime, as well as his war guilt. In addition, there was a new development that Yasuda 
studies and debates have become internationalized. Needless to say, such crude 
classification ignores the different nuances of diverse existing studies.   
On the one hand, some commentators continue Hashikawa’s critical 
assessment. They examine Japanese Romanticism’s implication with cultural 
nationalism and even with fascism, pointing out that the ideology of aesthetic 
authenticity promoted the wartime regime. Scholars in the United States such as Kevin 
Doak and Alan Tansman, for instance, represent this trend. Rather than just dismissing 
Yasuda as a reactionary ideology, they stress that Yasuda’s apparent reaction to 
modernity is itself a modern phenomenon or modernist attitude. Yet, even as they 
criticize the Japanese Romantics, they still presuppose a simplistic schema that as a 
conflict between universal modernity and particular cultures, which virtually coincides 
with that of the “West” and the rest (or Japan). This binary opposition derives in part 
from a rather traditional view of Romanticism in general. I will thematically examine 
their interpretations shortly.  
In contrast to these more or less critical interpretations of Yasuda’s politics, 
other scholars argue that Yasuda was an aesthetician immersed in Japan’s cultural 
traditions and therefore was essentially anti-political. Moreover, the claim is that his 
Romantic irony should be regarded as a rhetorical resistance that nullifies the 
dominant discourse at the time. For instance, in Yasuda Yojūrō, written in memoriam 
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of Yasuda’s death in 1981, literary critic Oketani Hideaki provides an immanent and 
nuanced reading of his texts in a chronological order.  He rejects unfair readings and 
crude denunciations of Yasuda’s literature, pointing out that Yasuda’s seemingly 
fanatic statements were actually directed against the wartime ideology of the “national 
policies” (kokusaku), including both “Japanism” and the logic of the “Civilization and 
Enlightenment.” In addition, he makes an important point about Yasuda’s irony. By 
paying close attention to Yasuda’s own context and his take on the Japanese literary 
tradition, he argues that it is not entirely reducible to the Romantic irony of Friedrich 
Schlegel. Oketani later specifies one significant source of Yasuda’s irony in the 
Tokugawa nativist Fujitani Mitsue (1768-1823)’s notion of “tōgo” (indirect, reversed 
way of saying) as opposed to chokugen (direct language).31 By the same token, 
conservative critic Fukuda Kazuya in Nippon no kakyō (Japan’s homeland) launches a 
polemic against existing interpretations as represented by Hashikawa’s. Fukuda 
                                                 
31 He quotes Fujitani’s 1808 text, Kojiki tomoshibi ōmune [The principles of illuminating the Kojiki]: 
“Within the minds of human beings, there is that which cannot be interrogated. Therefore, since one 
cannot use direct language to reach that part, in our great country we make use of a miraculous method. 
When one uses tōgo, the kami are there….Thus, tōgo is the border between speaking and not speaking. 
The essence of tōgo is when one wants to say what one thinks, but instead says what one does not 
think.” (Translation borrowed from Susan L. Burns, Before the Nation: Kokugaku and the Imagining of 
the Community in Early Modern Japan [Durham: Duke University Press, 2003], 138.) See Oketani 
Hideaki, Shōwa seishin shi [A spiritual history of Shōwa] (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū, 1992), 197. However, 
even if Oketani’s point is taken, it would go too far to eliminate German Romanticism’s influence on 
Yasuda. For Fujitani’s tōgo, see Sakabe Megumi, “Kotodama—Fujitani Mitsue no kotodama ron 
ichimen” [Spirit of words—one aspect of Fujitani Mitsue’s theory of spirit of words] in Kamen no 
kaishakugaku [Hermeneutics of persona] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976), 211-39. Pointing 
out has the word tōgo has two senses of “hiyu” (metaphor) and “soto ni sorasu” (turning away to the 
outside), Sakabe compares these with “metonymy” and “metaphor” in Roman Jacobson’s sense. One 
might be tempted to compare it with “trope” as “turning away” that Paul de Man discussed in his essay 
on Friedrich Schlegel. If this is the case, Yasuda and Schlegel would come closer to each other through 
Fujitani. For more on Fujitani, see Naoki Sakai, ““Jō” to “kanshō”—seiai no jōcho to kyōkan to shutai 
teki gijutsu wo megutte” [“Feeling” and “sentiment”—concerning the emotion and sympathy of 
sexuality, and subjective technology] in Jendaa no nihonshi [Japanese history of gender], ed. Wakita 
Haruko and Susan Hanley (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), 137-77. Sakai argues that 
Fujitani’s poetics discloses the essentially “transvestite” nature of gender-role playing, as well as the 
“feeling” as the site for social encounter and antagonism. He also suggests that in Fujitani, the 
“feeling,” is only negatively presentable through tōgo, because it is different from “sentiments” which 
can be represented within the dominant ideology. If Yasuda Yojūrō relied upon Fujitani’s theory of 
tōgo, it is no wonder that Yasuda created a transvestite imperialism, as it were, through a female figure 
named Kawahara Misako. See my concluding argument of this chapter. 
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vehemently contests his presupposition that suggests that Yasuda was a former leftist 
and even converted from the movement.32 This legend, he insists, is not only factually 
ungrounded, but this sort of reading is theoretically problematic because it reduces 
literature into a political ideology. Instead, he argues that Yasuda should be taken as a 
modernist writer who pursued purely artistic significations that are independent of the 
referential reality. Moreover, Yasuda’s nationalism, he claims, was a necessary 
consequence of his modernism. As I will show later, it is interesting to see that both 
Fukuda and Tansman pay close attention to the dimension of Yasuda’s language while 
at the same time providing diametrically opposite evaluations of his politics.    
Thus, these polemics revolved around whether one should evaluate Yasuda’s 
politics, and Romantic irony in particular, positively or negatively, and whether or not 
Yasuda’s irony derives directly and singularly from, and therefore reducible to, 
German Romanticism. This, however, begs another question of how to understand 
German Romanticism itself, and, as I show later, one of the biggest shortcomings of 
the existing studies is that they are severed from the recent developments in the field 
of German Romanticism. 
Despite the seemingly antagonistic oppositions, however, these interpretations 
on Yasuda and Japanese Romantics do share some basic presuppositions: first, their 
movement pursued aesthetic politics; second, its ideology represented anti-
civilizational, ethnic nationalism (as opposed to state nationalism and imperialism); 
and third, its politicality is concentrated in the use of Romantic irony.  
I agree that Romantic irony is central in Yasuda’s aesthetic politics. Moreover, 
I do agree that he was a nationalist. But the crucial question is what kind of nationalist 
he was. I argue that he was an imperial nationalist, as opposed to ethnic nationalist, 
who appealed to a universal “world history.” Surprisingly enough, the developments 
                                                 
32 See Fukuda Kazuya, Nippon no kakyō [Japan’s homeland] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1993), 115-120. 
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of Japanese empire in East Asia, for Yasuda, marked a turning point in “world 
history” that is comparable to the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution. 
Because of the dominant interpretation, this fact has been either consistently 
overlooked or taken as a mere demagogy. To be sure, Yasuda’s involvement in 
wartime Japanese discourse in a broad sense has been the very question that has been 
disputed. But the approach taken was to exclusively ask whether or not, and to what 
extent, he supported, justified and promoted Japan’s war efforts. In other words, the 
“war of invasion” was made to serve for shorthand for “imperialism.” However, this 
perspective tended to identify imperialism with its extreme and final manifestations, 
running the risk of minimizing the question of the colonial rule by Japanese empire. 
This means a paradox of forgetting empire through discussing the wartime regime. 
The fact was, however, that Yasuda legitimized Japan’s colonialism in Korea by the 
notion of world history. 
Here, too, Hashikawa Bunzō is a case in point. 33 He does address the fact that 
Yasuda was involved in Japanese colonialism in Korea. He mentions that Yasuda in 
his 1938 travelogues on colonial Korea celebrated the so-called Japanist activists and 
intellectuals there who actively collaborated with Japanese colonial policy of “naisen 
ittai” (Japan and Korea as a single body). Hashikawa criticizes Yasuda saying,  
The existence of these facts [Korean collaboration with naisen ittai] he 
described here cannot be denied. Still, Yasuda does not feel it necessary at all 
to take into account the fact that there were hidden cases to the contrary…It 
would be undeniable that he was completely impotent in grasping not only the 
historical image of war since the “China Incident,” but the emergent reality of 
the national resistance (minzoku kōsō).” (175-6) 
                                                 
33 Kawamura Minato addresses the general question of Yasuda’s encounter with Asia and its possible 
influence on him (i.e., Yasuda’s so-called Asianism in the postwar). While he rightly recognizes that the 
discourse of world history was central to Yasuda’s narrative, he tends to read Yasuda’s postwar 
“Asiatic” “pacifism” into his prewar writing. Moreover, Kawamura does not examine Yasuda’s actual 
meeting with the Korean intellectuals and its political implications. This is very unfortunate because 
Kawamura is one of the leading scholars who problematized pre-war Japanese writers’ involvement 
with Japanese imperialism in Asia. See Kawamura Minato, “Yasuda Yojūrō no bōrei” [The specter of 
Yasuda Yojūrō] in Gunzō (March 1996), 162-182. 
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Hashikawa also detects “sacred shamelessness” and “terrible nationalistic indulgence 
(minzoku shugi teki tandeki)” (67). By the same token, Hashikawa refers to the famous 
case of Yi Kwangsu who converted to Japanism, and describes his essay on his 
experience of conversion, entitled “Gyōja” (ascetic devotee), as a “terribly ugly theory 
of conversion.” (83) “It brings home to me,” he continues, “that the problem of 
colonial imperialism in its most existential form concerns beauty and ugliness of the 
human soul.” (83) In this way, Hashikawa denounces Yasuda, as well as the pro-
Japanese collaborators like Yi, basically from moralistic reasons. Moreover, he takes 
for granted the framework of ethnic nationalism (minzoku shugi) on both sides of the 
colonizer and the colonized here. By appealing to the anti-colonial “national 
resistance,” he seems to avoid fully analyzing how and why Japanese colonial policy 
could have attracted and mobilized the colonial subjects. Above all else, Hashikawa 
misrecognizes Yasuda as ethnic nationalist, which is not the case at all, as I will show 
in the following chapters.  
 In this way, the issue of Yasuda’s “colonial imperialism” formed a blind spot, 
which has been a predominant tradition in the studies of Yasuda Yojūrō in the postwar. 
I would like to claim, however, that it is necessary to take Schmitt’s remark seriously. 
Let me quote his statement again:  
Political activity is not possible in this way. But criticism is, which can discuss 
everything and inflate ideologically, revolution as well as restoration, war and 
peace, nationalism and internationalism, imperialism and its renunciation. 
 
What is especially suggestive in our context is that Schmitt clearly admits that political 
Romanticism can be imperialist. To be sure, his point is that, once political Romantics 
advocate imperialism, it would immediately be canceled out by its renunciation. 
However, what if a denial or even critique of imperialism can be most effectively 
imperialist or constitutive part of imperialism? What if this oscillation derives from 
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the equivocity of irony? And what if this imperialism was not so much a mere 
outcome and contingent ideological content of subjectified “occasionalism” as was 
necessitated by constantly relativizing movement of irony?  
In the following I will articulate my critical stakes vis-à-vis the existing studies 
in the form of a commentaries on Kevin Michael Doak’s Dreams of Difference and 
Alan Tansman’s essay “The Beauty of Violence: Yasuda Yojūrō’s “Japanese Bridges” 
included in his Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism. These works can be regarded as 
representative studies on the Japanese Romantics and Yasuda Yojūrō in English 
literature. If my treatment seems rather critical, it is solely due to the polemical nature 
of the subject. 
 
Equivocity of Difference: Kevin Michael Doak’s Interpretation of Yasuda Yojūrō 
A good example for the elusive nature of Yasuda’s writing and the difficulty in 
pinning it down is provided by Kevin Michael Doak’s Dreams of Difference, one of 
the most comprehensive studies on the Japanese Romantics in both English and 
Japanese literature. Doak describes the Romantic movement as a critical response to 
Japanese modernity since the Meiji Restoration. His basic thesis is that Japanese 
Romantics and Yasuda in particular pursued cultural identity of Japan and 
“difference” from the homogenizing power of modernity that is represented by the 
“West.”34 He, too, subscribes to the notion that Yasuda advocated “ethnic 
nationalism” (minzoku shugi) as opposed to “official state nationalism” (kokka 
shugi).35  
                                                 
34 Kevin Michael Doak, Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity 
(Los Angeles and Berkley: University of California Press, 1994). 
35 For a thorough criticism of Doak’s notion of prewar Japan as ethnic nationalism, see Naoki Sakai, 
“Imperial Nationalism and the Comparative Perspective” in positions: east asia cultures critique (17:1), 
181-94. 
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Perhaps because of the nature of the topic, the story he narrates on the Japanese 
Romantics and Yasuda Yojūrō is often quite equivocal and even contradictory, though 
comprehensive and informative. What Doak means by “difference,” however, is not 
self-evident. He does not say that the writers were cultural essentialists. “The Japanese 
romantics,” Doak says, “made clear… the artificial nature of “ethnicity” or “culture” 
in modern Japan and, hence, the need to consciously produce within the context of the 
modern world what will appear as native, traditional, and pure.” 36 In addition, he 
points out that, “as inhabitants of a modern world, they had much more in common 
with their contemporaries in Europe and America than with their own premodern 
ancestors.”37 Such a split situation would be prone to an ironic consciousness. Doak 
describes Yasuda’s take on Romantic irony as follows:  
In a definite move, Yasuda ultimately sought to displace irony from the 
German romantics and their search for cultural relativity in Europe to a nativist 
context that questioned the applicability of European norms of social 
organization to Japan. (4) 
 
This remark is deeply equivocal, because it remains unclear whether or not Yasuda 
applied Romantic irony as a foreign concept to the native context, and therefore 
rejected the nativist premise. Or, on the contrary, is he saying that Yasuda tried and 
even managed to assimilate irony into a native principle? In any case, it is not so 
obvious if Yasuda himself was making such a distinction between native vs. foreign. If 
the “pure poet” Hölderlin suffered from schizophrenia, Yasuda argued, it was because 
he could not bear “the disintegration that arises from within the absolute.” (quoted in 
Doak, 4)38 Here, Yasuda clearly recognized that “irony” as the consciousness of this 
                                                 
36 Doak, Dreams of Difference, xviii. 
37 Ibid., xix. 
38 In terms of German Romanticism, Doak mentions a post-structuralist analysis in Philip Lacoue-
Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s Literary Absolute, but he makes a serious misunderstanding. Quoting 
them, Doak says: “Indeed, the focus on the self, its certainty and effects, is a central theme in 
Romanticism and has been traced to the German romantics’ attempt to rethink Descartes’s legacy to 
Western thought that “it is in reconstructing the world… that the subject constitutes itself as subject.”” 
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disintegration is constitutive of “modernity” per se. Doak fails to provide any adequate 
evidence that Yasuda felt the need to distinguish Europe and Japan in this regard. In 
fact, Yasuda wrote numerous pieces on themes in European literature and cultural 
history, such as Hölderlin, Napoleon, and Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther. In 
these essays, Yasuda himself does not especially stick to the dichotomy between 
Europe and Japan nor try to differentiate Japan from the so-called “West,” as I show in 
the following chapters. If this is the case, he was fully aware and acknowledged that 
the fate of European modernity as he described it is his own. It would then become all 
the more difficult to claim that Yasuda’s project lay in creating “difference.”  
In the meantime, Doak argues that Yasuda moved to pursue “universality” in 
the late 1930s. Specifically, Doak points out that Yasuda regarded the Hakuhō-Tenpyō 
period (645-794) as a “cosmopolitan” (sekai teki) era. I also agree that Yasuda was 
concerned about “universality,” but it is misleading to say that Yasuda looked for 
universality only in Japanese tradition, and that he turned to the tradition because he 
had “elucidated the failure of Napoleon to resurrect a concept of universality that 
would undergird differences among various cultures in modernity.”(9) Yet, one has to 
take seriously the fact that Yasuda felt sympathy with the Napoleon’s tragic and 
unsuccessful attempt at empire-building. It would make more sense to understand that 
                                                                                                                                            
(Doak, Dreams of Difference, xxxiii) It is true that the romantics tried to “rethink” the Cartesian legacy. 
But what does it mean? In this context, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy are emphasizing  how different the 
romantic subject is from the Cartesian subject that would be transparent to itself.  According to them, 
the romantic subject, in reconstructing the world “from a primitive chaos,” produces a work out of it—
namely, “fragments”—thereby forming itself as an artistic creator. “This creator, however,” they 
continue, “is not the subject of a cogito, either in the sense of immediate self-knowledge or in that of the 
positing of a substance of the subject.” (Philip Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, Literary Absolute, 
trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester [Albany: SUNY Press, 1988], 52) A few lines later, Doak 
reveals his complete misunderstanding. Quoting another scholar, he continues as follows: “The 
romantics saw identity not as the product of a system of signification in which the subject is always 
decentered but as the moment when “the subject appears fully present to itself in a signified without a 
signifier, a represented without means of representation” [quoted from Anthony Easthope, Poetry as 
Discourse].” Apparently, Doak cites these different authors without understanding that they are making 
the very opposite arguments. This would suggest, at the very least, that Doak’s notion of German 
Romanticism is rather confused and problematic. 
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Yasuda is performatively suggesting that the contemporary Japan should not only 
learn the lesson, but assume the mission. In fact, as I show later, Yasuda at the time of 
the Sino-Japanese War believed that Japanese empire represented a “world historical” 
universality.  
Because Doak does not take the context of Yasuda’s imperialism into 
consideration, he makes rather tenuous interpretations. He claims that Yasuda made 
another turn from this universal Japan, quoting Yasuda’s abstruse passage written in 
1940: “The Basis of the Japan Romantic School has become a realism called Japan as 
irony, or the irony of a free Japan that has simultaneously maintained destruction and 
construction.” (quoted in Doak, 19) He maintains that Yasuda came to speak of “Japan 
as irony,” because he failed to “articulate a coherent basis for a universal value in 
Japanese traditions.” (14) While there are some commentators who point to a certain 
change in Yasuda, associating it with his experience in the Chinese Continent in 1938, 
his interpretation is not very convincing. He discusses Yasuda’s essay on Sorrows of 
Young Werther  as a key text for Yasuda’s turn, but the text hardly provides an 
evidence for it, because there Yasuda just describes the conflict between romantic love 
and the institution of marriage in the novel as “shameful contradictions” (quoted in 
Doak, 16) of modernity itself. This is none other than a continuation of the same 
argument in his early essays. Apart from whether or not there was certain change in 
Yasuda, it is important to understand that universal Japan for Yasuda could be, and 
was, “Japan as irony” simultaneously. As literary critic Oketani Hideaki suggests, 
Yasuda from early on recognized that there is a constitutive gap between the ideal and 
the real, the universal and the particular, in a state system.39 The ideal universality of a 
                                                 
39 Oketani argues that this “realism called Japan as irony” does not represent change in Yasuda’s 
thought, by convincingly tracing his conception of irony as a gap between the ideal and the real to one 
of his earliest essays on the establishment of the ancient state and kotodama (spirit of words) in 1930: 
Yasuda Yojūrō, “”Kōkyo kōrai no uta” ni okeru kotodama ni tsuite no kōsatsu: jōdai kokka seiritsu nit 
suite no autorain” [An observation on the spirits of words in “Poem wishing Godspeed to the 
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state is always ironic in relation to its infrastructure. While he thus incorporated the 
materialist view of history in his theory of irony, he did not reject the dimension of the 
ideal—as expressed in the idea of kotodama—as mere ideology. Hence, even if he 
                                                                                                                                            
Ambassador to China” by Yamanoue Okura: an outline for the establishment of the ancient state] in 
Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 40 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1989), 62-72;  originally published for the May 1930 
issue of Shisō under the name of Yuhara Fuyumi. In this essay, Yasuda employs the materialist view of 
history, developed by Engels’ The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State, to discusses 
Yamanoue Okura’s notion of kotodama in his famous “Poem wishing Godspeed to the Ambassador to 
China” included in Man’yōshū, Book five, 894. Here is the poem: “It has been recounted/ down through 
time/ since the age of the gods:/ that this land of Yamato/ is a land of imperial deities’/ stern majesty,/ a 
land blessed by the spirit of words./ Every man of the present/ sees it before his eyes/ and knows it to be 
true.” (The Ten Thousand Leaves, vol. 1, trans. Ian Hideo Levy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981], 390.) Yasuda says that kotodama is a “mysterious faith” in the “absolute will” as a productive 
power, which the “emperor” represents on the earth. He locates this notion in the historical context of 
the Hakuhō-Tenpyō period (645-794). He interprets it as reflecting the establishment of the state power 
and the “notion of sacred emperor” (teiō shinsei kannen). In the meantime, since the state power was 
established on the basis of class division, Yasuda argues that “class struggle” was intensified at the 
Tenpyō era and expressed in the form of “Romantic revolt” (roman teki hankō). Interestingly, Okura is 
also known for his “Dialog of the Destitute” (bingu [or hinkyū] mondō ka). That is to say, the same poet 
celebrated Yamato as “the land of imperial deities’ stern majesty,” while pointing to its contradictions. 
Yasuda holds “Man’yo, they say, is a collection of voices that mourn the disappearing kotodama.” 
While Yasuda obviously presupposes the Marxist theory, what gives a twist to his reading is his 
understanding of the relationship between the infrastructure and the ideological dimension. Oketani 
claims that Yasuda understands Okura’s ambivalence through Fujitani Mitsue’s hermeneutics of tōgo. 
In other words, Oketani’s interpretation suggests that for Yasuda, Yamato as “the land of imperial 
deities’ stern majesty” implies a certain irony, which anticipates later “Japan as irony.” See Oketani 
Hideaki, Shōwa seishin shi, 190-223.  What is equally interesting from our perspective is the fact that 
Yasuda was concerned about this poet Okura rather than others. Okura’s life was deeply involved in the 
international context of the ancient East Asia: his poem on kotodama, dedicated to the ambassador to 
Tang China, contrasts Yamato and Tang; he himself had been delegated there as a diplomat from 702 
until 707; in fact, his poems show his familiarity with Chinese texts including Buddhism and 
Confucianism; moreover, in the postwar, scholars such as Nakanishi Susumu advocated a theory that 
Okura was a native Korean whose family exiled from Baekche to Yamato when the country was ruined 
by Tang and Shilla. See Nakanishi Susumu, “Sōkoku to meimō—Yamanoue no Okura wo megutte” 
[Conflicts and vacillations—concerning Yamanoue no Okura] in Nakanishi Susumu Man’yō ronshū, 
vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1996), 439-455; for a summary of the subsequent debate, especially about 
Okura’s reception of Buddhism, as well as an examination of existing translations of Man’yōshū, see 
Roy Andrew Miller, “Yamanoue Okura, A Korean Poet in Eighth Century Japan,” in Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, vol. 104, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1984), 703-726. Nakanishi argues that what is 
characteristic about Okura’s poetics lied in vacillation (yure) between two conflicting theses, such as 
Buddhism as the universal principle for salvation and the pains and sorrows of human reality. However, 
these theses, Nakanishi claims, remained a mere juxtaposition (taichi) because they were not 
“dialectically” elevated to “antitheses.” Although Nakanishi does not spell it out, this interpretation 
seems to be closely related to the irony that it was this native Korean who spoke of kotodama. 
Interestingly enough, one of the scholars who immediately supported Nakanishi’s theory of Okura as a 
native Korean was Takagi Ichinosuke, who, as a professor of the Keijō Imperial University, had hosted 
Yasuda Yojūrō in Keijō in 1938. In any event, judging from Yasuda’s other essays on Korea, it is 
almost certain that when he discussed Okura in this early essay, Yasuda had a view that the ancient state 
was a multiethnic empire just like the contemporary Japan.  
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speaks of “realism,” it does not contradict his notion of irony, as Doak says. Nor does 
it immediately mean that he abandoned universalism. Due to the lack in this 
understanding, Doak criticizes Yasuda’s “change” in the following way:  
Far from imagining a principle of difference that could distinguish Japan from 
the modern, Western nations, what he finally achieved was a form of 
intellectual stagnation that greatly resembled more familiar Western notions of 
nationalism. (20)  
 
Although it is quite dubious to suggest that Yasuda tried to distinguish Japan from the 
“West” in this way, it is true that Yasuda was a nationalist. The crucial question here, 
however, is what type of nationalism he advocated. Although Doak writes as if 
Yasuda turned from universalism to ethnic nationalism, Yasuda, I argue, remained 
committed to imperial nationalism based on universal world history.  
 Thus, it turns out that, in spite of his intention, Doak is unable to show 
“difference,” constantly cancelling out what he is saying. He oscillates between 
attributing cultural difference to Yasuda and admitting homogeneity with the “West.” 
Doak seems to be trapped by the ironic gaps between Japan vs. West, universal vs. 
particular, difference vs. identity. As Yasuda was fully aware, these gaps are far from 
simple dichotomies, but ambiguous relationships. While Doak’s oscillation surely 
reflects such ambiguity itself, one might be tempted to say that it also derives from 
projection of Doak’s own “dreams of difference” and its frustration.  
 
Yasuda Yojūrō’s “Japanese Bridges” and the Politics of Literature: A Critical 
Commentary on Alan Tansman’s Reading 
A translator of Yasuda’s masterpiece, “Japanese Bridges,” Alan Tansman provides a 
close reading of this seemingly apolitical text as a “fascist aesthetic.” I will 
extensively comment on this piece, not only because his dense essay is one of the most 
recent monographs on Yasuda, but because it displays in a very paradigmatic manner 
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nearly all the issues I would like to address. The points I am going to make here will 
form a basis for my reading of Yasuda’s writings in the next chapters. 
Like previous commentators, Alan Tansman, too, discusses Yasuda in terms of 
aesthetic politics that pursued cultural authenticity in face of malaise of modernity. 
But what is it that makes his politics a specifically fascist aesthetics?   
Yasuda thereby offered a cure to individuals exhausted by the wounds of 
modernity (ironically through the piercing of his poetic arrow)—by the loss of 
cultural identity; alienation from native traditions; and feelings of 
inauthenticity, isolation, and loneliness. If fascism attempted to resolve these 
conditions through a politics of action, it is appropriate to use the term fascist 
in describing Yasuda. Fascism was Yasuda’s “bridge,” so to speak, between 
politics and aesthetics. Yasuda evoked fascist moments that transcended reason 
and made sacrifice of individuality to a higher cause seem attractive. 40 
 
Even though Yasuda did not recommend direct action, his rhetoric, Tansman 
emphasizes, not only has a radical quality that nullifies the distinction between text 
and action, aesthetics and politics, but in fact endorses “violence.” Yasuda would 
“bridge” the gap through kotodama or the magical power of words. Therefore, 
Tansman focuses on the way in which Yasuda’s rhetoric of “bridge” urges, 
interpellates and even conscripts the reader into violence. Tansman critically analyzes 
Yasuda’s etymological word play that lies at the heart of his essay on “Japanese 
bridges.”  
Before discussing Tansman’s criticism, I would like to take a brief look at how 
Yasuda interprets the etymology and mythology of Japanese bridges. The Japanese 
term for “bridge,” hashi, has many homonyms. For instance, “bridge,” “chopstick,” 
and “ladder” are all hashi. There was a long-standing debate about its etymology, 
Yasuda says, over whether it originally meant “end” (or “margin”) of things or the 
                                                 
40 Alan Tansman, “The Beauty of Violence: Yasuda Yojūrō’s ‘Japanese Bridges,’” in Aesthetics of 
Japanese Fascism (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2009), 53. Hereafter 
references are cited by page number in the text. 
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“boats used as intermediaries.” But that such overlapping of meanings in one name 
was no wonder, Yasuda states. 
[I]t makes good sense to understand hashi as that which connects two things, 
allowing movement back and forth across a flat surface and also movement up 
and down. Moreover, it is not at all odd to think that the people of old 
abstracted these means of movement back and forth and that for them hashi, 
which were facilitators of movement, were at the same time at the ends of 
things.41 
 
Yasuda further points to an important phenomenon in Japanese cultural history, that is, 
ama no hashidate or the Floating Bridge of Heaven. Significantly, he quotes Motoori 
Norinaga here: “In the age of the gods, there were bridges everywhere climbing to and 
descending from heaven.” Thus, hashi in such polysemy implies a movement of both 
“crossing and flying.” “[T]he end of things immediately meant flight,” which attests to 
kotodama or “the magical power of words.”42  
                                                 
41 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Japanese Bridges,” trans. Alan Tansman, Journal of Japanese Studies (34:2, 2008), 
265.  The first version of the essay was written in 1936. Tansman’s translation is based on the second 














Yasuda Yojūrō, “Nihon no hashi,” in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), 164-5. 
42 Such etymological thinking does not seem to be unique to “Japanese cultural tradition.” One might be 
tempted to associate Yasuda’s essay with Heidegger’s reflection on “bridge.” In “Building Dwelling 
Thinking,” Heidegger talks about the bridge: “To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it 
gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location 
(Ort) can make space for a site....A space is something that has been made room for, something that is 
cleared and free, namely within a boundary (Grenze), Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which 
something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its 
presencing (Wesen).” (Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” trans. Albert Hofstadter, in 
Poetry, Language, Thought [New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975], 154.) In this way, one can 
draw several important connections between them: both Yasuda and Heidegger derive their insight into 
the bridge from a reflection of language; describe the bridge as a place that allows the humans and gods, 
the earth and the heaven to gather; and understand that the essence or identity of things manifests itself 
at this marginal, liminal and peripheral place of boundary. Interestingly enough, postcolonial theorist 
Homi Bhabha begins his Location of Culture with this very epigraph from Heidegger. That is to say, his 
postcolonial thinking of hybridity and heterogeneity was inspired by Heidegger’s notion of “boundary” 
as “that from which something begins its presencing.” See Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004 [1994]), 1, 7. In this way, hashi would serve as a figure for 
ambiguity inherent in any form of identity. At the same time, however, what Yasuda’s prewar writings 
show is that such a sense of heterogeneity inscribed in the trope of hashi constituted very subjective 
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Tansman critically examines this mythological reflection. Tansman describes 
Yasuda’s operation as emphasizing the “orality” of hashi, making his prose into 
hypnotic incantation, and invalidating the distinctions of meanings. It is precisely here 
that he detects what he calls a “fascist moment.” Moreover, it even ignores the 
historical difference of the referents designated by the word. 
This one sound, hashi, connotes and contains all Japanese tradition. Hashi no 
longer denotes a specific meaning but functions as a sound, whose pulse 
revives the power of kotodama. Hashi as it appeared in the love poetry of the 
Heian court becomes coeval with the hashi of Kamakura warfare or the hashi 
of Edo love suicides. Hashi disrupts history and yokes it to a timeless musical 
moment—a fascist moment. (66) 
 
In short, Tansman regards Yasuda’s rhetoric as “violent,” because the “musical” 
quality of his prose paralyzes rational thinking by undermining the semantic and 
historical differences.  
Based on this reading, Tansman characterizes Yasuda’s writing as a whole in 
terms of hashi. “Bridges, in their capacity to embody contradictions, possess for 
Yasuda the qualities of literature itself.” (71) Literature as a bridge, or better yet, 
bridges as literature—this happy trope of a trope would be true for almost any 
literature deserving its name. But Tansman says this from a critical reason. He 
continues: “Stationary structures that allow movement, in Yasuda’s imagination they 
“fly” and “float.” They are at once stationary and kinetic, permitting movement but 
leading nowhere, reaching into prehistory but also leading to a limitless future.” (71) 
He further paraphrases this “nowhere” as “[n]owhere of violence.” (88) Thus, in the 
final analysis, Tansman thinks of Yasuda’s “bridge-literature” negatively for the 
reason that it urges “violence.”  
                                                                                                                                            
formations of Japanese empire. Therefore, my essay sees in this internally contested nature of the 
subjective formations more of a trope for imperial identity than postcolonial potentials. 
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Unfortunately, however, his arguments are not very convincing for a number 
of reasons. First, his criticism seems to miss what is at stake in Yasuda’s literary 
writing. I would argue that Yasuda’s rhetoric of hashi is not so much concerned about 
musicality per se as textuality. Second, his conception of “fascism” is rather vague in 
the first place. If one follows his definition of “fascist moment,” i.e., the rhetoric 
nullifying specific differences, rational and real, of meanings and referents, any poetic 
or “musical” language would be “fascistic.” This would not tell much about what 
makes Yasuda’s politics specifically “violent,” or even “fascistic.” To be sure, 
Tansman makes a series of distinctions such as rational vs. emotional, and so on, in 
order to characterize the so-called “fascist moments,” but these binary oppositions 
seem to derive from quite simplistic and old-fashioned conceptions of Romanticism. 
Third, these issues both cause and are caused by his misreading of Yasuda’s texts. 
What is especially revealing is Tansman’s treatment of Yasuda’s depiction of women, 
which is one of the important characteristics of his writings. Because of his own rigid 
conception of gender, Tansman fails to grasp Yasuda’s peculiar “feminism.” At worst, 
Tansman even distorts Yasuda’s text, as I show in detail. I am not claiming that 
Yasuda was a genuine feminist, but it is important to take into account the fact that he 
was not only different from, but critical of, the dominant gender ideology. Otherwise, 
it would be impossible to appropriately comprehend the implications of his seemingly 
non-masculinist gender politics, which I claim served for the empire in a paradoxical 
way. In the following, I will discuss these problems respectively. 
 
a) Textuality of Hashi 
First of all, however irrational and forced Yasuda’s rhetoric may seem, it is far 
from mere word play based on the writer’s unbridled imagination. It is true that he 
brackets both the meanings and the referents. Yet, does that necessarily mean that he 
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intended to exclusively focus on “orality”? Is Tansman saying that when a word is 
deprived of its meaning, the only thing left is its “sound”? Here, is he not caught up in 
a simpleminded view of a word as a combination of sound and meaning? There is no 
reason, however, to ignore or eliminate the aspect of writing. In his oblivion of textual 
inscription, Tansman himself reveals a symptom of what Jacques Derrida called 
“phonocentrism.” In contrast, through a sort of literary reduction of the signified of the 
sign hashi, Yasuda actually brings attention to the aspect of signifier, or better yet, 
writing. In other words, what Tansman fails to see is that Yasuda’s writing is first and 
foremost concerned about textuality that is open to “dissemination.” 43 Specifically, 
when Yasuda talks about the etymology of hashi and enumerates its different 
meanings such as “bridge,” “end,” “boat,” “ladder,” “chopsticks,” and so forth, he is 
showing that a signifier—“hashi”— signifies not only one fixed signified, e.g., 
“bridge, but also another signified, “ladder,” for instance, and how the latter itself then 
turns into another signifier, “hashigo.” Yasuda was fully aware that this play of 
difference is ineradicable from the movement of textuality. This move on the part of 
Yasuda is in complete agreement with German Romanticism, which, as the recent 
studies show, discovered or indented the modern notion of “literature” and literary 
texts. In the next chapter, I will show how Yasuda developed his notion of textuality 
and Romantic irony through his reading of Friedrich Hölderlin and Friedrich Schlegel 
in particular. 
In the third chapter, however, I will argue that Yasuda Yojūrō was actively 
involved in Japanese empire through his notion of “world history” and Romantic irony. 
                                                 
43 See Derrida’s locus classicus: “Yet if reading must not be content with doubling the text, it cannot 
legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is 
metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text whose content 
could take place, could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give 
here to that word, outside of writing in general.…There is nothing outside of the text [there is no 
outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte].” (Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak [Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997], 158.) 
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To this end, I will evoke the figure of hashi in its polysemic moments—“bridge,” 
“ladder,” “boat,” “end”— to illuminate Yasuda’s literary imperialism. In other words, 
I will show how this multiple hashi is a suitable trope for the ironic movement that 
constitutes the imperial formation by deconstructing ethnic identities. Significantly 
enough, Tansman, too, cites Yasuda’s involvement in Japan’s expansion to Manchuria, 
and even describes it in terms of his desire for “bridge.”  
The clearing of that actual space in the expanding empire was first prepared for 
by the clearing of imaginative space. The “real bridges” of Manchuria, the 
region’s actual culture, needed to be replaced by “bridges of the 
imagination”—Japanese bridges.(100).  
 
This is an important point, and I also claim that Yasuda’s imperialism was motivated 
by the hashi trope. However, he seems to use it as a simple, external metaphor, i.e., 
“bridge,” that is meant to represent a different thing, that is, Yasuda’s imperialism. 
Instead I would like to pay attention to the polysemic and even conflictive moments 
that are gathered in the term hashi and describe the internally articulated structure and 
movement of Yasuda’s imperial project. I would also like to point out that Tansman 
still makes a rather simple-minded contrast between “imaginative” (metaphorical) and 
“real” bridges. This distinction however, becomes tenuous if one recognizes that 
Yasuda’s very enterprise was prefigured and internally determined by these multiple 
moments.  
Moreover, it is also questionable whether Yasuda’s bridge literature tried to 
replace foreign (Asian) bridges by “authentic” Japanese bridges. One important case is 
the connection between the hashi figure and the colonial relationship. That is to say, 
what is at stake is how to understand what I call Yasuda’s Romantic colonialism. 
Tansman quotes Yasuda’s passage in which he mentions his experience with a native 
Korean during his first trip to the Peninsula in 1932: “When I came to a place where 
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there was no bridge, a local person who happened to be there insisted on taking me 
across on his shoulders.”(101) Here is Tansman’s interpretation of this encounter:  
If these fascist moments were to embark Japanese on a journey to a place 
where they might feel the beauty of stillness, then the conveyance to that 
place—the bridge—would be furnished by the colonized themselves, a people 
Yasuda characterized as happily stuck before the rise and fall of modernity. 
(101)  
 
This reading does capture the moment of hashi as the intermediary, and I find 
important his point that the colonized was made to serve as such in this instance. Yet, 
in part because of his traditional notion of Romanticism, Tansman cannot fully 
recognize the complexity of this encounter. Specifically, he does not seem to be aware 
of the possibility that if a colonial figure can become a “bridge,” it inevitably 
contaminates the authenticity of “Japanese” bridges. As my reading of Yasuda’s 
journey through the Korean Peninsula will show, hashi is far from a static place of 
“timeless beauty,” but rather a heterogeneous site of intercourse and encounter in 
which the colonized “Koreans” were mobilized to the movement of the “world 
historical” empire as its subjects, which, in turn, affected and transformed the 
“Japanese” identity itself. In other words, hashi is precisely something that hybridizes 
“cultures.” 
 
b) Implications of the Recent Studies of German Romanticism  
Second, if Tansman missed Yasuda’s textual dimension, it is also caused by 
the fact that Tansman’s view of German Romanticism is based on its outdated notions 
that have been amply questioned in the recent studies. Unfortunately, this inadequacy 
in the understanding of the Romanticism notion is persistent in the studies of Japanese 
Romanticism both in Japan and the United States. Here I concentrate on Tansman, 
first, because his essay shows the problem most consistently, and, second, because his 
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interpretation of Yasuda as fascist aesthetics is largely a reworking of this traditional 
view.  
Tansman introduces a series of binary oppositions regarding Romanticism. 
“The beginnings of Romanticism in the West,” he says, “can be traced to the 
eighteenth-century German-speaking countries whose sense of cultural inferiority vis-
à-vis French military strength, social organization, and arts resulted in a period of 
cultural imitation that wounded national pride.” (55) Referring to Isaiah Berlin’s once 
influential work, he states: “By claiming that cultural values are not universal, the 
German romantics rejected the French Enlightenment assumption that all values are 
immutable and timeless, insisting instead on the uniqueness of national cultures.” 
(304) Furthermore, he brings in another dichotomy, that is, the one between the 
“West” and the “non-West”: “Japanese resentment toward the West was akin to 
German resentment toward France.” (55) He calls this relationship “Yasuda’s burned 
bridge to the West.” It is surprising that Tansman, even today, uses the term “West” in 
a totally unmarked way. That is to say, he suggests that there is such an entity, and in 
so doing reinforces the dichotomy between the “West” and the “Rest,” even as he talks 
about a cultural divide between France and Germany. When one sees such problematic 
operation repeated, one feels the strong need to reaffirm the insight that such an entity 
as the “West” is always constructed by a hierarchical and exclusionary operation.44 
Even apart from that, all this characterization clearly suggests that Japanese Romantics 
would be more inferior to, more reactionary, and more violent than its German 
counterpart.  
                                                 
44 Naoki Sakai calls this process of identification the “schema of co-figuration,” and analyzes how such 
discursive operation constructs the idea, or better yet fantasy, of the “West” by negating and reifying its 
other. See Naoki Sakai, “The Problem of “Japanese Thought”: The Formation of “Japan” and the 
Schema of Cofiguration,” in Translation and Subjectivity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997), 40-71; “Dislocation of the West and the Status of the Humanities,” in Naoki Sakai and Yukiko 
Hanawa ed. Traces vol. 1 (Ithaca: Traces Inc., 2001), 71-94. 
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In this way, Tansman reiterates the traditional paradigm that tended to describe 
German Romanticism as a reaction to modernity and the Enlightenment and as a 
yearning for the historical past of the nation. This view was based upon a series of 
binary oppositions between modernity vs. tradition, reason vs. emotion, and liberalism 
vs. communitarianism, and universalism vs. particularism, which were often made to 
overlap with the geopolitical conflict between France vs. Germany. Under this scheme, 
German Romanticism was sometimes even associated with Nazism as its precursor. 
Tansman, too, makes virtually little distinction between Romanticism and fascism. 
However, the recent developments in the field in the last thirty years have put 
into question these old-fashioned preconceptions about Frühromantik or early German 
Romantics, revealing surprisingly “modern” or even “postmodern” aspects of this 
literary movement. First and foremost, post-structualist literary theorists such as Philip 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, Paul de Man and Winfried Menninghaus argue 
that the Romantics of Jena in the 1790s created the idea of “literature” as a genre 
based on poietic self-production of subject, thereby opening up a contemporary notion 
of textuality in its temporal and fragmentary nature.45 Menninghaus even claimed that 
the Romantic theory of “absolute self-reflection” as a process of “infinite doubling” in 
signification deconstructed “metaphysics of presence,” thereby anticipating what 
Derrida called “différance.”46 Therefore, it follows that Romantic writers never reified 
cultural essence or tradition of a nation, but were fully aware that subjective identity is 
always already constructed and deconstructed in writing.  
                                                 
45 See Philip Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, trans. Philip Barnard and 
Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Winfried Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdopplung: Die 
frühromantische Grundlegung der Kunsttheorie im Begriff absoluter Selbstreflexion (infinite doubling: 
the early Romantic foundation of theory of art in the concept of absolute self-reflection) (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1987); Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 187-228 and “The Concept of Irony,” in Aesthetic 
Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 163-184.  
46 See Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdopplung, 115-131. 
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In contrast to this postmodern interpretation, German philosopher Manfred 
Frank claims that the Romantics did reject the first principle, i.e., the unconditioned 
absolute, but this anti-foundationalism did not abandon the normative idea as a goal 
for “infinite approximation.”47 Also, in terms of political philosophy, Frederick Beiser 
demonstrates how Romantic writers such as Schlegel embraced the French Revolution 
and republicanism, trying to reconcile reason, individual freedom, and progress with 
the idea of community.48 Although these scholars differ in their take or emphasis on 
literature vs. philosophy and modernity vs. postmodernity, all these discussions 
effectively undermine the above mentioned binary oppositions concerning German 
Romanticism.  
These research trends will help deconstruct the established image of Japanese 
Romanticism as reactionary, cultural particularism. The modern or postmodern nature 
of Romantic literature can be said to be condensed in the notion of “Romantic irony,” 
and it is Yasuda’s ironic writing that prevents him from being cultural essentialist or 
ethnic nationalist.  
At the same time, however, I will argue, in the next chapters, that the 
deconstructive moment in his ironic practice was the very element that led him to be 
deeply involved in Japan’s colonial empire. Moreover, I will show that, contrary to the 
traditional notion that Romanticism was steeped in the heritage of particular national 
culture, Yasuda advocated a certain kind of universalism through the idea of “world 
history.”  
In this connection, I would like to point out that there is another growing field 
in the studies of German Romanticism that addresses the Romantic conception of the 
                                                 
47 See Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth 
Millán-Zaibert (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004).  
48 See Frederick Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1992); The Romantic Imperative (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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“Orient.” Since Edward Said’s path-breaking Orientalism (1978), the representation of 
the “Orient” in the “Western” discourse has been vigorously discussed as a question of 
power and knowledge production in various fields of the humanities. But Said’s own 
treatment of German Orientalism remained minimal. “What German Oriental 
scholarship did,” Said claimed, “was to refine and elaborate techniques whose 
application was to texts, myths, ideas, and languages almost literally gathered from the 
Orient by imperial Britain and France.”49 The fact that Germany lagged behind Britain 
and France in terms of colonial enterprise makes it difficult for him to argue for the 
complicity between knowledge and power in the German case. However, scholars 
such as Nicholas Germana, Susanne Zantop, Todd Kontje and others have filled this 
gap, arguing that many German writers and thinkers since Johann Gottfried Herder 
were deeply interested in the nascent object of study called the “Orient” and tended to 
identify themselves with this “victim” of the Western European imperialism.50 In fact, 
Schlegel, a serious student of Sanskrit and the author of Über die Sprache und 
Weisheit der Inder (On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians), insisted on the 
Indian origin of the Germans. Likewise, his brother August Wilhelm Schlegel 
maintained “Germany must be considered the Orient of Europe.”51 Significantly, 
Germana describes this tendency as “self-Othering” of German Orientalism. This 
remarkable point effectively undermines the boundary between the “West” and the 
“non-West” in terms of Romanticism. What is also important in our context is that 
Friedrich Schlegel tried to ground this conviction by narrating a world history based 
on his migration theory in his Lectures on Universal History.52 To be sure, there are 
                                                 
49 Edward Said, Orientialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 19. 
50 For good surveys of the field, see Nicholas A. Germana, “Self-Othering in German Orientalism. The 
Case of Friedrich Schlegel” in The Comparatist, vol. 34 (May 2010), 80-94; The Orient of Europe: The 
Mythical Image of India and Competing Images of German National Identity (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009), 1-17.   
51 Quoted in Germana, “Self-Othering,” 84. 
52 See Germana, The Orient of Europe. 137-42. 
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several historical and geopolitical differences between Japanese and German 
Romanticisms.53 However, the fact that both envisioned the idea of “world history” in 
their own ways shows that the Romantic mode of thinking was never intrinsically 
cultural essentialist or ethnic nationalist, but was profoundly concerned about the 
global dimension of the world and history.  
 
c) Politics of Yasuda’s Ambiguous “Feminism” 
As a result of his persistent reliance on binary oppositions, Tansman often 
misses the subtle ambiguities of Yasuda’s literary politics. The shortcomings become 
most visible in Tansman’s misinterpretations of Yasuda’s take on two female figures: 
1) a mother in the medieval Japan who commissioned the rebuilding of a bridge in 
memoriam of her lost son Kinsuke, and 2) Kawahara Misako, a Meiji educator who 
went to the Chinese Continent and was involved in a secret intelligence activity at the 
Russo-Japanese War. Yasuda is known for his penchant for “femininity,” which 
belongs to the genealogy of kokugaku or the National Studies. It is also noteworthy 
that he was also informed by the materialist view of history especially in terms of 
women’s history.54 His depictions in both cases show remarkable ambivalence, 
                                                 
53 Whereas the early German Romantics were witnessing the emergence of the modern nation-state 
system at the time of the French Revolution, the writers of Japanese romantics in the 1930s began their 
career in a historical conjuncture marked by the Russian Revolution, the general crisis of capitalism and 
the rise of fascist movements. Above all else, Yasuda’s Japan was a colonial empire, while the Germans 
in the early eighteenth century suffered from the intervention by France and the disunion of their nation. 
54 In addition to the tradition of the National Studies, Yasuda presupposed a view of women’s history 
based on the materialist view of history as developed in Friedrich Engels’ The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State (1884). While he never identified himself as a Marxist, he did not deny 
certain theoretical validity of it either. He referred to Engels’ work in a number of his essays. Especially, 
in a 1939 essay on Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther, he provides most extensive comments on 
Engels in the context of discussing the ironic or aporetic relationship between the modern notion of 
romantic love and the institution of marriage, as well as hypocritical practices of actual marriage in both 
Catholic and Protestant countries. Yasuda, however, is skeptical of Engels who still stuck to the idea of 
true marriage based on romantic love for the proletariat. Instead, he finds Nietzsche at least more 
consistent, because he claimed that marriage as an institution should be abolished. See Yasuda Yojūrō, 
“Weruteru ha naze shinda ka” [Why did Werther die?], in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.3 (Tokyo: 
Kōdansha, 1986), 287-353, esp. 341-51. 
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sometimes resisting a simple-minded ideological critique, and sometimes disrupting 
traditional gender norms for women.   
 
1) A Mother Figure and the Politics of Mourning 
For Tansman, the most revealing example of the “fascist aesthetics” is 
Yasuda’s reading of a brief epitaph at the Saidan-bashi Bridge in Nagoya. But it is 
precisely here that Tansman’s interpretation stumbles. This inscription from the late 
sixteenth century was written in both Japanese and Chinese by a woman who 
commissioned the (re)building of the bridge on the thirty third anniversary (sanjū san 
kai ki) of the death of her son. Quoting the Japanese text, Yasuda describes it as “the 
single most superlative bridge literature in Japan.”55 Here is the epitaph by Tansman’s 
translation: 
“On the eighteenth day of the second month of Tenshō 18 [1591], the 
honorable Kinsuke, a child of 18, died in battle at Odawara. For this reason, 
and from an excess of unbearable sorrow, I now build this bridge. This 
mother’s body dissolves into tears. May he attain Buddhahood. The 
generations to come and those after them who see this document shall chant 
[his posthumous] name Itsukanseishun to the Buddha. On the thirtieth [sic] 
memorial of his death.”56  
 
Tansman further quotes Yasuda’s following commentary on this bridge literature.  
In the feudal wartime era, the wives of samurai, out of their sense of duty, hid 
their tears as they killed the beloved children of their own flesh, and without 
blinking proudly celebrated their husbands’ departure to die in battle, and they 
saw this as beautiful; these woman were imbued with deep beauty and sorrow. 
Stuffed with the atmosphere of the age, the inscription is intensely moving. But 
hers was a self-sacrifice imbued with the awareness of the inevitability of 
defeat: it shows neither resistance nor protest, nor a vain revolt, nor the signs 
of a call to the masses for individual liberation. (91) (My emphasis.) 
                                                 
55 “I am not merely saying that this woman’s voice—which thought of those people’s journeys, as they 
went from this shore to that, and sang, out of sympathy, of the “excess of unbearable sorrow” from her 
eternal sorrow—is the single most superlative bridge literature in Japan, but that precisely this woman’s 
voice, this pure voice that thankfully continues to exist in this world, was something that expressed an 




How then does Tansman interpret this passage? Here Tansman criticizes Yasuda, 
saying that he “hijacks” the mother’s grief and mourning. “Yasuda’s version of the 
fascist moment turns on this seductive ideology of self-sacrifice and its attendant 
sorrow.” (91)  
I agree that the basic note of Yasuda’s quote shows a profound sense of 
resignation.57 I would argue, however, that there is a considerable gap between the 
sense of resignation and celebration of “self-sacrifice.” Is Yasuda celebrating, 
promoting or demanding “self-sacrifice” here? Apparently Tansman’s reading is based 
on a literal straightforward reading of the text itself, because in his quote, it speaks of 
“self-sacrifice.”  
This is not the case, however. Surprisingly enough, there is nothing in the 
original, whether in the first edition or the second, that would correspond to this 
passage containing the word “self-sacrifice,” which I italicized: “But hers was a self-
sacrifice imbued with the awareness of the inevitability of defeat.” 58 In fact, Tansman 
does not include this passage in his translation of the whole essay published prior to 
his monograph. Therefore, he must be aware that it is his own insertion into the quote. 
In other words, he knowingly presents his own “paraphrase” as a quote. If this is the 
                                                 
57 This is made explicit by the passage that Yasuda added in the revised 1939 version of “Japanese 
Bridges”: “From the most ancient times boys have had in their hearts the desire to lay their lives on the 
line. They have lived life as heartless Buddhist prayer, drawing on the ancient beginnings of life, for the 
sake, even, of nameless wars, dying even for that which was destined for defeat. Theirs has been the 
sorrowful strength of men coloring human history. And the woman’s heart was as it should be: wilting, 
shedding silent and hidden tears on the morning of her husband’s departure for battle. This 
extraordinarily gentle femininity was, in its gentleness, a woman’s power.” (Tansman’s translation in 
the “Beauty of Violence,” 91) Yet, it does not cancel the profound ambiguity included the preceding 
passage.  For the difference between the first and second versions, see also Tansman’s endnote on the 
revision, Tansman, Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism, 301-2. 





,C *(Yasuda, “Nihon no hashi,” 197) 
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case, one has to say that this is a rather disingenuous move in order to make his 
interpretation appear persuasive. 
How different would the text read if this insertion were taken out? It is evident 
that Yasuda is making a sharp contrast between the inscription and its historical 
context. The first sentence in the quote indicates the general atmosphere of the 
medieval period in which it was considered a virtue for women to be proud of, and 
even celebrate, the sacrifice of their husbands and sons. Yasuda says “the inscription is 
intensely moving,” precisely because it does not follow such a moral; the mother 
publicly but humbly expresses her ever-lasting feeling of loss and mourning of her 
beloved child even after thirty three years. He is saying that in spite of, not because of, 
the general climate of self-sacrifice, the mother lamented the loss. If Yasuda adds that 
“it shows neither resistance nor protest…nor the signs of a call to the masses for 
individual liberation,” he is not recommending “self-sacrifice,” but merely rejecting 
ideological interpretation that would project modern value system onto what he calls 
the “pure voice” of the mother and appropriate it for one’s political purpose. In other 
words, this whole passage is rejecting both militarist and progressive appropriations of 
the epitaph. In fact, he emphasizes that the mother expressed “an emotion that 
completely transcended any demands from the power of others [tariki], an emotion 
that believed naturally in the function of literature.” 59  
I am not trying to say that Yasuda was actually critical of the warrior culture of 
the medieval period and, by extension, the contemporary Japanese militarism. Nor am 
                                                 
59 Yasuda, “Nihon no hashi,” 197. My translation. Here his use of tariki is quite unorthodox. In this 
connection, I would like to point out that it is Tansman’s misreading that Yasuda relied upon the 
Buddhist notion such as “tariki.” Tansman says that tariki “informs the entire essay. He [Yasuda] 
describes this concept as “the lack of an intense human will, born from Buddhism and the Oriental 
belief in salvation through reliance on other’s strength.”” (Tansman, “The Beauty of Violence,” 97) But 
Yasuda is actually negating such an ordinary notion: “[t]hat Buddhism, and the Oriental belief in 
salvation through the help of others, gives birth to a lack of an intense human will is a lie.” This is in 
fact his own translation! (Yasuda, “Japanese Bridges,” 291.) In this way, his reading and his translation 
of “Japanese Bridges” are sometimes at odds with each other.   
46 
I suggesting that the expression of profound grief is in and of itself essentially opposed 
or contradictory to self-sacrificial attitude. Yet, it is hardly deniable that these two 
feelings are at least contrary to each other. If this is the case, Yasuda’s text is far from 
univocal, but involves essential tensions within it.  
It is certainly possible and even necessary to argue that by stressing the purity 
of emotion and negating the political appropriation of such emotion, Yasuda’s rhetoric 
is all the more effective in terms of presenting his own reading as authentic and 
thereby making the reader less cautious about his stakes behind such a move. 
Undoubtedly, such insistence on feeling as politically indifferent or even anti-political 
can be a highly political posture. 60 In this regard, too, Yasuda was an heir to Motoori 
Norinaga who privileged “mono no aware,” which was considered to be a feminine 
principle. Tomiko Yoda makes an important point on Norinaga: 
Norinaga used the inferior status of the feminine to exorcize what he perceived 
to be the hypocrisy and insincerity of the moralizing and didactic approach to 
poetry. He insisted on considering the affective source of poetry not on the 
basis of what ought to be but of what is, however transgressive it may be for 
the dominant ethical codes of the society.61  
 
She also argues that Norinaga, as well as his modern followers since the Meiji era, 
appropriated the negativity of the feminine in order to construct a national literature. 
                                                 
60 Maruyama Masao once detected paradoxes in Norinaga’s aesthetics. Norinaga politicized literature, 
while at the same time, “aestheticizing” (bungaku-ka) and de-politicizing politics. See Maruyama 
Masao, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane (Tokyo: University 
of Tokyo Press, 1974), 171. Relying on Carl Schmitt’s Political Romanticism, Maruyama argued that 
Norignaga’s aesthetic politics was quite “occasionalist,” affiliating itself with contrary ideologies. 
While Norinaga recommended “absolute devotion” to the status quo from the standpoint of “nature as 
the invention of the Gods,” he, just as Ogyū Sorai, paradoxically invited the logic of “shutai teki sakui” 
(subjective invention, or “automatic invention” in the English translation) through this idea of “nature.” 
The existing regime is legitimate only insofar as it is the invention of the Gods, which relativizes the 
grounds of power and makes them only temporary. This would undermine the legitimacy of the 
Tokugawa feudal regime in a dialectical fashion, paving the way for the specifically modern political 
order based on subjectivity. See Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, 154-
76 and 264-73.  
61 Tomiko Yoda, Gender and National Literature: Heian Texts in the Constructions of Japanese 
Modernity (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 35. 
47 
Generally speaking, Yasuda’s insistence of the purity of emotion and femininity 
belonged to this tradition, and it is therefore necessary to be attentive to what kind 
political effects his appeal to the figure of femininity produces. As far as Yasuda’s 
particular passage above is concerned, however, the aspect of “transgressiveness” 
seems to be predominant, which makes his politics profoundly ambivalent. As 
Tansman claims, the second version with its added passage may imply that sacrifice at 
a battle is something inevitable and needs to be endured, which might have aroused 
the feeling of resignation in the reader. But it means that the ambivalence and gap 
between grief and self-sacrifice has become even deeper.  
Here it is important to recognize that in order to promote “self-sacrifice,” one 
needs something more than such ambiguous, passive acceptance of the loss; dying for 
the nation must be valorized as an honorable cause. In the context of the Yasukuni 
Shrine debate in Japan in the early 2000s, Takahashi Tetsuya analyzes how the Shrine 
functioned historically to honor the war dead in Japan’s war efforts and colonial 
enterprise, and calls its psychological mechanism of self-sacrifice “emotional 
alchemy” that converts grief on the part of the bereaved into joy and honor, giving the 
loss the meaning as the death for the country and the Emperor.62 In contrast to such 
                                                 
62 Takahashi says: “If the emotions of the bereaved relatives were felt as simply human beings, it could 
only result in grief. However, the grief became converted into joy as a result of the state ceremony. 
From grief to joy, from unhappiness to happiness, in what was akin to an alchemist’s trick, the bereaved 
relatives’ emotions had been turned around 180 degrees.” See Tetsuya Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai 
[The Yasukuni problem] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2005), 43. See also its partial translation, Tetsuya 
Takahashi, “The National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine,” trans. Philip Seaton, in Nationalisms in 
Japan, ed. Naoko Shimazu (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), 171. At the center of this emotional 
alchemy was, and still is, the Yasukuni Shrine that worships the Emperor System through the ideology 
of the State Shinto and its apparatus. Since its foundation as Tokyo Shōkonsha in 1869, the Yasukuni 
Shrine has functioned to honor the fallen soldiers in Japan’s continual war efforts as eirei (glorious 
spirits), and in so doing, it was supposed to provide the meaning of the lives and deaths for all the 
Japanese people— not only “the glorious dead of Yasukuni,” but also the bereaved families called “the 
mothers of Yasukuni” and so on. Takahashi argues however, that this does not mean the Shrine was 
created to “mourn” the dead. Rather, it has been meant to promote the self-sacrificial mentality by 
expressing the gratitude and respect to the war dead on the one hand, and replacing and repressing grief 
at the loss and the work of mourning, on the other. Significantly, Takahashi discusses the mothers of 
Yasukuni as an example of “emotional alchemy.” He mentions a roundtable discussion entitled “Tearful 
Meeting with Proud Mothers who Gave their Only Sons to the Nation” (June 1939 issue of the 
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emotional alchemy, which was predominant in the late 1930s, Yasuda is not trying to 
glorify the death of a medieval soldier nor is he negating or repressing the expression 
of the mother’s grief. Above all else, her inscribed lament itself neither affirms nor 
negates self-sacrifice; it is solely dedicated to mourning her lost child. Such 
commemoration might contain in it a potential to resist mobilization to self-sacrifice, 
as Takahashi argues. At the very least, there would be no room for criticizing state 
violence in the first place, if one denies the significance of such mourning.   
To be fair, what Tansman is trying to show is that Yasuda’s politics lies 
precisely in “bridging” this very gap between sorrow and self-sacrifice. Nonetheless, 
that does not justify ignoring all the nuance and ambiguity of Yasuda’s passage, 
reducing it to a monolithic ideology. In this sense, Tansman’s interpretation is rather 
forced, and does injustice to Yasuda’s text.  Does this not contradict his own 
standpoint against “violence”? 
 
In this context, I would like to take a brief look at a relatively recent 
interpretation of Yasuda Yojūrō by a Japanese critic Fukuda Kazuya, because it 
represents a polar opposite view to Alan Tansman’s criticism. In Nippon no kakyō 
(Japan’s homeland), Fukuda argues that Yasuda was a modernist writer, just like the 
French symboliste Stéphane Mallarmé, in the sense that he put into parenthesis 
referential reality and pursued autonomy and materiality of language. Therefore, 
Yasuda realized, Fukuda emphasizes, that so-called “genjitsu” or reality is something 
                                                                                                                                            
magazine Shufu no Tomo), which Hashikawa Bunzō had taken up earlier in his essay, “The 
Establishment and Development of Yasukuni Thought” in Chūōkōron, October 1974. Takahashi 
suggests that Hashikawa overlooked the grief of the mothers when he interpreted their words as 
showing “absolutely no protest or [feminine] weakness (memeshisa)” (quoted in Takahashi, Yasukuni 
mondai, 24; “The National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine,” 166). This oversight was partly due to the 
mothers’ own tendency. “What we see here,” says Takahashi, “is that as soon as the grief is expressed, 
it is psychologically repressed and shut out; and although it is replaced by feelings of honour (‘giving a 
son to the emperor’ and ‘being of use to the emperor’), at the very least we can detect the conflict in the 
bereaved families between grief and honour” (Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, 35; “The National Politics 
of the Yasukuni Shrine,” 174). 
49 
that is always already constructed by “shukō” or idea (design) prior to it. This is an 
important point which we must take note of. To be sure, Tansman too calls Yasuda a 
modernist, but he does not seem to make good use of this insight. In this respect, 
Fukuda is theoretically more sophisticated than Tansman. Taking up Yasuda’s 1942 
Manyōshū no seishin (the spirit of Manyōshū) in particular, Fukuda even claims that it 
was meant to be a criticism against the contemporary “reality” of total war and 
mobilization. At the same time, “Manyōshū no seishin,” Fukuda argues, “shows how 
the critique of “reality” by symbolisme inevitably leads to “Japan.””63 He calls this 
fictive construct the “illusory Japan” (kyomō no nihon). “The illusory Japan manifests 
itself as an unavoidable consequence for true symboliste, true modernism, and true 
literature.”64 In other words, fascism as a technological movement for a fictive 
community is an offspring of modernism. One cannot avoid fascist desire, Fukuda 
insists, insofar as there is always anomie and social division. His reading strategy, 
however, is to completely remove political judgment on the basis of the idea of 
autonomy of art and literature. Referring to Yasuda’s purge in the postwar, he insists: 
“Would there be a crime for literature in the first place? Only ethics or politics in 
“reality” condemns a crime. And, if one talks about a crime of a writer, then literature 
is already defeated by “reality.” Precisely because the illusory Japan is a principle of 
criticism that guarantees freedom and open-mindedness of thinking, this “Japan” was 
put to death in the postwar.”65  
Fukuda would say that such comments are made in the spirit of literature, but 
in so doing, he knowingly undermines the separation he himself has just made 
between representation and the real politics. As abuse or misuse of irony, this 
shameless tactic appropriates liberty admitted to literature in modern society. Such 
                                                 
63 Fukuda Kazuya, Nippon no kakyō [Japan’s homeland] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1993), 130. 
64 Ibid., 135-6. 
65 Ibid., 146. 
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aestheticism is never critical or antagonistic to, but totally dependent upon and 
complicit with liberalism as the dominant ideology of modernity. Although he invokes 
the names of fascist writers and thinkers such as Ezra Pound and Martin Heidegger to 
present his own project as somewhat “dangerous,” the kind of criticism Fukuda is 
practicing poses no real threat or challenge to political reality and the status quo. Carl 
Schmitt’s criticism against Romanticism would never be truer for Fukuda. Ironically, 
however, he never understands that so-called “illusory Japan” actually integrated in it 
diverse, multi-ethnic populations. What Yasuda called “Japanese irony” or “Japan as 
irony” is that it was an empire. Yasuda clearly saw and experienced this “reality”—
Yasuda says “passion for decadence” was their “idea,” while “Japanese irony” was 
“reality”—, Fukuda could never perceive it.  
In this way, it is easy to see that his statements are diametrically opposed to 
Tansman’s political judgment on Yasuda. Simply put, Fukuda reduces politics into 
literature, whereas Tansman does literature into politics. I would argue that both sides 
miss the very ambiguity that characterizes Yasuda’s literary politics. Tansman and I 
would agree that Fukuda, along with Yasuda, needs to be criticized, but his mode of 
argument would not be effective in criticizing Fukuda’s kind of ideology because they 
presuppose more or less the same image of Yasuda—as ethnic nationalist and/or 
fascist—with just opposite evaluations on it. In fact, Tansman cites Fukuda’s name 
only twice in the footnotes, and describes his short essay, written in reply to a critique 
against his Nippon no kakyō, in just one phrase: “[t]he best argument for the purely 
poetic nature of Yasuda’s works.”66 This comment is simply incredible. These are the 
reasons why I am trying to detect those elements inherent in Yasuda’s text that resist 
such reductive readings, while presenting a fundamentally different interpretation of it. 
 
                                                 
66 Tansman, Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism, 311n77. 
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2) Yasuda Yojūrō’s Transvestite Imperialism  
The second example is the 1939 essay “Kawahara Misako,” included in the 
second version of Japanese Bridges, which presents his appreciation of Kawahara’s 
1909 autobiography, Mōko miyage (a souvenir from Mongolia). A Meiji woman who 
was born in 1875, Kawahara decided to engage in the project of educating Chinese 
women, went to Shanghai by herself in 1903, and then was invited to Kalaqin (
), Mongolia by the royal family there. This first female Japanese teacher in the 
Continent, she taught at women’s schools subjects like the Japanese language and so 
on. Moreover, she got involved in the intelligence activity in the context of the Russo-
Japanese War, collaborating with the Japanese military officers.  
Tansman frames Yasuda’s take on this and other Japanese women’s 
experiences in the following schema: 
Yasuda’s implicit argument that femininity most authentically embodies an 
unsullied native essence belongs to the broader cultural critique of the 
imposition of abstract universals on a local identity. To distinguish the native 
from the foreign, Yasuda associates the native and authentic with femininity, 
emotion, instinct, and beauty, all grounded in the particular circumstances of 
Japanese life and tradition. He contrasts these with masculinity, with 
inauthentic intellectual abstractions and rational ethics, belonging to foreign 
intellectual systems that universalize identity and are grounded nowhere in 
particular. (95)  
 
He goes on:  
Yasuda locates the Japanese essence in women because women, he believed, 
are most fettered, through emotion and motherhood, to the circumstances of 
their particular, local, everyday lives and are unsullied by the world of 
masculine abstraction and intellectual machination. (95) 
 
Here again, he sets up a set of quite clear-cut oppositions such as feminine vs. 
masculine, native vs. foreign, particular vs. universal and so on. 
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 However, I find both his reading and framework dubious for several reasons. 
Yasuda’s extremely ambivalent and even conflictive depictions of the Meiji woman do 
not fall into such simple dichotomies, as I show in the following. If this is the case, it 
would suggest that it is Tansman himself, not Yasuda, who brings in these binaries. 
Therefore, one might suspect that they are his own preconceptions. Moreover, it is 
important to point out that these binaries are not only constative statements about 
gender, but the very act of applying them has a gendering effect. In other words, by 
applying these hierarchical dichotomies to a cultural other (in this case, “Japan”), 
Tansman is involved in presenting Japan as “feminine” as opposed to the “masculine” 
that is represented by the universal “West.” Tansman may intend to objectively 
describe what Yasuda is doing, but he does not seem to make any special efforts to 
undo, or at least distance himself from, such gendered and gendering categorizations 
which have of course been amply challenged and problematized by feminist 
scholars.67  
Here I would like to briefly trace his essay to show what kind of desire he 
invests in this female figure. First of all, Yasuda describes her motivation to become 
an international teacher. Inspired by Shimoda Utako, a famous female educator in the 
Meiji period, she wished to be an educator, too. He also points out the historical 
context: “A romantic belief among our nation after the Sino-Japanese War—i.e., the 
mission to awaken Asia—was burning in this gentle woman [Kawahara].”68 She was 
hired as an instructor for a newly-created female class at the Yokohama Daidō School 
for Chinese in 1900. At the same time, however, “while my dawn of hope has begun 
shining,” quotes Yasuda, “I realized that, in order to engage in such a world enterprise 
                                                 
67 See, for instance, Ueno Chizuko, “In the Feminine Guise: A Trap of Reverse Orientalism,” in 
Contemporary Japanese Thought, ed. Richard Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 225-245. 
68 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Kawahara Misako,” in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.4 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), 206. 
53 
(sekai teki jigyō), I must have pride and faith in myself in face of the Westerners.” For 
this reason, she decided to learn a foreign language at the Kōran Women’s School 
established by a French catholic missionary. In the meantime, she became more and 
more convinced that educating Chinese women is a key for “proper guidance” (zendō) 
and “awakening” (kakusei) of the Chinese people.69 In this way, there is no doubt that 
her “world enterprise” was a civilizational mission partly motivated by a mimetic 
desire for the “West.” Yasuda, too, uses phrases such as “enlightenment” (keimō) and 
“edification” (kyōka). Moreover, he praises this woman precisely because she 
envisioned such a “world mission” (sekai teki shimei). 
Moreover, that “world mission” which this young Meiji woman came to feel 
with her sympathy typical of a literature girl (bungaku shōjo fū na), not to 
mention her action she dared with such boldness that is rarely seen even among 
heroines (jōfu), truly shows the deep image of a pioneer. It was only after the 
battle of Joshū [in May 1938], in going along with the state policy, that famous 
intellectuals and critiques of the Shōwa Japan dared to speak of the same 
“world mission.”70  
 
Contrary to Tansman’s interpretation, Yasuda no doubt applauds this female figure for 
her international and universal vision. Obviously, he thinks she is far from “fettered,” 
while she is said to be compassionate. Tansman misses the fact that her role as a 
teacher of the Japanese language abroad is something that traverses the separation 
between native vs. foreign in the first place. Moreover, while implicitly ironizing the 
contemporary discourse of the “world mission,” Yasuda compares her with Meiji 
heroes: “in the boldness and resolution of her action, she equaled the enthusiastic and 
devoted actions of those great men that Japan of the same period produced.”71 In this 
respect, Yasuda does not follow the traditional opposition between feminine vs. 
masculine.  
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 207-8. 
71 Ibid., 208. 
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At the same time, however, we can see an interesting tension or ambivalence 
here. That is to say, Yasuda desires to differentiate Kawahara Misako from a modern 
type of women called jojōfu or joketsu (heroine or Amazon): “the word called “jojōfu” 
is a notion that was created by the Civilization and Enlightenment as the ideology of 
the opening of Japan in the Meiji era.”72 He repeatedly emphasizes that she was a 
gentle, caring, and natural Japanese girl. “It makes me feel very nostalgic that she did 
not have the character of the new Enlightenment, but very naturally lived the 
sentiments of old Japanese women.”73 He even emphasizes that “there is no need for 
female mouths that speak of theory and propaganda. The highest human action that 
Miss. Kawahara conducted throughout the times of peace and war was made possible 
not by an artificial logic, but by a logic that the natural feeling of love teaches.”74 
Apparently here, he highly evaluates traditional gender norms. He goes on to makes 
explicit his stakes in this essay: “I add a little irritatingly repetitive discussions about 
Miss. Kawahara, because I wanted to criticize today’s heroines of the time-of-crisis 
type or the state policy type as un-Japanese (hi nihon teki).”75 In this way, these 
heroines would be those women who were modernized, and lost both their 
“femininity” and “Japanese-ness.” Yasuda is trying to distinguish Kawahara from 
them, because she was often regarded as a typical heroine. He wants to rescue her 
from the dominant interpretation.  
In this way, Yasuda’s “feminism” reveals deep ambiguity and even 
contradiction in terms of Kawahara Misako’s gender. On the one hand, he praises the 
Meiji woman for her sense of the civilizational mission and international activity. In 
this regard, she was as good as the great Meiji men. In other words, he is not 
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celebrating her for traditional gender roles as a wife or a mother. On the other hand, he 
insists that she was not a modernized, masculine heroine, but a traditional Japanese 
woman who was very delicate and compassionate. He wants to stick to the essential 
notion of femininity that is based on the dichotomy of traditional vs. modern, feminine 
vs. masculine here.76 For this reason, Yasuda runs the risk of splitting Japanese 
women into good and bad types, thereby excluding the latter as “un-Japanese.” In one 
word, he is saying that being a traditional woman and being a modern woman are 
compatible, while at the same time mutually exclusive. 
However, it is questionable whether or not Kawahara was different from the 
degraded figure of “heroines.” It is important here to emphasize that this female figure 
with the “world mission” was involved in Japan’s imperial expansion. First of all, 
from the way she describes her own experiences, it is obvious that she understood her 
tasks as specifically “civilizational” missions.77 Furthermore, once the Russo-Japanese 
                                                 
76 Literary critic Iguchi Tokio discusses the “feminine” in Yasuda Yojūrō. See Iguchi Tokio, “Yasuda 
Yojūrō—inorii to ‘onna’” [Yasuda Yojūrō: irony and woman], Gunzō (July 1999), 240-56. Referring to 
Hashikawa Bunzō’s work on Japanese Romantics, he says: “Yasuda was a “completely weak person,” 
because he was a “woman;” his thought was the “thought of pure slave” [Hashikawa], because he was a 
“slave” who won’t be a master (subject), refusing to participate in what Hegel called the dialectical 
struggle of death between the master and the slave.” (Ibid., 251.) Using the Lacanian psychoanalysis, he 
characterizes the woman/slave as pre-Oedipal imaginary refusing to accept the castration by the 
symbolic order of the name of father. In terms of the writing style, such woman/slave, he argues, 
corresponded to the traditional Japanese writing, whereas the modern subject was formed by the genbun 
itchi (unification of spoken and written language), which is regarded as a neutral style, but is actually 
modeled on the masculine. Moreover, he claims that these styles are equivalent to two forms of modern 
nationalism: “One is Japan as the ‘nation-state’ that was formed by genbun itchi, while another is Japan 
that returns to the name of ‘emperor’ who governs the beauty and sublime.” (254) Significantly, he also 
mentions Yasuda’s essay on Kawahara Misako, pointing out that Yasuda criticized jojōfu or heroine 
type as the modernized type of women. Suggestive as it may be, his whole argument is based on a series 
of simple binary oppositions that come down to traditional vs. modern. As a result, he completely 
misses Yasuda’s deconstructive ambivalence and his involvement in Japanese empire through his 
appeal to femininity.  
77 In Shanghai, she sought to instill the sense of punctuality in her students by strictly observing the 
class schedule. (Yasuda, “Kawahara Misako,” 211); she also pointed to the hygiene conditions, which 
she described as unclean and even filthy. In Kalaqin, she stated her aim was to “develop Mongolia that 
has been dormant for thousand years.” (214) Here she made efforts to “make the royal family pro-
Japanese.” (219) 
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War broke out, her actions became straightforwardly imperialist. As he moves to this 
topic, Yasuda says:  
I wanted to talk about her usual life in detail in the first half, and then only 
roughly about her wartime activities that gave her eternal fame in our society, 
because I wanted to touch upon the process of her whole humanity that 
resulted in such enterprise. 78 
 
Here he stresses that the primary issue is her femininity, while her imperial adventures 
are merely secondary. Without these secondary episodes, however, she would have 
been scarcely famous or important. Kawahara, as the only Japanese left in the Kalaqin 
area, got involved in covert missions as a spy. As Yasuda describes, she sought to 
make secret investigations and reports on whether or not the maneuvers by Russians 
were going on within Mongolia. And, when Japanese units of special commandos 
arrived there, she helped them disrupting the Russian communication and 
transportation systems, and so on.79 As a result, she was decorated in recognition of 
her outstanding service in the war.  
In spite of her extraordinary actions, Yasuda insists that she represents a 
common type of gentle Japanese women. Yasuda claims that her achievements were 
all the more valuable, because she retained the essence of Japanese femininity. 
However, her actual actions not only show little sign of difference from the heroine 
type, but in fact seem more heroic than usual heroines would be: covert military 
maneuvers in the front line. In other words, the once negated, secondary moment, i.e., 
the heroic element, returns to supplement the primary moment of true femininity. The 
opposition he makes between Kawahara Misako as the real Japanese female and the 
heroine type as imperfect Japanese women collapses. His attempt at distinguishing 
them turns out to be based on a denial. 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 222. 
79 Ibid., 222-7. 
57 
It is important, however, to recognize that the gender politics in Yasuda’s text 
is quite different from the dominant discourse on women, as Alan Tansman describes 
it. His insistence on the essentialist gender norm constitutes only one aspect of his take 
on women. To be sure, he introduced a division and hierarchy within women based on 
this view. However, while this sort of operation of both idealizing and demonizing 
women is a quite traditional move in the masculinist ideology, Yasuda’s take on 
gender seems to be irreducible to such a strategy. I would rather argue that his take on 
this female figure is determined by two competing motivations or desires: while he 
wants to differentiate Kawahara and heroines in terms of essential Japanese femininity, 
his point is to claim that a Japanese woman can be modern and international without 
losing her traditional and national beauty. By attributing two contrary, if not mutually 
exclusive, properties to Kawahara Misako, Yasuda is saying that a real Japanese 
woman should be both traditional and modern, and both national and global at once. 
Yasuda’s claim is actually more cunning and demanding than the essentialist ideology: 
he expects women to be doubly competent in private and public lives, which can work 
as a double bind on women.80     
                                                 
80 Significantly, Yasuda’s ambivalence largely corresponds to the gender politics in the wartime 
mobilization regime. Ueno Chizuko points out that at the WWII, there were two types of gender 
policies in general: 1) “gender segregation model” that aims at “the nationalisation of the private sphere 
while maintaining the gender role assignment” such as motherhood, and 2) “integration model” that 
aims to “dismantle the gender role assignment itself” through public participation. (Chizuko Ueno, 
“Engendering the Nation,” in Nationalism and Gender, trans. Beverly Yamamoto [Melbourne: Trans 
Pacific Press, 2004], 1-65. 43.) She observes that Japan’s wartime gender policy was based on the 
segregation model, while at the same time it came close to the integration model because the state had 
to mobilize women as labor force due to a shortage of male labor. As a result, the total war regime in 
Japan, as in other Axis and Allied countries, promoted the “nationalization of women” (josei no 
kokuminka) to an unprecedented degree. Moreover, Ueno critically examines how representative 
Japanese feminist writers and activists, such as Hiratsuka Raichō, Takamure Itsue, Yamakawa Kikue, 
and Ichikawa Fusae, all ended up collaborating with the wartime regime—for two different strategic 
reasons, i.e., either segregation (difference) or integration (equality). As Ueno emphasizes, both 
strategies had to lead to an impasse: “If we go along with gender segregation we must adhere to norms 
of femininity, but as the converse of this we are able to acquire an autonomous domain inside a 
women’s ghetto. At first sight, equality appears to be achieved by the strategy of disregarding gender. 
However, for as long as the public sphere is defined in terms of masculinity, women who become 
producers or soldiers have to resign themselves to being second-class workers or soldiers. This means 
taking on a double burden and doing their best to maintain their womanly role while being reduced to 
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In this connection, Ueno Chizuko makes an important point that the Japanese 
male subjects have a tradition of presenting themselves as “feminine” due to their 
inferior status vis-à-vis the superior other such as China. As Ueno and others such as 
Tomiko Yoda convincingly argued, Norinaga’s kokugaku is one of the representative 
cases. However, this never changes the fact, she says, that Japanese society has been 
patriarchal. She calls this more cunning version of male domination “transvestite 
patriarchy.” 
In transvestite patriarchy, women are doubly marginalized. In the forced 
alternatives of either masculine or feminine, in the frustrating oscillation 
between men and women dictated by gender dualism, any counter-discourse of 
woman against transvestite patriarchy becomes, in turn, “masculine.” In just 
this way, in the recent past, feminized Japan exercised masculine power over 
its colonies such as Korea and Taiwan.81  
 
Interesting as it is, Yasuda’s case seems slightly different. What is particular about 
Yasuda lies in his desire to present a Japanese woman who is both traditional and 
modern, and both national and global at once. Nevertheless, there is no denying the 
fact that Yasuda is appropriating her “femininity” for the sake of the empire. “Her 
affection in and of itself, as humanism,” Yasuda says, “agreed with the ideal of the 
state.”82 Women can and should be its active agent; natural womanliness does not 
contradict commitment to the state, that is the empire. Moreover, through this 
feminine move, he seems to imply that Japanese empire is so humane, compassionate 
                                                                                                                                            
an auxiliary labour force.” (63) Thus, the wartime experiences proved, Ueno concludes, that “women’s 
liberation was impossible within the framework of the modern nation-state.” (64) For this reason, Ueno 
calls for “transcending the state,” or even “dismantling the category women,” because the gender 
difference itself is a modern construct formed within the nation-state. To this end, however, it would be 
necessary to first thematize the context of empire, which she does not take into account (except when 
she discusses the so-called “comfort women” controversy). One important effect of Yasuda’s gender 
politics was not only to “nationalize women,” but also to make them into agents of empire. Given 
Ueno’s historical accounts, it is possible to interpret Yasuda’s ambivalence as a type of gender politics 
that combines or conflate both strategies of segregation and integration. Thus, it is necessary to 
recognize that the imperial formation appropriates the very deconstruction of gender. 
81 Ueno, “In the Feminine Guise: A Trap of Reverse Orientalism,”, 241-2.  
82 Yasuda, “Kawahara Misako,” 201. 
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and benevolent vis-à-vis the Asian peoples. A pioneer international educator who was 
aware of her “world mission,” Kawahara Misako served as an ideal figure for such a 
political purpose. To borrow Ueno’s phrase, one might be tempted to call Yasuda’s 
strategy “transvestite imperialism.” 
What Yasuda’s desire for femininity in this specific case tells us is that in order 
to mobilize women for the empire, Yasuda, unwittingly or not, has to undermine 
traditional binary oppositions concerning gender. It also suggests that imperial 
formation would be effective if it emerges from the minority positions as in Kawahara 
Misako’s case. If in 1940, Yasuda speaks of the creation of Manchukuo in retrospect 
as “an expression of a new bold ideal of civilization and its world view,” he never 
“abandoned his lamenting feminine voice,” as Tansman says (100). On the contrary, 
such feminine voice remained instrumental in Yasuda’s transvestite imperialism.  
Just like the example of Kinsuke’s mother, Yasuda’s take on Kawahara, albeit 
in a different political direction, is far from univocal. What Alan Tansman calls 
“fascist aesthetics” fails to grasp such elusive politics in Yasuda’s text. In the final 
analysis, the persistent binary oppositions Tansman is projecting onto his writing 
function as epistemological barriers that prevent him from penetrating the workings of 
ambiguity and ambivalence in empire.  
In the next chapters, I will first show how Yasuda’s conception of Romantic 
irony deconstructs binary oppositions, producing profound ambivalence in his writing. 
I will then explore thematically how this ambivalence works in Yasuda’s Romantic 
colonialism in which the colonized subjects in Korea supplement the Japanese national 
identity called kokumin to form a “world historical” empire. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A Genealogy of Romantic irony:  
Yasuda Yojūrō and the Early German Romantics 
 
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry...It alone can become like 
the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, an image of the age. And 
it can also—more than any other form—hover at the midpoint between the 
portrayed and the portrayer, free of all real and ideal self-interest, on the wings 
of poetic reflection, and can raise that reflection again and again to a higher 
power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors. 
—Friedrich Schlegel, Athenaeum Fragment 116 83 
 
Representation mingles with what it represents…In this play of representation, 
the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are thing like reflecting pools, 
and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, 
a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split in 
itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the 
image, the double, splits what it doubles. 
—Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 84 
 
The Japanese Romantic writer Yasuda Yojūrō is known for his use of Romantic irony. 
His notion and practice of irony derived from an intimate understanding of Hölderlin 
and the early German Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel. As I have discussed in 
the previous chapter, commentators since Hashikawa Bunzō have debated over how to 
interpret the sources and functions of Yasuda’s irony. Unfortunately, however, they 
are too often dependent upon traditional views on German Romanticism that are either 
based on its later, conservative period or derive from the hostile standpoint of its 
opponents such as Hegel and Schmitt. However, recently there have been considerable 
advances in the studies of the early German Romantics. They are no longer regarded 
                                                 
83 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971),175.. 
84 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 [1976]), 36. 
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as reactionary cultural essentialists, but rather interpreted as having achieved insights 
into textuality that even anticipated later post-structuralism. Also, the sophistication of 
their theoretical and philosophical project has been rightfully acknowledged as being 
comparable with German Idealism. In light of these new developments, Yasuda 
Yojūrō’s take on the early German Romantics proves to be quite remarkable. 
Therefore, it is high time to propose a new interpretation of Yasuda’s Romantic irony. 
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Yasuda Yojūrō in his early 1930s essays 
comprehended the critical stakes of the early German Romanticism surprisingly well. 
Yasuda grasped its basic problematic as the “disintegration within the absolute,” 
which set the task for the post-Kantian philosophical thinking. This notion also 
provided him with appropriate criteria to discern the different theoretical and literary 
standpoints among the German writers and thinkers of the late 1790s from Hölderlin 
to Fichte and Hegel to the early Romantics. While deeply sympathetic with Hölderlin 
as the “pure poet,” Yasuda chose to follow the path taken by the Romantics, especially 
Friedrich Schlegel, a path of finding a solution within the disintegration through 
“Romantic irony.” To explicate the theoretical implications of Romantic irony, I will 
discuss how it derived from the early Romantics’ confrontation with Fichte’s 
transcendental philosophy of reflection. It turns out that the Romantic appropriation of 
the concept as reciprocity and infinite self-mirroring deconstructed not only the 
dichotomy between the primary and the secondary, as well as the metaphysical notion 
of the absolute. As a result, reflection becomes a productive medium for self-
presentation of the “absolute” in an altered sense, while the world in this self-
mirroring reflection becomes that of textuality. In this Romantic notion of reflection, 
language reveals its profoundly metaphoric nature as catachresis, while the subject 
here gets both de-centered and infinitely doubled. Although Yasuda himself did not 
delve into such philosophical arguments per se, his commentary on Schlegel 
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undoubtedly shows that he recognized the reciprocal and also doubling character of 
the producer and the produced, and had the insight into the essential arbitrariness of a 
work of art, which he calls a “lie.” All these discussions lead to the notion of 
Romantic irony, which Schlegel characterized as “permanent parabasis.” As I will 
show, what Yasuda called “Romantic revolt” proves to be its equivalent. In 
concluding, I will raise a question of how Romantic irony can serve for imperial 
“world history,” which I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
 “Disintegration within the Absolute”: Yasuda on German Romanticism and 
Idealism  
In his 1933 essay on Friedrich Hölderlin, which comes out of his undergraduate thesis 
he submitted at the Tokyo Imperial University, Yasuda describes him as a “pure poet” 
who pursued the unity of life and art.85 Referring to the young Hölderlin’s friendship 
with Hegel and Schelling at the theological seminary at Tübingen, Yasuda writes that 
Hölderlin belonged to the young generation in Germany who was enthusiastic over 
Kant’s critical philosophy and the French Revolution: they saw realization of freedom 
in the Revolution. However, the history of the late 1790s Germany turned otherwise. 
Nascent capitalism, he explains, promoted the separation between life and art, while 
the reality of the contemporary Germany was still caught up in the feudal social 
relationship. This was the socio-economic conditions in which these thinkers, as well 
                                                 
85 Literary critic and Germanist Kawamura Jirō points out that Yasuda’s piece was one of the earliest 
monographs on Hölderlin written in Japanese, which coincided with the Hölderlin revival in Germany 
promoted by the scholars such as Friedrich Gundolf and Norbert von Hellingrath who belonged to the 
circle of the poet Stefan George. These intellectuals celebrated Hölderlin as the quintessential German 
poet, which was politically appropriated by the National Socialists in the 1930s. On the other hand, 
Kawamura also suggests that Yasuda’s reading of Hölderlin as a pure poet was not dissimilar to Georg 
Lukacs’s in his 1934 essay “Hölderlin’s Hyperion,” which interpreted him as an uncompromising 
sympathizer of Jacobinism. See Kawamura Jirō, “Herudaarin” in Ironia no Yamato [Yamato of irony] 
(Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2003), 168-83. 
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as the Frühromantik or the early German Romantics, began their literary and 
philosophical career. He continues:  
This historical time period of Hölderlin’s was the one in which Fichte’s “I” 
was elevated to Schelling’s absolute. The disintegration within the absolute 
and the painful consciousness of this, as well as the reconciliation that sublates 
but preserves the oppositions—these were Hegel’s terms that expressed new 
consciousness of life for the first time.” 86 
 
While Yasuda does not explicitly theorize the relationship between the socio-
economic conditions and their thought, his formulation of the philosophical 
problematic that captured this generation is quite remarkable. In fact, “the 
disintegration within the absolute” points to the very problem that the young three—
Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin—sought to overcome in their so-called das älteste 
Systemprogram des deutschen Idealismus (Oldest Program toward a System in 
German Idealism), a brief manuscript composed and written together in the spring of 
1797.87 As Philip Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy argue in Literary Absolute, 
these thinkers sought to resolve the consequences of Kant.88 His transcendental 
philosophy eradicated any substantial principle by demonstrating that objectivity is 
constituted by the forms of our representations, which resulted in the unrecognizability 
of the things in themselves, while dividing the subject into the epistemological and 
practical subjects. In other words, it was reflective consciousness of subjectivity that 
                                                 
86 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Kiyoraka na shijin” [Pure poet] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 
1986), 213. 
87 This program addresses realization of freedom in harmony with nature by appealing to the idea of 
“beauty,” which involves themes such as remembrance of ancient Greece, and as a creation of a “new 
mythology” and “sensuous religion” based on the history and work of humanity that is realized as “the 
people.” Significantly it also speaks of abolition of the “state” as a mechanical system. Discovered, 
named and published in 1917 by Franz Rosenzweig, this document, which was certainly handwritten by 
Hegel, has been controversial in terms of its authorship. Rosenzweig first ascribed it to Schelling, which 
Wilhelm Böhm soon disagreed with in support for Hölderlin’s authorship; and later, Otto Pöggeler and 
other Hegel scholars claimed it was composed by Hegel. For the original text and an English translation 
of the document, as well as a commentary on it, see David Farrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute: German 
Idealism and Languishing of God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 16-44.  
88 See Philip Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, trans. Philip Barnard and 
Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 27-37. 
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brought about the “disintegration within the absolute.” As Yasuda says, however, 
“Kant willingly revealed the contradictions of his own theory” in Critique of Judgment, 
which attempted at synthesizing this split between knowledge and morality, nature and 
freedom, in the realm of art.89 Following Kant, all post-Kantians tried to solve the 
question.90 One of the earliest, and most influential attempts was made by Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte in Wissenschaftslehre (“doctrine of knowledge”) and its various 
reformulations that aimed at unifying the split through self-positing and the reflective 
consciousness of the I. In contrast, the younger generation of intellectuals from 
Schelling and Hegel to Hölderlin to the Jena Romantics, in their own ways, pursued an 
alternative, i.e., a possibility of a different conception and Darstellung of the absolute. 
Darstellung, a word that has multiple meanings such as presentation, figuration, 
staging and so on, was used in contradistinction to Vorstellung or representation as the 
faculty of subjective reflection. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue, these figures in 
the Oldest Program sought for the resolution in their conception of a “system-subject” 
in the form of “work of art.” Yet, they also parted their ways: while the philosophers 
came to conceive of a self-mediating “system-subject” as a totality such as “spirit,” the 
writers, especially the early Romantics, were more concerned about a theory of 
“literature” as a different version of auto-poiesis. What Schlegel called “Romantic 
poetry” as “progressive, universal poetry” (Athenaeum Fragment 121) is one 
important instance of this theorizing.91 As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue, that 
does not refer to any specific genre, but simply means “literature” in its most general 
sense of poiesis or production. That is to say, literature became a medium in which the 
                                                 
89 Yausda, “Kiyoraka na shijin,” 198. 
90 For a comprehensive account of the history of German philosophy after Kant in terms of how post-
Kantians dealt with the paradoxes Kant’s Critiques introduced, see Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 
1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
91 Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 175; Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, ed. 
Wolfdietrich Rasch (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1964),.38. 
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“absolute” is figured, staged and presented through fragments, allegory, wit and 
especially irony. Hence the “literary absolute.” The very project of “literature” as 
Bildung or the poetic and poietic self-formation of humanity was the product of this 
historic conjuncture.  
Yasuda’s early essays on German literature demonstrate his exact 
understanding of such a problematic. What he referred to as the “disintegration within 
the absolute,” taken from the young Hegel’s formulation, constitutes the horizon that 
would determine the entire range of developments contained within both German 
Idealism and Romanticism. Hegel himself, by interpreting this disintegration as the 
“negativity” of subjectivity, claimed that absolute knowledge will be achieved as a 
dialectical process of negation in which the subject knows and realizes itself as the 
“spirit”; other writers and thinkers of these schools proposed alternative perspectives 
to this same problematic; the early Romantics among others responded to this question 
by the notion of “irony.” Yasuda was highly attentive to these differences. For 
instance, Yasuda observes that Hölderlin, unlike Hegel and the Romantics, could not 
bear the “disintegration.”  
The pure poet cannot find dialectics or irony as an expedient method to get rid 
of the opposition between reality and self, or between self and other. He can 
find only two cases, either himself sinking to reality or bending reality to 
himself.” 92 
 
In this context, Yasuda refers to Hölderlin’s Hyperion. He could have cited the 
following passage: “Whether we know it or not, the goal of all our striving is to put an 
end to that eternal conflict [Widerstreit] between our self and the world, to restore the 
ultimate peace, which is higher than all reason, so that we can unite with nature in one 
infinite whole.”93 Hölderlin goes on to say, however, that this unification is only 
                                                 
92 Yasuda, “Kiyoraka na shijin,” 201.  
93 Translated and quoted in Krell, ibid., 21 
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possible as an “infinite approximation.”94 Hölderlin may have grasped a unity of 
“love” as “a real sacrifice that ties humans to a higher life,” as Yasuda says, unlike 
Fichte or Hegel who conceived of it as mere postulate for moral life.95 But it was 
Hölderlin himself who identified a radical separation between subject and object as a 
“primal division” (Ur-teilung or judgment) in “being” as such. Moreover, if many of 
his works were dedicated to ancient Greece as an ideal, this yearning derived from the 
sense that it had long been lost. David Farrell Krell thus calls the absolute in Hölderlin 
the “tragic absolute.”96 Yasuda fully understood that Hölderlin endeavored to live 
through enormous tensions in love and being. This is why he pays tribute to his 
profoundly tragic sensibility, and shows deep compassion for his fate: suffering from 
schizophrenia, he had to spend the rest of his life in the so-called Hölderlin Tower at 
the Neckar River in Tübingen until his death in 1843.97 Yasuda kept his deepest 
respect for the poet into his later period and even named Hölderlin in his preface for 
The Spirit of Man’yōshū in 1942. 
 
Yasuda on Schlegel and Romantic Irony 
Fascinated as he was by Hölderlin, Yasuda himself takes the path of the Romantics, 
i.e., that of irony. For Yasuda, irony represents nothing but a way to find a solution 
within the very “disintegration” itself. This will be clear when one turns to his 1934 
essay on Friedrich Schlegel, “Lucinde’s Revolt and the Crowed within Me.” Lucinde 
is an ironic and self-ironizing novel on love, friendship and decadence of a poet. 
Yasuda is concerned about the relationship between the poet (artist) and his work of 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 Yasuda, “Kiyoraka na shijin,” 210. 
96 Krell, ibid., 4. 
97 The motif of the fear of becoming mentally ill often appears in Yasuda’s early novels. In Tōshin (life 
size), for instance, the protagonist says: “…since I entered my college, I started studying psychiatry 
rather than my major field.” See Kamiya Tadataka, “Yasuda Yojūrō no shōsetsu” [Novels by Yasuda 
Yojūrō] in Yasuda Yojūrō ron [On Yasuda Yojūrō] (Tokyo: Kari shokan, 1979), 39-64; the quote on 60. 
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art, which is closely related to “Romantic irony” as Schlegel’s basic philosophy of art 
and literature: 
He [Schlegel] believes that the freedom to create a work must secure the 
freedom to destroy the creation at the same time. The artist feels only 
discontent with himself. He inevitably knows the “lie” of a work, but it is a lie 
that is not false (sakuhin no uso, itsuwari de nai uso). And that is essentially 
what the artist urgently tries to express. The work and its author must always 
be mixed together. In creating it, the author must destroy the created reality of 
work at the same time.98  
 
Here, almost every sentence in this passage can be said to paraphrase early Schlegel’s 
Fragments in the late 1790s. Irony, Schlegel says, is a form of “continuously 
fluctuating between self-creation and self-destruction.” (Athenaeum Fragment 51) 99 
This is one of the basic formulas of Romantic irony. These phrases such as the 
“fluctuating” (Wechsel or alternation), “self-creation” (Selbst-schöpfung) and “self-
destruction” (Selbst-vernichtung) are the terms borrowed from Fichte, who employed 
them to designate the process in which the absolute I posits itself and annihilates the 
not-I as Anstoss (check or stimuli); as a result of this alternation, self-restriction 
(Selbst-beschränkung) will take place.100 Because of this reliance, Hegel 
misrecognized that Schlegel was Fichte’s artistic epigone.  
However, as the recent scholarship on the early German Romanticism 
emphasizes, Schlegel made a subtle but crucial turn in appropriating Fichte’s 
transcendental philosophy. Before going into this problematic in detail, I would first 
like to point out that Yasuda noticed the remarkable difference between Schlegel and 
                                                 
98 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Rutsuinde no hankō to boku no naka no gunshū” [Lucinde’s revolt and the crowed 








99 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, 167; Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, 30. 
100 See Critical Fragment [Lyceum Fragment] 37. Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the 
Fragments, 146-7; Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, 9-10. 
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both Fichte and Hegel. For instance, Yasuda makes an insightful observation in the 
following statement:   
All artists, not only Schlegel, are keenly conscious of their contradictions and 
most aware of the disintegration of their inner self…Perhaps, the influence of 
Fichte on the Romantics was none other than this fragment. That is to say, it 
would not be the influence of Fichte’s philosophy of overcoming, but the 
influence of Fichte’s existence or rather the atmosphere of the historical time 
in which Fichte existed. 101 
 
In other words, Yasuda is saying that, unlike Fichte, Schlegel did not believe the 
disintegration in the self can ever be eliminated. By the same token, Yasuda makes a 
critical commentary on “dialectics” in general. Yasuda’s basic viewpoint is that the 
Schlegelian irony distinguishes itself sharply from Hegelian dialectics, too, at least in 
its later, systematized and popularized form: while the latter will sublate the terms by a 
third, higher concept, the former leaves them to their infinitely mutual, cyclical 
penetration, as I will show shortly.102 In addition, as I have noted in the previous 
chapter, Carl Schmitt criticized the Romantics for their tendency to advocate the 
“suspension of antithesis by a higher third,” but this seems to be more appropriate for 
dialectics. In this way, Yasuda, again, goes along with Schlegel: Yasuda detests 
dialectics, in both Hegelian and Marxian versions, as something “apathetic” 
                                                 
101 Yasuda, “Rutsuinde no hankō to boku no naka no gunshū,” 183. 
102 In his own way, however, Schlegel employed the term Dialektik favorably. As Andreas Arndt and 
Jure Zovko write, “the irony becomes a method of thinking as it is assigned the philosophical task to 
conceptualize the ‘insolvable conflict of the unconditioned and the conditioned.’ Schlegel sees in this 
antinomic relationship the core problem of philosophy exposed by Kant’s transcendental dialectics [in 
Critique of Pure Reason]; yet the antinomy is not a semblance (Schein), but is to be understood as 
paradoxical state of things captured and acknowledged by the irony and to be held valid in its 
contradictoriness.” Andreas Arndt and Jure Zovko, “Einleitung” [Introduction] in Friedrich Schlegel, 
Schriften zur Kritischen Philosophie, 1795-1805 [Writings on the critical philosophy, 1795-1805], ed. 
Andreas Arndt and Jure Zovko (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007), xix. While trying to retain the 
original meaning of “dialectics” in the Platonic sense, Schlegel claimed that the antinomy has an 
objective significance as the interface in which the finite and the infinite are mutually related. See ibid., 
xxiii-xxvii. It is also important to mention that “dialectics” in this sense comes very close to the 
conception of dialectics by the Kyoto school philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime. 
Their notions of “absolute contradictory self-identity” (Nishida) or “absolute mediation” (Tanabe) 
represent forms of dialectics without the absolute, first principle such as the I or spirit or matter, 
although they do not thematize the rhetorical and linguistic dimension per se.  
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(mukiryoku) because it cannot bear the tensions of continual alternation; in contrast, 
irony makes it possible to keep tensions and ambivalence intact, without falling into 
binary oppositions.103  
 
The Question of “Reflection” in the Early German Romantics 
In order to highlight the critical stakes of the concept of “Romantic irony” and to show 
how Yasuda comprehended them, it is necessary in this context to take a brief look at 
the current interpretation regarding the confrontation of Schlegel and Novalis with 
Fichte, which has been one of the most important focal points in the studies of the 
early Romanticism.104 The crucial question here is how the Romantics transformed the 
conception of “reflection” from its traditional understanding, including Fichte’s. This 
view regarded reflection as separated from and secondary to the immediate or the 
absolute that is supposed to exist in itself, independently of the reflection as the 
activity of a subject. In other words, it presupposes a dichotomy between the 
immediate as primary and the reflection as secondary. As a consequence, there arises a 
series of paradoxes which Kant’s critical philosophy brought about: the subject not 
only cannot recognize the object as it is in itself, but the I as the subject of reflection 
becomes inaccessible and incomprehensible to itself because the reflection brings 
about a split and doubling between the knowing and known subjects; in order to know 
                                                 
103 See, for instance, Yasuda Yojūrō, “Weruteru ha naze shinda ka” (Why did Werther die?) in Yasuda 
Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), 331. Yasuda often appealed to this form of irony, for 
instance, when he said in 1938 right before his trip to China: “If we seek for a spiritual symbol of our 
time, it is peace and war as irony. They were nothing but identical. Today’s war correspondent does not 
have time to think of a word that would sublate them.” For Yasuda, “despair and conviction,” 
“decadence and construction,” “boldness and calmness,” and “destruction and defense” are all ironies, 
meaning the identity of the antitheses. Moreover, the distinction of the West and the East is said to be 
such an irony. See Yasuda Yojūrō, “Shōwa no seishin” [The spirit of Shōwa] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, 
vol. 16 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1987), 12-13. 
104 Here I will limit myself to Schlegel because Yasuda rarely referred to Novalis (Friedrich von 
Hardenberg). However, his Fichte Studies developed an anti-foundationalist and anti-representationalist 
conception of reflection and marks a central place in the early Romantic philosophy. As for Novalis, see 
Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millán-
Zaibert (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 39-54, 151-76.  
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the knowing subject itself, it must fall in to regressus infinitus. Transcendental 
subjectivity is the name for this paradox. Early Fichte’s argument in the 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 just reinforced it by postulating the self-positing and self-
reflexive consciousness called Tathandlung (“fact-act”), according to which the 
knowing act of the I is said to constitute its very being. The early Romantics 
developed their own philosophy in critical dialogues with Fichte’s attempt as one of 
the first post-Kantian projects, which, however, led to deconstructing “transcendental 
philosophy” in general.  
 
“Medium of Reflection”: Benjamin on Schlegel  
It was Walter Benjamin’s doctoral thesis, The Concept of Criticism in German 
Romanticism (1920), that launched, for the first time, this line of reading that situates 
Schlegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s transcendental idealism in the context of 
theorizing “reflection.”105 He argued that the Romantics reversed Fichte’s discussion 
in a way that, contrary to the traditional presupposition, shows the priority and 
productivity of reflection. Describing Schlegel’s notion of the absolute in 
contradistinction to Fichte’s, Benjamin argues that “in itself, this absolute would most 
correctly be designated the “medium of reflection.”…Reflection constitutes the 
absolute, and it constitutes it as a medium.”106 The absolute, which was supposed to be 
separate and isolated from reflection, not only merges with reflection in this 
“medium,” but is constituted and produced by and in it. Importantly, Benjamin 
distinguishes this medium (Medium) from a dialectical “mediation” (Vermittlung), 
                                                 
105 Walter Benjamin, The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, trans. David Lachterman, 
Howard Eiland, and Ian Balfour in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 1, ed. Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 116-200. 
106 Ibid., 132. 
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which still presupposes two poles of the reflector and the reflected.107 Such a 
relationship between the reflecting and the reflected, then, evades the dichotomy 
between active vs. passive, and should be described in the middle voice.108 Although 
Benjamin did not employ this grammatical category, it is interesting to note that the 
German term Medium also refers to it. However, how does such a reversal become 
possible? The key word here is the notion of Wechsel, i.e., reciprocity or alternation. 
Benjamin quotes Schlegel’s Philosophical Lecture, 1804-6.:  
Philosophy must have at its basis not only a reciprocal proof (Wechselbeweis) 
but also a reciprocal concept (Wechselbegriff)…For this reason philosophy, 
like an epic poem, must start in the middle, and it is impossible to lecture on 
philosophy and to pay it out piece by piece in such a way that the first piece 
(das Erste) would be completely grounded for itself and explained.109  
 
Schlegel calls such a thinking “cyclical philosophy.” Such reciprocity and cyclicality 
of philosophizing has enormous implications. “That philosophy begins in the middle,” 
Benjamin points out, “means that it does not identify any of its objects with ur-
reflection, but sees in them a middle term in the medium.”110 Interestingly enough, 
Benjamin negates “ur-reflection,” i.e., original or originary reflection that would reach 
and touch the absolute, but it is crucial to understand that this does not mean he just 
                                                 
107 In his 1951 recollection for the prewar years in which he served as the editor for the journal 
Tetsugaku kenkyū (philosophical studies) at the Kyoto Imperial University, Nakai Masakazu used these 
same terms to characterize the debate between Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime: he interpreted 
Tanabe’s 1930 criticism against Nishida, published for the journal, as addressing the question of 
whether “baikai” should mean Medium as in Nishida or rather Vermittlung, which would be 
discontinuous and therefore truly dialectical. (See Tanabe Hajime, “Nishida sensei no oshie wo aogu” 
[Learning from Prof. Nishida’s teaching] in Tanabe Hajime zenshū, vol. 4 [Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 
196?], 303-28.) Nakai himself was sympathetic with Tanabe, because he believed that a responsible 
political action would be only possible with the latter conception. See Nakai Masakazu, “Kaiko jūnen” 
(the ten years in retrospect) in Nakai Masakazu essensu [Essential Nakai reader] (Tokyo: Kobushi 
shobō, 2003), 202-8. Yet, his point, which is critical of Nishida, provides an indirect support for an 
interpretation that Nishida’s thinking has a significant affinity with the Romantic philosophy as 
specified here. If this is the case, one might be tempted to say that the “medium of reflection” 
corresponds to what Nishida called basho (place).  
108 See Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1982),1-27, esp.9.   
109 Quoted in Benjamin, The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, 137. 
110 Ibid., 137. 
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reiterated the traditional concept of reflection that would remain, by definition, 
secondary to what it reflects. Instead, Benjamin, along with Schlegel, is saying that 
“[r]eflection is logically the first and primary.”111 That is to say, his major point is that 
reflection is not a secondary function, but rather the “medium” for the absolute. If this 
is the case, Benjamin is undermining the very dichotomy between primary vs. 
secondary in this whole reciprocal and cyclical relationship between the absolute and 
reflection.  
It is important to add, however, that Schlegel already developed this idea of 
Wechsel in his earlier Athenaeum period, and that he did so by explicitly connecting it 
with the very notion of “irony.” See the following Athenaeum Fragment 121: 
An idea is a concept perfected to the point of irony, an absolute synthesis of 
absolute antitheses, the continual self-creating interchange (Wechsel) of two 
conflicting thoughts. An ideal is at once idea and fact.112 
 
From this statement it follows that irony constitutes the negative aspect of the infinite 
alternation. Therefore, irony and reflection are the two sides of the same coin that is 
the medium of reciprocity. Remarkably, this fragment makes explicit that the irony 
synthesizes the “absolute antitheses,” which amounts to the same thing as relativizing 
the binary oppositions. Irony thus deconstructs the Fichtean dichotomy between the I 
as subject and the not-I as object, thereby undermining the priority and sovereignty of 
the subject position. In this regard, Schlegel made a radical departure from early 
Fichte’s subjective idealism. 
 
Reflection as Production 
As is clearly seen in these discussions, Schlegel’s conception of reflection and irony 
shows a profound affinity to deconstructive thinking. Critically elaborating on 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 134. 
112 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, 176; Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, 40. 
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Benjamin’s seminal reading, Winfried Menninghaus provides a theoretically rigorous 
reinterpretation of this whole argument from such a perspective. Benjamin’s reading 
indicates, he argues, that “the absolute is nothing that precedes or evades the 
reciprocity, but nothing other than the totality of the not-absolute limbs of reciprocity, 
which is identical with the reflexive connectedness of ‘everything real.’”113 These 
moments of reflexive connectedness, i.e., the reflecting (reflector) and the reflected, 
Menninghaus points out, show not only a semiotic structure of what Ferdinand de 
Saussure called signifiant and signifié, but its deconstruction through reciprocity and 
mutual alternation of these poles. Making this point, he says:    
Reflection in Benjamin’s understanding should be nothing otherwise than the 
reciprocal production of the reflected and the reflecting, as it were…[T]he 
differential splitting in the reflection poles not only not runs contrary to the 
immemorial absolute, but this absolute already finds itself in the position of the 
splitting-split reflection and therefore experiences self-presentation 
(Selbstdarstellung) in it.114   
  
That is to say, Schlegel’s insight into reflection, in this reading, implies, first of all, the 
absence of what Jacques Derrida called “transcendental signified,” an ultimate, 
absolute presence of meaning that would be free from the structure of sign and 
                                                 
113 Winfried Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdopplung: Die frühromantische Grundlegung der 
Kunsttheorie im Begriff absoluter Selbstreflexion [Infinite doubling: the early Romantic foundation of 
theory of art in the concept of absolute self-reflection] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 57. From 
a slightly different perspective, Manfred Frank also stresses and documents in detail the importance of 
Wechsel concept in the formation of the early Romantic philosophy, which he claims was first 
developed by Novalis. Schlegel, he points out, appropriated the Fichtean terminology to mean strictly 
reciprocal determinations that are motivated by “the “feeling” of a lack, also referred to by Schlegel as 
an imperfection (Unvollendung): “a striving towards knowledge,”… a “tendency […] toward the 
Absolute,”… “a longing […] for the infinite.” See Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early 
German Romanticism, 184. Frank argues, first, that this appropriation represented a departure from 
Fichte’s philosophy of first principles. Second, the priority of the feeling or emotion (Gefühl) suggests 
that he early Romantics such as Schlegel and Novalis show a tenet of an epistemological and 
ontological realism that acknowledges the passivity of a subject vis-à-vis the world. (If this is the case, 
it is far from inconsistent if Yasuda spoke of a certain kind of “realism,” as he did in terms of “realism 
called Japan as irony.”) For Frank’s treatment of Schlegel, see ibid., 177-219. From a Derridean 
perspective, Menninghaus criticizes Frank’s theoretical standpoint developed in What is 
Neostructuralism?, which he claims is still caught up in the traditional notion of reflection. See 
Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdopplung, 267-75. 
114 Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdopplung,  58. 
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signification.115 Rather, in what Menninghaus describes as “absolute self-reflection,” 
everything is susceptible to endless alternation of the chains of signifier and signified. 
Secondly, reflection in this conception functions as a “supplement” for the absolute, 
meaning that what was supposed to be secondary turns out to be “the first and the 
primary,” constituting the absolute. Menninghaus thus claims that what Benjamin 
called the “medium of reflection” indicates the “supplementarity” of reflection in 
Derrida’s sense. This represents a radical reinterpretation of reflection as production 
qua “self-presentation” of the “absolute” through infinite doubling and duplication. In 
short, the Romantic notion of reflection and irony, Menninghaus insists, not only 
rejected the “transcendental signified” and “metaphysics of presence,” but already 
fully gained the insight into what Derrida later called “différance.”116  
It is in the Romantic theory of literature as “transcendental poetry” and in the 
figure of “self-mirroring” in particular that the deconstructive power of reflection is 
fully developed. Both Benjamin and Menninghaus refer to a famous Athenaeum 
Fragment 238 in which Schlegel compares poetry that is, literature, to “transcendental 
philosophy.” Significantly enough, this is also the passage that Yasuda Yojūrō would 
have in mind when he wrote in the above quote: “the work and its author must always 
be mixed together. In creating it, he must destroy the created reality of work at the 
same time.” Here is the Fragment:  
…just as we wouldn’t think much of an uncritical transcendental philosophy 
that doesn’t represent (darstellen) the producer along with the product and 
contain at the same time within the system of transcendental thoughts a 
description of transcendental thinking: so too this sort of poetry should unite 
the transcendental raw materials and preliminaries of a theory of poetic 
creativity—often met with in modern poets—with the artistic reflection and 
beautiful self-mirroring…In all its descriptions, this poetry should describe 
                                                 
115 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 20. 
116 See Menninghaus, Unendliche Verdopplung, 115-131. See also Derrida, “Différance.” 
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itself (sich darstellen), and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of 
poetry.117  
 
Here again, in a seeming reliance on the “transcendental philosophy” à la Kant or 
Fichte, Schlegel performs a deconstructive operation on this mode of thinking. At a 
first glance, it may appear that when he talks about “represent[ing] the producer along 
with the product,” Schlegel is saying that the heroic, transcendental or rather 
transcendent subject can freely express or alienate itself, and thus have the license to 
destroy its expressions as its own property. Yet, he does not mean such a caprice or 
whim of the “Romantic” subject that would absolutize itself. Although this is one of 
the common preconceptions about Romanticism in general, it misses Schlegel’s point 
here. To “represent,” or rather present, “the producer along with the product” does not 
follow the representationalist model of expression, according to which the producer 
expresses and alienates itself in the product. This model presupposes the subject as an 
autonomous, proper, and self-identical entity. On the contrary, the phrase suggests that 
the producer is presented, i.e., reflected and signified, in the product. In other words, 
the producing subject is put in the object position, restricted and bound by the product, 
which amounts to saying that the presenter as signified in the work will be put in the 
position of the signifier or the presented. The product thus presents the producer in 
these senses. Here the hierarchy between the producer as subject and the product as 
object is not only reversed, but the subject position is reduced to a moment in the 
alternating chain of signification. One might immediately notice that this is not only 
one of the effects of radical reciprocity of reflection, but that the question of reflection 
and that of presentation (Darstellung) are inherently connected with each other. 
                                                 
117 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, 195; Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, 53. 
Benjamin quotes this passage in Benjamin, The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, 170. 
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Yausda’s statement that “the work and the writer must always be mixed together” 
should be understood in this specific sense. 
 Because of this productive and creative nature of reflection, Schlegel calls it 
“artistic reflection,” which he also describes as “poetic reflection.” One of the key 
figures that Schlegel employs to illuminate the characteristics of this reflection is 
“self-mirroring,” which gives a figuration to the strictly middle-voiced relationship 
between the reflecting and the reflected. In the Athenaeum Fragment 116 on “romantic 
poetry,” Schlegel presents the same idea vividly:  
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry...It alone can become like 
the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, an image of the age. And 
it can also—more than any other form—hover at the midpoint between the 
portrayed (das Dargestellte) and the portrayer (der Darstellende), free of all 
real and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that 
reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an endless 
succession of mirrors.118 
 
The figure of endless self-mirroring of reflection that hovers and floats at the midpoint 
suggests not only that any ultimate beginning or endpoint is absent, but also that there 
is no original or its copy. Instead, everything in this process becomes an “image” 
(Bild) without origins and multiplies itself infinitely. Thus, romantic poetry, that is, 
literature in general, is becomes the “universal” medium for the “whole 
circumambient world.” Here the world is conceived as nothing but images and marks 
of the play of difference in the signifying process. In a word, the world becomes traces 
of textuality. Such is the basic concept that underlies the understanding of work of art 
in the early German Romantics. 
At the same time, romantic poetry as self-reflexive, transcendental poetry is 
characterized by self-doubling. This is the reason why Schlegel at the end of 
Athenaeum Fragment 238 says that “[i]n all its descriptions, this poetry should 
                                                 
118 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, 175; Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, 38. 
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describe itself (sich darstellen), and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of 
poetry.” If one should specify a genre for this notion of “poetry of poetry,” which is 
inseparable from poetry per se, however, it would correspond to that of “criticism.” 
This dimension of German Romanticism was precisely what Benjamin’s essay was 
precisely concerned about. The notion that reflection is productive implies that 
criticism is not secondary to the work of art, but frees and completes the potentials 
inherent in it. In irony as a symbolic form, Benjamin maintains,  
reflection elevates itself to the absolute. Criticism of art exhibits this symbolic 
form in its purity; it disentangles it from all the inessential moments to which it 
may be bound in the work, and finishes with the dissolution of the work.119  
 
This constitutes the significance of “transcendental poetry” as “poetry of poetry.”  
“Poetry of poetry is the comprehensive expression for the reflexive nature of the 
absolute.”120 The self-reflexive and self-referential act of irony realizes freedom of 
literature as a productive mode of writing. In this way, criticism represents a self-
mirroring of work of art. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Schlegel, as well as 
Yasuda, produced some novels, but was primarily engaged in writing essays and 
criticism. This is quite truthful to the idea of romantic poetry. As Benjamin claims,  
[t]he idea of poetry has found its individuality…in the form of prose; the early 
Romantics know no deeper or better determination for it than “prose.” In this 
seemingly paradoxical but in truth very profound intuition, they find an 
entirely new basis for the philosophy of art.121 
 
Work as a “Lie” 
Returning to Yasuda’s context, Yasuda’s piece on Schlegel, too, is a critical essay on 
his novel. For Yasuda, criticism represented a major form of writing. Here he did not 
regard Romantic literature as a mere expression of the autonomous self or 
                                                 
119 Benjamin, The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, 172. 
120 Ibid., 171. 
121 Ibid., 173. 
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absolutization of the arbitrary self, but understood it derives from reflection of the 
“disintegration” within the self. “The I is a contradiction itself. The absolute hovers 
(tadayotte iru). Consequently, the self is worthless (kudaranai)....the work Lucinde is 
conceived by an artist who begins his lifetime work with the self-consciousness that he 
is a worthless human being.”122 This statement, which somehow reminds us of 
Schlegel’s Fragment I quoted, shows Yasuda’s understanding that the Romantic novel 
lies in reflexively ironizing the artist himself. However, “the I,” Yasuda says, “who 
has reached the bottom of oneself is then expanded from there to infinite distance.”123 
That is to say, self-reverting reflection turns itself into an ecstatic movement to the 
world at the same time. 
What is crucially important is how Yasuda grasped the notion of the “work” 
(sakuhin). His conception of work is, first, starkly different from the model of self-
expression of the artist. Second, if Yasuda talks about simultaneous self-creation and 
self-destruction, it is far from purely negative, but productive in an eminent sense. 
Here let us quote the important passage again: 
He [Schlegel] believes that the freedom to create a work must secure the 
freedom to destroy the creation at the same time. The artist feels only 
discontent with himself. He inevitably knows the “lie” of a work, but it is a lie 
that is not false…The work and its author must always be mixed together.124 
 
Driven by the urge for the infinite, which also implies the discontent, the artist 
produces a “work.” Interestingly enough, however, Yasuda calls it the “lie of a work,” 
“a lie that is not false” (sakuhin no uso, itsuwari de nai uso). It sure means a literary 
fiction or creation. But it does not remain a mere fictive work in a commonsensical 
sense because it lies prior to the division between truth and falsehood. It implies that 
the work as created lacks something, because of a lie, or rather presents itself as 
                                                 
122 Yasuda, “Rutsuinde no hankō to boku no naka no gunshū,” 178. 
123 Ibid., 177. 
124 Ibid., 181. 
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excessive, because it is not false. Therefore, Yasuda is saying that literary production 
is a form of “lie” in a profound, “extra-moral sense,” to use Nietzsche’s phrase. 
This is also in profound agreement with Friedrich Schlegel’s view of Poesie or 
literature. As Paul de Man argues, Schlegel gained insight into the “radical 
arbitrariness of any sign system” and therefore described language essentially as a 
metaphor or trope, which etymologically means “turning away.” Schlegel 
characterizes it even as “error, madness and simpleminded stupidity.”125 In other 
words, they recognized that there is profound “catachresis” at the bottom of language, 
because a name and the named are structurally different. Needles to say, this line of 
argument is also supported by Menninghaus’s interpretation that Schlegel 
deconstructed the metaphysics of “transcendental signified” through the notion of 
“absolute self-reflection.”  
 
Irony as “Permanent Parabasis” 
Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize that the profound metaphoricity of language as 
catachresis provides the conditions of possibility, and also necessity, for something 
like “irony.” While irony is usually defined as “saying one thing and meaning 
something else,” it is rooted in the essential catachresis of language. When Schlegel 
says in one of his Fragments (Ideas 69), “[i]rony is the clear consciousness of eternal 
agility, of an infinitely teeming chaos,” it suggests that irony derives from a speech act 
                                                 
125 See Paul de Man, “The Concept of Irony” in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), 180-1. In this illuminating talk, de Man discusses the relationship between 
Fichte’s philosophy and Schlegel’s conception of irony. De Man claims that the dialectic of the self-
creation, self-destruction and self-limitation in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre can be read as a theory of 
linguistic trope, while associating his idea of setzen or positing with “catachresis” as a capacity of 
naming randomly. (Ibid., 173) However, this interpretation of Fichte is a rather non-standard if not 
forced reading that deconstructs the logicist nature of his consistent system. Curiously enough, though, 
it results in reinforcing the traditional interpretation that stresses the influence of Fichte on Schlegel and 
their continuity. It would be a more accurate interpretation to see early German Romantics as a 
skeptical move away from Fichte’s foundationalism and the search for the absolute first principle such 
as the transcendental “I.” See Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, 
23-54. 
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of articulating this radical “chaos.”126 Obviously, the so-called “catachresis” is another 
name for this “chaos.” Irony is a keen consciousness that any limited, finite 
enunciation is never adequate to this profound chaos that lies at the heart of speaking 
and writing. That is the reason why irony constantly undoes and destructs what is said. 
At the same time, it never remains negative, but reveals the metaphoric nature of 
“chaos” itself by multiplying names for it with wit, allegory and so on, just as 
reflection mirrors the whole world. This is the affirmative moment of Romantic irony. 
As Schlegel says, irony in this conception is far from a mere form of rhetoric in the 
traditional sense of persuasion, but becomes “Socratic” and even “transcendental” in 
its deconstructed sense. “Philosophy,” he says in the Lyceum Fragment 42, “is the real 
homeland of irony, which one would like to define as logical beauty…Only poetry 
can also reach the heights of philosophy in this way, and only poetry does not restrict 
itself to isolated ironical passages, as rhetoric does.”127  
What Yasuda described as “the lie of a work, a lie that is not false,” I argue 
needs to be taken in this sense. If this is the case, the entire passage of Yasuda’s which 
I quoted above can be understood as describing the nature of Romantic irony. How, 
then, does irony work more specifically?  
Irony as a mode of poetic reflection represents a form of endless self-creation 
and self-destruction that mixes the producer and the product, the work and the artist. 
As such, irony brings about constant self-doubling. Significantly, in the above Lyceum 
Fragment, Schlegel identifies this self-doubling structure of irony as a “transcendental 
buffoonery”:  
There are ancient and modern poems that are pervaded by the divine breadth of 
irony throughout and informed by a truly transcendental buffoonery. 
Internally: the mood that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all 
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limitations, even above its own art, virtue, or genius; externally, in its 
execution: the mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian buffo.128 
 
This passage describes the movement of irony as “transcendental”; the mood 
(Stimmung) that rises above one’s own limitations, in turn, behaves like a buffo or 
clown toward the limited self. This going out of oneself and returning to oneself takes 
place in the ironic self-doubling simultaneously. If this is the case, self-reflection in 
irony is ecstatic at once. While such doubling is a practice of self-parody, it is 
important, however,  to see that Schlegel does not necessarily identify the agent of 
irony with the I or a self-reflexive subject, but describes it as poetic, i.e., textual 
phenomena. Thus, Paul de Man understands the role of the ironic buffo in its specific 
relation to narrativity and rhetoric, which he means in a deep sense that derives from 
the essentially metaphoric nature of language. “The buffo, what Schlegel refers to in 
commedia dell’arte, is the disruption of narrative illusion, the aparté, the aside to the 
audience, by means of which the illusion of the fiction is broken.”129 Irony is an 
operation that disrupts consistent and continuous flow of a narrative line.  
Furthermore, de Man relates “transcendental buffoonery” to a rhetorical 
technique known as “parabasis,” which Schlegel mentioned elsewhere: “the irony is a 
permanent parabasis (Parekbase).”130 According to Paul de Man, “parabasis” is “the 
interruption of a discourse by a shift in the rhetorical register.”131 He also illustrates it 
by referring to another rhetoric called “anacoluthon,” which means “a break in the 
syntactical expectations of the pattern.”132 Romantic irony as permanent parabasis 
repeats such operation throughout the text. Thus, it not only means one thing and says 
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129 De Man, “The Concept of Irony,” 178.  




something else as in a conventional irony, but constantly interrupts and undoes a 
consistent narrative line by doing so.  
 
Parabasis as “Romantic Revolt”  
For example of parabasis, de Man refers to a short chapter called “A Reflection” in 
Schlegel’s novel Lucinde that appears to develop a philosophical argument about the 
relationship between “the definite” and “the indefinite,” but that actually describes 
something completely different, i.e., a physical connection between a man and a 
woman. Schlegel consciously puts a “double meaning” in this passage.133 This 
naturally caused a scandal, which suggests that parabasis is disruptive and subversive 
of the socially sanctioned norms that are embedded in the allegorical structure of a 
narrative. Thus, de Man provides his definition of irony: “permanent parabasis of the 
allegory of tropes.” 
The allegory of tropes has its own narrative coherence, its own systematicity, 
and it is that coherence, that systematicity, which irony interrupts, disrupts. So 
one could say that any theory of irony is the undoing, the necessary undoing, 
of any theory of narrative, and it is ironic, as we say, that irony always comes 
up in relation to theories of narrative, when irony is precisely what makes it 
impossible ever to achieve a theory of narrative that would be consistent. 134 
 
Significantly enough, in the very context of commenting on Schlegel’s 
seemingly scandalous episode, Yasuda, like de Man, recognized that Lucinde is a 
work that resists narrativity:  
It is all about love. It has no narrative (monogatari) whatsoever. Needless to 
say, it has none of what can be called a plot (purotto). A narrative account in 
this case would be dull, literally boring.135  
 
Moreover, Yasuda contrasts narrativity with Schlegel’s pursuit of ideal love.  
                                                 
133 See Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, 118-21.  
134 De Man, ibid., 179. 
135 Yasuda, “Rutsuinde no hankō to boku no naka no gunshū,” 187. 
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All he thinks about is friendship and love. He is deeply concerned about the 
basis of love such as the masculine and the feminine. The singularity (yuiitsu 
no mono) lies in instantaneity (shunkansei). Things like beauty, love and the 
arts belong to it. Here the theory of Romantic synthesis conceives of the instant 
act of love extremely mystically.  
 
That is to say, true feeling of love and friendship is something that evades narrativity 
that accounts events with a coherent plot and a consistent story line. From this 
perspective, Yasuda rejects the charges against Schlegel. “The criticism this book 
received was launched against the lechery that would disrupt the customs and morals 
of a good family life. However, Julius is never a lecherous protagonist. He did nothing 
but idealizing and ironizing the unparalleled sacred love.”136 In other words, Yasuda 
defends Schlegel, saying that his openness should be regarded as a criticism against 
the hypocrisy of a moralistic attitude.  
Clearly, Yasuda associates narrativity with the dominant values and ideology 
of a civil society, which he calls gunshū or the crowd. In contrast, he closely connects 
the instantaneity and ideality of true feeling with what he calls “Romantic revolt” 
(roman teki hankō). At the same time, however, he does not equate this revolt with an 
elitist attitude that looks at the crowd with contempt and exceptionalizes himself. 
Instead, as the title of this essay—“Lucinde’s Revolt and the Crowed within Me”—
shows, he has a keen consciousness that the artist is part of the crowed. This ambiguity 
is nothing but a doubling effect of Romantic irony. Thus, it becomes possible to 
identify Yasuda’s “Romantic revolt” as his version of “permanent parabasis” as the 




                                                 
136 Ibid., 188. 
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Conclusion: Romanticism and the Question of “World History” 
In concluding, I would like to consider the political implications of the Romantic 
theory of reflection and irony. As I have shown, Romantic irony as a form of self-
mirroring and self-doubling reflection proved to have a critical power to deconstruct 
the binary oppositions between the primary and the secondary, the absolute and 
reflection, the original and the copy and so forth. One of the important consequences 
of this ironic operation is nothing less than the recognition that there is no absolute 
identity, subjective or objective, human or otherwise. It thus inevitably leads to 
constant formation and deformation of an identity, on the one hand, and to essential 
ambiguity and endless doubling in the process of identification, on the other. Another 
consequence, however, is that the identity will be supplemented and constituted by the 
lesser term of the binary opposition that was supposed to be secondary and inferior. 
This is the logic of supplementarity implied in the Romantic theory of absolute self-
reflection. Needless to say, such a critical conception of identity is effective in 
undermining forms of essentialism such as ethnic nationalism, racism, and sexism. 
However, there are certain social systems that are driven to overcome a given limit, 
distinction or boundary, thereby universalizing themselves. One can readily give the 
examples of imperialism and capitalism among others. These are potentially global 
social formations that tend to “deconstruct” themselves. That is to say, the moment of 
irony, in some form or other, is built in these mechanisms. 
Another but closely related example is a narrative of “world history” that aims 
to integrate particular histories of nations and collectivities. As I have discussed, 
however, Paul de Man emphasized that irony as permanent parabasis destroys a 
system of narrative that grounds an identity formation. Here he is pointing to a 
deconstructive power of irony. In opposition to major theorists of irony such as 
Benjamin and Kierkegaard, who seem to suggest an ultimate sublation of irony by 
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realization of the absolute idea in history or the arrival of Christ, he juxtaposes 
Schlegel’s passage that claims priority of chaos over human understanding: “Is not 
this entire infinite world built out of nonunderstanding, out of chaos, by means of 
understanding?” De Man then maintains: 
Any attempt to construct—that is, to narrate—on no matter how advanced a 
level, is suspended, interrupted, disrupted, by a passage like this. As a result, it 
also makes it very difficult to conceive of a historiography, a system of history, 
that would be sheltered from irony. Friedrich Schlegel’s interpreters have all 
felt this, which is why all of them, including Kierkegaard, have to invoke 
history as hypostasis as a means of defense against this irony. Irony and history 
seem to be curiously linked to each other.137 
 
This interpretation can be said to evaluate the destructive or deconstructive power of 
irony to the maximum. Yet, it also seems to contain certain ambiguity, because de 
Man opposes irony to history, while at the same time linking them to each other.  
As a matter of fact, however, it cannot explain how and why both Schlegel and 
Yasuda, in their own ways, actually came to appeal to the idea of 
“Universalgeschichte” or “world history” in their later phases. In the case of Schlegel, 
he offered Lectures on Universal History at Cologne in 1805-6.  Driven by the 
conviction that “all ideas, and the history of the human spirit; everything, everything 
originated in India without exception,” he narrated a history of the human race as a 
process of transmission of the original civilization, i.e., India, by way of colonization 
and migration.138 While his fascination with India surely dates back to his earlier 
period, this lecture course represents a certain shift in Schlegel’s thinking. As Nicholas 
A. Germana says,  
Schlegel’s more cosmopolitan, intellectually radical, aesthetic Romanticism 
had, by 1805, been replaced by an effort to ground German history and culture 
in a tradition of unimpeachable nobility and antiquity—Vedic India.139  
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Schlegel’s concern about medieval culture, Catholicism, and the Indian origin of the 
Germans became increasingly predominant, which culminated in his famous work, 
Über die Sprache and Weisheit der Inder (On the Language and Wisdom of the 
Indians), published in 1808. This turn was undoubtedly promoted by the humiliation 
of German states by France and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire by 
Napoleon in 1806. One important characteristic, however, that remained consistent in 
Schlegel’s interests in things India and, by extension, German orientalism throughout 
this period is what Germana calls “self-Othering”:  
Self-Othering…was a curious rhetorical strategy which involved two distinct 
forms or acts of Othering—imaginative constructions of the oriental Other 
with whom one could identify and the western imperial Other, against whom 
one was seeking to construct an identity.140  
 
In fact, Schlegel’s brother, August Wilhelm even stated that “[i]f the regeneration of 
the human species started in the East, Germany must be considered the Orient of 
Europe.”141 This significant feature of German orientalism indicates the plasticity and 
malleability of geopolitical co-figuration concerning the East-West binary. Moreover, 
one might be tempted to see in it an echo of the Romantics’ earlier philosophizing of 
reflection and irony. If this is the case, it will be hard to say that irony and history are 
mutually exclusive.  
In an analogous manner, but in a different historical and geographical context 
with divergent political stakes, Yasuda Yojūrō was also increasingly concerned about 
the notion of “world history” since the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. 
Under these circumstances, he made a forty-day trip to the Korean Peninsula and the 
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Chinese Continent from May to June 1938. Significantly enough, he consciously 
connects his project of “world history” with Romantic irony as a “transformative” 
power. As I will show in the next chapter, his travelogues unequivocally asserted the 
“world historical” mission of imperial Japan. Moreover, with this scheme he endorsed 
Japanese colonial rule in Korea by celebrating the desperate efforts of the colonized 
Koreans to become “Japanese.” If this is the case, rather than treat this fact as a mere 
episode that is notorious but accidental or “occasional” to Yasuda’s thought, or just 
reduce it to the historical context of Japanese imperialism, one might need to ask the 
question: how Romantic irony, in spite of its destructive power, could lead to, and 
become instrumental in, constructing a vision of “world history”? In the next chapter, 
therefore, I will go on to show how irony as permanent parabasis is at work in the 
imperial formation as developed in Yasuda’s texts, by effectively undermining any 
fixed identity, as well as binary oppositions. At the same time, however, I will also 
suggest how the colonized in the lesser position would supplement and constitute the 




Yasuda Yojūrō and the Korean Peninsula as the “Japanese Bridge” 
 
For a long time, the meaning of the Japanese word hashi—does it mean end, or, 
does it generally refer to boats used as intermediaries?—has been the topic of 
heated debate. Hashi [bridge] and hashi [chopstick] and hashi [ladder] all are 
hashi, but it makes good sense to understand hashi as that which connects two 
things, allowing movement back and forth across a flat surface and also 
movement up and down. Moreover, it is not at all odd to think that the people 
of old abstracted these means of movement back and forth and that for them 
hashi, which were facilitators of movement, were at the same time at the ends 
of things. 
—Yasuda Yojūrō, “Japanese Bridges” (1939) 142  
 
To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold 
(Geviert) in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is 
itself a location (Ort) can make space for a site....A space is something that has 
been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a 
boundary (Grenze), Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something 
stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which 
something begins its presencing (Wesen). 
—Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1951) 143 
 
There are ancient and modern poems that are pervaded by the divine breadth of 
irony throughout and informed by a truly transcendental buffoonery. 
Internally: the mood that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all 
limitations, even above its own art, virtue, or genius; externally, in its 
execution: the mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian buffo. 
—Friedrich Schlegel, “Lyceum Fragments 42” 144 
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In this chapter, I will examine Yasuda Yojūro’s literary involvement in Japanese 
colonialism in Korea in his travelogues that come out of his 1938 trip to Korea, 
Manchuria and China. By locating him in the historical contexts of the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1937-45 and the colonial policies by the governor-general’s office in Korea, 
Japanese empire, I will ask how Yasuda’s Romantic irony was involved in and served 
for Japanese empire.  
I will first suggest how closely the notion of “world history” was tied with his 
motifs of irony, bridge and Romanticism in his imperial journey. I will then analyze 
his characteristic narrative and set of tropes in depicting Korea and the Korean people 
such as the “road of intercourse” and “hantō” or the peninsula. I will go on to 
thematize his encounter with Korean writers and intellectuals who were devoted to the 
so-called Nihonshugi or “Japanism” at the time. To this end, I will locate this contact 
in Japan’s colonial policies in the late 1930s, as represented by “Japan and Korea as a 
single body” (naisen ittai) and the “military and logistic base for the continent” 
(tairiku heitan kichi). I will pay close attention to how Yasuda’s ambivalent rhetoric of 
Romantic irony is at work in this narrative of imperial world history by suspending 
and transforming the meaning of Korean “independence” into what he calls “semi-
independence.” Furthermore, I will juxtapose Yasuda’s response to the Japanist 
movement with the radical practice of a Korean intellectual, Hyun Yong Sup, who 
Yasuda met with in Keijō or Seoul. I will show how Hyun’s conception of “Japan and 
Korea as a single body” derived from a universalist ideal with certain critical and 
ironical stakes in it. By analyzing this encounter from both sides of the colonizer and 
the colonized, I will demonstrate how Romantic irony inscribed in empire 
deconstructed and hybridized the notions of “Japan,” the “Japanese” and the “national 
polity.” Here I will suggest not only that Yasuda’s world history was internally 
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contested by its peripheral encounter, but also that the figure of kokumin or the people 
emerged from this liminal place where heterogeneity is negotiated. In this contact zone, 
Yasuda and Hyun were complicit with and mirrored each other but in an asymmetrical 
way. Finally, I will also suggest that Yasuda’s emblematic figure of hashi or “bridge” 
is an illuminating trope. In his essay “Japanese Bridges,” Yasuda plays on the 
Japanese word hashi or bridge, which has so many homonyms such as “boats” (or 
“intermediary”), “chopstick,” “ladder,” and “end” (or “periphery”). According to his 
etymology, these words all mean “connect[ing] two things, allowing movement back 
and forth across a flat surface and also movement up and down.”  I will show that 
these polysemic elements—especially “boats,” “ladder,” and “periphery”—help 
explicate the movement of Yasuda’s imperial project.   
 
“World History,” Irony, and Bridge—Yasuda’s 1938 Imperial Journey 
From May 1, 1938 to June 12, with the backdrop of the China Incident, the critic 
Yasuda Yojūrō, together with the writer Satō Haruo, traveled to the continent, starting 
from the Korean Peninsula through Manchuria to North China and Mongolia.145 They 
were sent to the continent as reporters for the journal Cogito, publishing their accounts 
of the trip in various media such as Cogito and Shinchō. Yasuda compiled these essays 
into a book entitled Mōkyō (). 146 This title is indicative of the political nature of 
                                                 
145 This was the second trip to the Peninsula for Yasuda. The first time, he visited there and Manchuria 
in 1932, right after Manchukuo was established. As Louise Young points out, there was a boom of 
tourism to Manchuria since the establishment of Manchukuo. One of the factors that promoted this 
phenomenon was the growing mass media such as Kaizō, which sent critics and writers to the continent, 
organizing special issues. For instance, the January 1934 issue of the journal published an essay by 
Hasegawa Nyozekan on Harping and Fujiki Kuzō’s travel account on Rehe (Nekka). See Louise Young, 
Japan’s Total Empire (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 259-268, esp. 
267. It is probable that Yasuda had read Fujiki’s essay, given Yasuda’s visit to Rehe. 
146 Yasuda Yojūrō, Mōkyō in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.16 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), 7-193. To briefly 
summarize the course of the journey, the writers began with the Korean Peninsula, visiting famous 
places such as Keishū (Kyongju), Huyo (Puyo) and Keijō (Seoul). In Seoul, they met colonial 
intellectuals who were dedicated to the so-called Japanist movements. Then, moving through Hōten 
(Shenyang) in Manchuria, they arrived in China and stayed at such cities as Tianjin and Beijing. 
Significantly it was Takeuchi Yoshimi and other Japanese friends who guided the visitors in the city of 
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his journey: Mōkyō, or Mengjiang (Mengchiang), was the name of the puppet 
government that was created by Japan in the area of Inner Mongolia, showing that his 
travel was deeply imbricated with both Japan’s war efforts and the wartime media 
discourse. Although the writers did not visit the battlefield directly, the military was 
always present on the train, in the cities or almost anywhere they visited. In these 
circumstances, more and more writers and intellectuals were being mobilized to visit 
the army and its soldiers in the battlefields and report to the Japanese public. 
Before his departure, Yasuda wrote an essay entitled “Shōwa no seishin” (the 
spirit of Shōwa). He did not hide his excitement here. Declaring that the present was 
the time of “transformation,” he emphasized the idea of “world history.” He insisted 
on the significance of the current warfare. 
The spiritual atmosphere (kifū) of our time has already transcended the 
spiritual history of our country. As the sole will to our mythical world history, 
it is now being practiced. All the conventional ethical system and international 
law have become impotent before this act. The fact of this act represents 
nothing but transformation of the existing world, its order and logic.147  
 
Obviously he meant by the “act” Japan’s decision to go to war with China. It is 
important to notice that he explicitly stated that the current developments 
“transcended” the confines of Japan’s national history. The warfare, he claimed, had a 
“world historical” significance that would transform the existing world system. More 
specifically, he claimed,  
A step forward is now being made from Japan’s independence to independence 
of Asia. In terms of cultural history, this represents reconstruction of world 
culture. It is new Japan’s mission to assert the culture, spirit and wisdom of 
Asia, which has been excluded from the old world culture.148 
                                                                                                                                            
Beijing. See Yasuda, “Pekin,” 78. Born in the same year of 1910, Takeuchi was Yasuda’s schoolmate at 
the Osaka Higher School. Yasuda alone made an excursion to Mōkyō. On the return trip, he went over 
to Nekka (Rehe) within the Manchukuo area to see the Imperial Dwelling Palace at Chengde of the 
Qing dynasty. He met with Sato and others again in Ryojun (Lushun) to return to Kobe on a ship.  
147 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Shōwa no seishin” [The spirit of Shōwa] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.16 (Tokyo: 
Kodansha, 1987), 14. 
148 Ibid., 10. 
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“Independence of Asia”—as I will show later, Yasuda undermined this very notion by 
his irony, but for now, it is necessary to note that he had this quite problematic view of 
the war not as Japan’s invasion, but liberation of Asia. He also regarded Japan as the 
“sole defender of Asia” that had fought against “the European invasion” since Japan 
opened the country.149 He must have completely forgotten or repressed the fact that 
Japan was fighting a war with China, not with Europe. Here one has to see his deeply 
self-deceptive pride in Japan’s hegemony in Asia. It is undeniable that he was caught 
up with such jingoistic ideology of the prewar Pan-Asianism, and there is no 
defending him in this respect. In fact, such wartime remarks of Yasuda invited a 
number of criticisms against him, especially in the postwar, as I mentioned elsewhere. 
However, it does not seem to be very productive if it stops at merely denouncing him 
for these and other statements. My point here is not to criticize him for his affirmation 
of, and involvement in, the war as such, but rather to examine how his imperialism 
was motivated by his own literary imagination and what kind of effects it produced in 
his experience and writing. 
 In this regard, what is important to note is the fact that he clearly connected 
this “world historical” warfare and the notion of “Romantic irony,” which represents 
his defining theme. Irony, Yasuda argued, is essentially transformative. It does not 
represent “stasis” (jōtai), but “action” (kōi) and “transformation” (henkaku). If the 
present time, i.e., the era of Shōwa, is the time of transformation, it is the time of irony. 
He speaks of war in this context, 
If we seek for a spiritual symbol of our time, it is peace and war as irony. They 
were nothing but identical. Today’s war correspondent does not have time to 
think of a word that would sublate them.150  
 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 14. 
150 Ibid., 12. 
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“Peace and war as irony”—this typical phrasing of Yasuda might also be rendered as 
“peace as an irony of war,” and vice versa. While he says these two things are 
“identical,” he is not trying to conflate both. The point is that the one cannot exist 
without the other. Or rather, he is saying that the one cannot remain itself, but 
becomes its opposite. In other words, he is negating the static identity and distinction 
of each. To be sure, this sort of rhetoric might seem indistinguishable from a rather 
banal justification of war that insists that a war is waged for peace. But his point is not 
necessarily to use irony to justify the war. He is not saying, at least literally, that a war 
is an ultimate form of transformation. But he means by transformation a meta-level 
necessity of “peace” and “war” constantly turning into each other.   
Yasuda’s use of irony here reminds us of Friedrich Schlegel. As I have 
discussed in the previous chapter, he described irony as “an absolute synthesis of 
absolute antitheses, the continual self-creating interchange of two conflicting 
thoughts.”151 Irony in Schlegel represents a constant and reciprocal alternation of two 
poles (reflection and the reflected) that undermines binary oppositions, showing the 
absence of any fixed meaning and identity. Obviously, Yasuda does share this insight, 
but it is important to recognize that Yasuda took irony not only as a linguistic form in 
the narrow sense, but explicitly as a form of actual conduct, which means that he 
understood action and feeling as dimensions of signification and textuality. Therefore, 
for Yasuda, “despair and conviction,” “decadence and construction,” “boldness and 
calmness,” and “destruction and defense” are all ironies.152 “Today,” he says, “our 
Romantic irony is most explicitly expressed.”153 
Significantly enough, Yasuda clearly maintains that the distinction of the 
“West and the East” (ryōyō) is also this sort of irony. “The differentiation of the West 
                                                 
151 Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments, 176. 
152 Yasuda, “Shōwa no seishin,” 12. 
153 Ibid. 
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and the East needs to appear as an irony of unity of both. In fact, this is the nature of 
the West and the East.”154 In other words, he did not conceive of these terms as a 
binary opposition or essential difference at all. This remark is all the more important, 
because most commentators on Yasuda still tend to presuppose such a fixed, reified 
and essentialized dichotomy. Then, what about Japan? Where is Japan’s place in the 
world? “The cultural exchange of the West and the East,” he continues, “was the idea 
of the twentieth century culture. And the only achiever (jitsugensha) of this idea is 
Japan in the East.”155 (By 1940, Yasuda would name such an ambiguous place in the 
world “Japan as irony.”) What may seem quite perplexing, however, is that he 
immediately goes on to talk about Japan as the “defender of Asia” against “European 
invasion.” Is he talking about the cultural exchange or the military opposition between 
the West and the East? While after all, the cultural exchange and war would also 
represent an “irony” for Yasuda, this is precisely the way his writing constantly 
displaces what he is talking about.  
It is important to remember, however, the fact that Yasuda was writing this 
essay when he was about to travel to China with which Japan was waging a war. The 
so-called China Incident broke out just nine months before it. Although the Chinese 
capital was occupied by Japanese army, the intense battle was being fought at Xuzhou 
(Joshū), and it was during Yasuda’s stay in Beijing, on May 19, that the place fell to 
the Japanese army. This event was believed to represent a major turning point in the 
Incident, which was, however, going to be a long, protracted war resulting in Japan’s 
defeat in 1945.  
                                                 
154 Ibid., 13. 
155 Ibid., 13-4. 
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In this connection, I would like to take a look at his travelogue on Beijing. It 
was precisely under such circumstances filled with uncertain hope and anxiety that he 
visited Marco Polo Bridge: 
As the bridge Marco Polo once visited, the name Rokōkyō has long given me 
Romantic feelings and is one of the foreign bridges I especially mentioned a 
few years ago in my essay “Japanese Bridges.” The fact that the epoch-making 
gunfire was launched on July 7, the twelfth year of Showa [1937], along with 
Marco Polo’s journey that I introduced there, makes us feel even more 
Romantic. When you think of it, Japan, whose dim presence far in the distance 
invited the white man’s period of exploration, has finally appeared as the main 
actor of this century. The signal fire of its beginning was lit at this bridge, 
which keeps its ancient name.156 
 
Such a sense of excitement might have been an ironizing of anxiety for the unknown 
future. At any rate, this passage suggests how the figure of bridge gathered Yasuda’s 
motifs, i.e., Romanticism, world history, and irony. What made him feel Romantic 
was a certain exoticism associated with a foreign trip and the accompanying legend of 
Marco Polo’s monumental journey, which represents the first encounter of the West 
and the East. Moreover, the very enterprise of war was deemed Romantic, which he 
framed in the world historical meaning. At the same time, the bridge also symbolized 
Romantic irony in Yasuda’s sense as the conflictive unity in difference between the 
East and the West, as well as Japan and China. In this way, it is the symbolic register 
of the bridge that ties together all these aspects.157 
                                                 
156 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Pekin,” in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.16 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), 84 
157 In Beijing, however, his Romanticism was not fulfilled. What was disappointing was the reluctance 
to collaborate with Japan on the part of Chinese intellectuals and people. Guided by his old friend 
Takeuchi Yoshimi, Yasuda had exchange with Chinese writers such as the brother of Lu Xun. In 
contrast to his favorable views on the Korean Japanists, however, Yasuda was not satisfied with the 
cultural operation (bunka kōsaku) going on between Japanese and Chinese intellectuals. On the contrary, 
he was “enraged” with the latter. “They—the Beijing intelligentsia—first implicitly praise Chiang Kai-
shek’s China; in so doing, then check Japan, and finally request Japan to change its policy toward China. 
Japanese high education officers are sent to negotiate with these verbose, detestable trade partners. 
Japan should rain as many as shells as possible instead of dispatching them.” (Yasuda, “Mōkyō,” in 
Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.16 [Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987], 105.) Furthermore, Yasuda happened to 
observe a flag procession by local Chinese people in which they, with the Japanese Flag and the Five 
Color Flag in their hands, celebrated the fall of Joshū. “However,” he confessed, “from their procession, 
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The Discourse of “World History” and the “Road of Intercourse” 
In this way, the notion of “world history” played a central role for Yasuda’s imperial 
journey from the outset. Here I will begin to examine how he figured this notion more 
specifically. In Keishū (Kyongju), an old capital of Korea, where Yasuda visited as the 
first place on his trip, he expressed his ambitions for the travel as follows: 
We are about to travel to the North, in which Japan now dares to mark the 
world history of this century and engages in a great enterprise to transform the 
history of our nation. And the path I am now taking will lay the initial ‘road of 
intercourse’ (kōtsūro) for a new world culture. This road will for the first time 
be opened by a romantic Japan, which our Yamato minzoku will display to 
foreign countries and other minzoku around the world.158 
 
Unlike his established image as an anti-civilizational thinker, Yasuda was involved in 
the discourse of universal “world history.” Of particular importance is the phrase 
“road of intercourse.” In fact, Yasuda not only observed but found it significant that 
the conditions of transportation in Korea had been much improved, with automobiles 
increased and roads widened in comparison to 1932, when he made his first trip to 
Korea and Manchukuo after the Manchurian Incident. Thus, the romantic Japan that 
Yasuda celebrated was based on and legitimized by the narrative of world history and 
therefore was not opposed to, nor entirely different from, the regime of economic 
development and modernization. In fact, his journey this time was imperialistic in 
nature, that is to say, he took its route around the sphere of Japanese influence. Yasuda 
explained why he and his fellow travelers chose this route.   
                                                                                                                                            
I felt none of those things such as the state (kokka), the people (kokumin), and nation (minzoku) that 
ground ideas and inspiration for great things today. In Beijing, generally, I had to experience cultural 
despair.” (Yasuda, “Pekin,” 72.) Thus, what made Yasuda feel disillusioned was in part this sort of 
passive resistance on the part of Chinese people, which not only disturbed Yasuda’s imperial fantasy 
and sense of superiority, but made him totally lose his sense of ironic detachment. He finally came to 
identify these Chinese people and intellectuals as the “enemy.” 
158 Yasuda, “Keishū made” [Until Kyongju] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.16 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), 
19. 
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Our route begins with Korea, through the axis line of Manchuria to North 
China and reaches Inner Mongolia, with our return trip through Nekka (Rehe), 
which, again, belongs to the new Manchuria. This route seemed to be a very 
rational way to look at our Japan of today and to think of its tomorrow…In 
order to learn from and think of the past and future of today’s romantic Japan, I 
decided upon this path through which we can trace two thousand years of the 
long history of Japan’s management of the continent (tairiku keiei).159 
 
“Two thousand years of the long history of Japan’s management of the continent”—
one has to say it is an extraordinarily wild, Romantic fantasy, but it was hardly 
divergent from some of the contemporary pan-Asianist discourse. What can clearly be 
seen here is that the so-called romantic Japan in essence conforms to the expansion of 
the Japanese empire. Therefore, this travel route was immediately geopolitical, 
corresponding to the historical traces and destiny of imperial Japan: Korea in this 
configuration would be taken as representing Japan’s past, while both Manchukuo and 
Mōkyō are made to point to its future.  
Moreover, it is important to recognize that his journey to the peninsula and to 
the continent was motivated and driven by the notion of “world history.” The received 
interpretation of Yasuda and the Japanese Romantics, however, tended to focus on the 
aspects of an anti-modern, particularistic and ethnic nationalism that rejects the 
rational, progressive, linear conceptions of time and history. To be sure, as Hashikawa 
Bunzō pointed out, the Romantic movement historically originated from the deepening 
crisis of modernity in the early 1930s, and was formed under the influence of German 
Romanticism, the demise of Marxism, and the heritage of National Studies 
(kokugaku); its essential element lies in the radical conception and practice of 
Romantic irony.160  Nevertheless, one cannot emphasize too much the fact that the 
Romantics retained the idea of world history. In fact, the Manchurian Incident was 
                                                 
159 Yasuda, “Keishū made,” 28. 
160 Hashikawa Bunzō, Nihon roman ha hihan josetsu [Introduction to the critique of Japanese 
romantics] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1995 [1960]), 28-35. 
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considered an epoch-making, quasi-revolutionary event in contemporary world history, 
one that would radically transform the desperate situation in an analogous way to the 
French Revolution. Therefore, they regarded the China Incident as a development of 
this transformative project.  
Curiously enough, we can see here an interesting parallel to Friedrich 
Schlegel’s conception of “universal history” based on a narrative of cultural 
transmission and migration, although Yasuda could not have read his lectures on it.161 
In addition, one might also point out a certain influence of the Marxist discourse that 
theorized the world history as a development of “universal intercourse” as developed 
in The German Ideology, which Yasuda most likely had read by 1935.162 Moreover, 
the discourse of world history needs to be understood within the discursive space of 
imperial Japan after the outbreak of the China Incident. A prominent case is Miki 
Kiyoshi, one of the most influential philosophers for Yasuda’s generation: Miki was 
not only the translator of the young Marx and Engel’s work, but also was one of the 
major scholars and intellectuals at the Showa Research Association who, in trying to 
“solve the Incident,” proposed the idea of “world history” based on the concept of the 
“East Asian Cooperative Community” (Tōa kyōdōtai) at about the same time. (I will 
look at the relationship between this project and colonial Korea later.) To be sure, 
Yasuda’s take on this influential figure in the mainstream academic journalism was 
                                                 
161 See Nicholas A. Germana, The Orient of Europe: The Mythical Image of India and Competing 
Images of German National Identity (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). 137-42. 
162 See Karl Marx, The German Ideology, trans. S. Ryazanskaya in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert 
Tucker, (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978 [second edition]), 162. Miki translated 
this German work into Japanese in 1930. Yasuda referred to it in one of his early novels, Tōshin (life 
size), first published for the journal Cogito, no. 37 (June 1935). The protagonist says he studies 
Marxism in order to refute the proletarian writers. “I read one of the book by Marx seven times. Really 
seven times. Then, at the seventh time, I was possessed by the confidence that I was speaking Marx’ 
words, becoming Marx himself. This was the self-acquired technique of becoming a double [bunshin]. 
(…) I was taking a nap with Die Deutsche Ideologie under my head.” See Yasuda Yojūrō, “Tōshin” 
[Life size] in Yasuda Yojro zenshū, vol.1 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985), 376-408; the quotes from 386-9. As 
for Yasuda’s novels, see Kamiya Tadataka, Yasuda Yojūrō ron [On Yasuda Yojūrō] (Tokyo:Kari 
shokan, 1979), 39-64.  
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quite ambivalent from early on, and became increasingly critical, rejecting his agenda 
of the Community by 1939.163 But it would go too far to say Yasuda was 
quintessentially an anti-modern, anti-civilizational thinker. He did envision Japan’s 
imperial project in terms of the “world historical” development of intercourse. At the 
very least, even apart from the question of whether or not such a conception is 
specifically or intrinsically Romantic, it is an established fact that the Romantic 
authors were deeply intrigued by a view of history as some spatial and temporal 
developments. 
What is important to recognize is how Yasuda’s notion of Romantic world 
history is motivated by a certain tropic structure. At this point, we can discern two 
distinct moments in Yasuda’s conception of world history specifically. First, world 
history per se, while inciting the sublime feeling of “Romanticism,” is nevertheless 
still conceived of in terms of the civilizational mission that is vertical or hierarchical in 
nature. The second, closely related aspect is the figure of kōtsūro, or “the road of 
intercourse,” as the horizontal expansion of this world historical project. To illustrate 
                                                 
163 Interestingly enough, one of Miki’s first essays on “world history” was published in June 1938, i.e., 
after Yasuda had departed for the trip. See Miki Kiyoshi, “Gendai nihon ni okeru sekaishi no igi” [The 
significance of world history in contemporary Japan] in Miki Kiyoshi zenshū [Collected works of Miki 
Kiyoshi] vol.14 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967), 143-50. As for the East Asian Cooperative 
Community, see its manifesto Shin Nihon no shisō genri [The principles of thought for a New Japan], 
published under the name of the Cultural Research Group of the Showa Research Association in 
January 1939. See Miki Kiyoshi, Shin Nihon no shisō genri [The principles of thought for a New Japan] 
in Miki Kiyoshi zenshū, vol. 17 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 507-533. Yasuda often refers to Miki 
in an ambivalent manner. See, for instance, the essay “Hōhō to ketsui,” included in the first version of 
Nihon no hashi (Japanese bridges) in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū vol.4, 51-66, in which Yasuda discusses 
Miki’s 1936 essay “Tōyō teki ningen no hihan” [Criticism of the Oriental man]. Moreover, it was in 
January 1939, precisely at the same time when the Showa Research Association published “The 
Principles of Thought for a New Japan,” that Yasuda wrote his famous essay “Bunmei kaika no ronri no 
shūen” [The end of the logic of the Civilization and Enlightenment] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.7 
(Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), 11-21. In this essay, while still speaking of the “world historical” nature of 
the Incident, he criticizes “Marxist literature” as “the last stage of the logic of the Civilization and 
Enlightenment.” He especially targets the “bureaucratic” way of thinking among contemporary 
intellectuals promoted by certain academic journalism. When one takes a look at another essay 
published immediately after this, it becomes clear that this attack was directed against Miki and 
Iwanami shoten for which he served as an adviser. Yasuda also mentions the “East Asian Cooperative 
Community” in this context. See Yasuda Yojūrō, “Jihen to bungaku” [The incident and literature] 
(published in March 1939) in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol.7 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), 28-40. 
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these two moments, I will invoke in the next section his emblematic figure, i.e., hashi 
or the “bridge” in its polysemic elements. First, the figure of world history signifies a 
hashi as the civilizational “ladder” (hashigo). Second, as the road of intercourse 
represents another hashi as the means and route—“bridge” or “boat”—for imperial 
expansion. These tropic figures, as I will show, serve as analytical frameworks to 
characterize Yasuda’s imperial project. 
 
Narrativizing Korea as a “Semi-Independent” “Peninsula” 
These two aspects of Yasuda’s world history are fully articulated in the figure of hantō 
or “the peninsula.” Here let us examine his specific narration of a history of Korea, 
which reveals the imperial nature of his project. 
In his essay, “Impressions of Korea,” Yasuda provides his most comprehensive 
view on Korea.164 Here he begins with his reflection on the past history and culture of 
Korea and then goes on to talk about the current situation in which the so-called 
Nihonshugi or Japanist movements emerged.  
What are Korea’s cultural undercurrents? My shallow impressions are not 
sufficient, but leaving aside the Gija legend and Tan’gun legend for now, I am 
interested in the national character (kunigara) that survived in spite of the 
neighboring Chinese dynasties of the Mongols, Ming, and Qing, forming a 
semi-independent country since the unification by Silla. This national character 
is not that of the Mongolians nor that of the Manchurians nor that of the Han. 
With this question in mind, I observed things Korean, enjoyed Korea’s scenery 
and read its literature.165  
 
As is clearly seen in his tendentious choice of the word, “semi-independence,” Yasuda 
downplays the historical significance of the unification and state-formation of Korea 
by Silla.  
                                                 
164 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Chōsen no inshō” [Impressions of Korea] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 16 
(Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986), 45-57; first appeared in Cogito (November 1938). 
165 Ibid., 46. 
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But the enterprise of the unification by Silla, which is said to have marked the 
very beginning of “Korean” history, was independence not so much by 
Koreans as by the T’ang dynasty. Korea was able to establish a state in its 
subsequent history because Japan’s check has always been effective against the 
continent.166 
 
Yasuda seems as if he had forgotten the history of the mid-seventh century in which 
Japan’s intervention into the peninsula completely failed. Yasuda does however, 
mention this historical fact of the defeat of Japan and its ally Baekje vis-à-vis Silla 
elsewhere, but he strictly narrates its positive outcome, emphasizing the artistic and 
technical contributions of Baekje’s refugees to the Japanese court. In this account, he 
implies that the ancient Japanese state was internationally open and even 
multicultural.167 In this way, his intent to make light of Korea is so open and explicit 
that he keeps emphasizing its inferior position in the history and geopolitical space of 
ancient East Asia.  
There would be no way to revive the culture of Silla. All Korean nationalism 
(minzoku shugi) is false, not only today, when the Korea that existed as an old 
road of intercourse has now changed its comings and goings, but also in terms 
of the cultural ethics of tomorrow’s world. Even the ethics that the humanists 
in Japan proper envision for the peninsula is false. The fact that the peninsula 
did not perish, after all, owes to the existence of Japan since the inception of its 
history.168 
 
In this way, Yasuda seems to dismiss out of hand any capacity of Korea to be 
autonomous, dismissing its attempts to be independent. Yet, as I show later, this does 
not necessarily mean that he eliminated every potential of “nationalism” for Koreans: 
the sole exception is to encourage nationalism in the form of “Nihonshugi” or 
“Japanism.”  
                                                 
166 Ibid. 
167 See Yasuda Yojūrō, “Fuyo” [Puyo] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 16, 38-42. 
168 Yasuda, “Chōsen no inshō,” 46. 
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Before going to this problem, however, let us first focus on what is 
characteristic in his narrative. Yasuda describes Korea primarily in terms of its 
geographical location between Japan and China, heavily relying upon the figure of 
hantō or the “peninsula.” In other words, this geographical feature serves as a trope for 
Korea’s cultural and political place in the East Asian world. It is important to notice 
that this figure of “han-tō” () is closely connected to another description, i.e., 
“han-dokuritsu” (	, “semi-independence”), in its insufficient or imperfect 
quality of “han,” that is, “half” or “semi-” ().For now, it will suffice to point out that 
the trope of hantō has two different, somewhat contradictory effects. First, it works to 
deprive Koreans of any autonomous agency, because the people tend to be reduced to 
a mere natural geography. Second, however, it also helps talk about the historical 
present in such a way to incorporate “hantōjin” or the “peninsular people” into the 
world historical project led by imperial Japan; the peninsula would provide an 
essential link or “bridge” to the continent. These aspects, I argue, correspond to the 
double meaning of hashi I mentioned above. That is to say, the hierarchical character 
of the first hashi as a “ladder” is implied in the subordinate status of the “han,” 
whereas the second hashi in the sense of a “bridge” or “intermediary” can easily serve 
as a metaphor for the spatial figure of the hantō, at least from the perspective of the 
Japanese archipelago towards the continent. I will call this tropic structure of Yasuda’s 
imperial project a “peninsula-bridge” regime. If this is the case, my reading of 
Yasuda’s narrative in terms of hashi is supported by this connection. 
Just as Yasuda reduces the Korean people into the mere geography, Yasuda 
devaluates them in cultural terms, contrasting Korean culture with that of the Japanese, 
which is supposedly essential and original. 
The culture that Koreans created is extremely meager. In the worlds of poetry, 
literature and painting, which are the most genuine fields of a native culture, 
they possess no worthwhile works. Yet, it is unusual that this minzoku, lying 
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between China and Japan, neither invaded the continent even once, nor was 
ever destroyed.169  
 
From the present perspective, such discriminatory talk of cultural hierarchy is utterly 
untenable in many ways. As a matter of historical fact, however, Japan’s cultural debt 
and influence from the Korean peninsula were enormous, ranging from important 
technologies such as iron to the arts and culture like Buddhism and Confucianism.170 
By ascribing these imports to the Chinese continent, and describing Korea as a mere 
“route” for them, Yasuda is trying to minimize, if not disavow, Japan’s large debt to 
Korea in its cultural history.The only exception, it seems, is the case of Baekje’s 
influence on the seventh century Japan. In addition, it is also arguable that even the 
Japanese imperial family descended from Korea. Significantly enough, Yasuda did not 
clearly deny its possibility, as I mention later.  
While it may be tempting to dismiss Yasuda as a mere chauvinist plagued by 
the prewar imperialist view of history, it would not be an adequate criticism if it is 
based on the standpoint of a national history that presupposes fixed categories of 
“Japan,” “Korea” and so forth, and requires self- identification with them. In other 
words, such a denunciation would repeat the kind of national identification that is 
similar to its object of criticism. Rather, it is necessary to keep in mind that these 
figures are nothing but historical constructs in certain conjunctures. Interestingly, 
Yasuda was actually not unaware that he was involved in one of the historic moments 
in modern history in which the malleable figure of the “nation” was being reshaped 
and refashioned. The performativity of Yasuda’s engagement with reconfiguring the 
nation requires further attention in order to make visible the historicity of this critical 
conjuncture in Japanese empire. 
                                                 
169 Ibid., 47. 
170 See Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, updated edition (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2005), 33-4. 
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Exposure to the “Japanist” Movement by Korean Intellectuals  
In May 1938, Yasuda Yojūrō visited the city of Keijō (Seoul) where he met with a 
number of Korean intellectuals who were involved in the Nihonshugi or “Japanist” 
movement. This was a critical historical moment when the new kōminka (
, 
imperialization) policy, including the “oath of imperial subjects” (kōkoku shinmin no 
seishi) and the volunteer soldier system, had been introduced by the Korean governor 
general’s office. Under this asymmetrical colonial power relationship, these 
enthusiastic writers and intellectuals endeavored to become “real” Japanese. In fact, 
Yasuda was quite impressed by these efforts and was lavish with praise of them. In 
other words, Yasuda showed due sympathy for those colonized who needed 
recognition from the colonizer. Both parties thus seem to have reached mutual 
understanding and recognition. However, as I will analyze in the following sections, 
their contact, which affected their subsequent writings, was filled with ambiguity and 
ambivalence on both sides of the colonizer and the colonized. My reading of the traces 
of the meeting will reveal another important dimension of hashi that I call the 
“periphery as a site of encounter.” As I will show, the periphery is a liminal place 
where one meets the other. In this encounter, one’s identity will be revealed to be split, 
heterogeneous and hybrid.  
In contrast to his initial mode of cultural and historical narrative, the tone of his 
essay becomes affirmative when he refers to the developments after the China Incident 
that changed the whole situation in a drastic manner. Yasuda asserts that today’s 
Korea is not what it used to be:  
But the Incident has made us understand for the first time that the culture that 
was transplanted from Japan was not merely the external forms of the culture 
of Western Europe. Many of the people of the peninsula have understood the 
world and Japan in world history, apparently obtaining their self-awareness of 
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being Japanese from that of having been Japanese. This means that the ideal of 
Japan has appeared in the peninsula for the first time. (italic mine) 171  
 
The Japanese ideal was something that could be “transplanted.” So was the spirit. 
Therefore, even if one was not Japanese, one could become Japanese. Moreover, one 
could even have the awareness that he or she had already been Japanese. If Yasuda 
really means this, it would amount to saying that “Japanese-ness” is not only not the 
exclusive monopoly of, the so-called “Japanese.” But it also means that it is never 
original to them, because someone who was neither born in Japan nor was Japanese 
can retroactively become Japanese. This would be the opposite to an essentialist 
understanding of “nationality.” This “nationalism” of Yasuda’s type, at least at face 
value, is fundamentally different from such an ideology of ethnic nationalism. 
Interestingly enough, Yasuda celebrated this awareness without any hint of irony here:   
Thanks to our great enterprise of today, the peninsular path as the old route of 
intercourse has changed drastically. The peninsular problem, which is coming 
up on seventy years since its emergence in the Meiji, now seventy years later, 
faces the possibility of a solution such that Japan and Korea would become as 
one (, naisen ichinyo).172 
 
Although he does not use the term naisen ittai () or “Japan and Korea as one 
body” here, what he saw in Korea was a political trend toward this since the outbreak 
of the China Incident. If the Incident was the turning point, it means that the problem 
of the Japan-Korea relation is inevitably embedded in its further relation to the 
continent, which is suggested in his description of Korea as the “route of intercourse” 
in this very context. In other words, not only the relation, but also the possibility of 
“oneness” between Japan and Korea is mediated by or even dependent upon 
something else, that is to say, the continent. This suggests that Japan and Korea can 
                                                 
171 Ibid., 47.  
172 Ibid., 50. 
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become as one vis-à-vis China. It is precisely at this conjuncture that the trope of 
hantō as the second hashi (bridge or boat) manifests its political implications most 
clearly. The “peninsula” symbolizes a regime of complicity and mobilization of the 
colonized in further imperial expansion, as I will discuss later. What is crucially 
important here is to understand that “oneness” under this “peninsula-bridge” regime is 
always already deferred and displaced in relation to the beyond, that is, the continent.   
It is a rare thing that the peninsular people have come to know the Japanese 
state as an ethics. In their ethical life, the lowest of all the commoners here are 
superior to the Chinese in terms of their value today. 173 
 
Yasuda seemed to equate “ethics” and “value” with knowledge of the Japanese state, 
which then constitutes the center of the “oneness.” As is clearly seen here, oneness is 
internally structured by the first hashi as the ladder of the vertical order between Japan, 
Korea and China. Therefore, his vision of world history develops itself essentially as a 
hierarchy of the states. And now the Japanese state was now at war with China.  
They [Koreans] read the “oath of imperial subjects” everyday. They see off 
soldiers to the battlefield, make constant donations, and assist families in the 
home front. Some of them even have come to participate in the imperial army 
for the first time. No one could have forced this spirit of service on the home 
front.174 
 
When Yasuda maintained that “the people in the peninsula have obtained cognition of 
the world for the first time,” it meant nothing but the awareness and becoming on the 
                                                 
173 Ibid., 47. 
174 Ibid., 50. “The oath of imperial subjects” is composed of the following phrases: the oath number one, 
which is meant for the school children—“1. We are the subjects of the Great Japanese empire. 2. We 
work together to dedicate our loyalty to His Majesty. 3. We train ourselves to become excellent, strong 
people (kokumin)”; the oath number two, which is intended for the students and adults—“1. We, the 
imperial subjects, will devote ourselves to the emperor’s country with loyalty. 2. We, the imperial 
subjects, will strengthen our union with mutual trust and cooperation. 3. We, the imperial subjects, will 
elevate the imperial way by nurturing perseverance and discipline.” See Kawamura Minato, Umi wo 
watatta nihongo [The Japanese language that crossed the sea] (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1994), 147. As for the 
oath, see also Yasuda Toshiaki, Shokuminchi no naka no “kokugo gaku” [Studies of kokugo in the 
colony] (Tokyo: Sangensha, 1997), 62-88.  
 107 
part of Koreans as imperial subjects, which should be demonstrated through active 
participation in warfare. 
Under these circumstances, the internal ambivalence in the oneness of Korea 
and Japan had to manifest itself in a violent fashion. First of all, it was all too obvious 
that the colonial subjects were never equal to native Japanese citizens. In other words, 
precisely because complete assimilation was impossible, the Koreans were driven into 
the desperate attempt at identification as the imperial subjects. It was in this situation 
that Japanism emerged in Korea, both anticipating and responding to the colonial 
government’s policy of kōminka or imperialization that aimed at making Koreans into 
loyal imperial subjects of the Japanese emperor.  
In this connection, Yasuda touched upon various attempts at pro-Japanese 
collaboration. In particular, he referred to two major movements. One group is called 
Kōkoku jinmin undō  (the “people of the imperial nation movement”) led by Jung Nam 
Soo (), who studied in the United States and was a Christian. Another example 
is the organization called Daitō minyūkai ( [sic]) based on the statist Cha 
Jae Jung ().175 Significantly, as Yasuda notes, “many of these people converted 
from nationalism (which is not that of Japan), socialism, anarchism and 
communism.”176 He points out the “reason” for conversion. “The reason for this, they 
say, is that they have a far wider recognition of the world than narrow-minded 
nationalists (minzoku shugi).” Interestingly enough, Nihonshugi as these Koreans 
                                                 
175 According to Tobe Hideaki, Cha was a converted activist who had participated in the 1929 Kwanju 
student incident. He was one of the founders of the organization for Korean former leftists, “e:
.” See Tobe Hideaki, “Shiryō to shōgen I. Nitchū sensō ki Chōsen chishikijin no Tōa kyōdōtai ron. 
Shiryō kaidai” [Materials and testimonies I. The discussions of the East Asian Cooperative Community 
by Korean intellectuals in the Sino-Japanese War period. Introduction] in Quadrante no. 6 (March 
2004), 344. The study group “Overcoming Colonial/Modernity” (Shokuminchi kindai no chōkoku 
kenkyūkai) has edited important collections of essays by colonial intellectuals during the period of the 
China Incident who responded to both the naisen ittai policy and the discourse of the East Asian 
Cooperative Community. Cha’s essay, “Tōa shin chitsujo to kakushin” [The East Asian new order and 
reform] is available in Choi Jinseok’s Japanese translation for the journal. See ibid., 368-72. 
176 Yasuda, “Chōsen no inshō,” 51. 
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understood and practiced it represented a much more universal standpoint than the 
other modern ideologies such as anarchism and socialism, not to mention Korean 
separatist nationalism. The term minzoku shugi () in this specific context 
was regarded as a backward, unenlightened attitude clinging to a particularistic 
principle that is minzoku. On the contrary, for these colonial intellectuals, the kōminka 
project represented a universalistic standpoint of “world history.” This was the very 
reason why they converted to Japanism. Yasuda continues: 
These peninsular Japanists, I heard, discuss questions such as whether or not 
Japanese nationalists (kokka shugi) argue for the Nazi type purity of blood. 
Rather, I know well that Japanese rightists embrace emotionally, or almost 
sentimentally, their international love for spreading the imperial way (kōdō). 
Surprisingly, this Japanism in the peninsular people advocates even the 
abolition of the Korean language.177
 
Precisely because they committed themselves to the universalistic standpoint, these 
colonial intellectuals could not help but be concerned about the tendency of ethnic 
essentialism among Japanese nationalists. Behind the seemingly pious attitude of the 
Japanists were there implicit critical stakes in their discussion about the racist politics 
of German National Socialism. In other words, these Korean intellectuals were 
involved in two distinct agenda at the same time: while trying to overcome ethnic 
nationalism within Korea, they intended to pressure “minzoku shugi” on the part of 
Japanese nationalists. In contrast, however, it is highly dubious whether the 
mainstream Japanese rightists were indeed so philanthropic, as Yasuda supposed.  
Of particular interest is that through introduction by Japanese intellectuals in 
Keijō, Yasuda had a meeting with one of the representative pro-Japanese collaborators 
(chinilpa), Hyun Yong Sup ( !).178 As was the case with other Japanists, he, too, 
                                                 
177 Ibid., 51. 
178 See ibid., 51-3.It was Professor Takagi Ichinosuke at Keijō Imperial University who introduced 
Hyun to Yasuda. At Keijō, Takagi taught kokubungaku (national literature) and was involved in the 
colonial policy of kokugo (national language). See Kawamura Minato, Umi wo watatta nihongo, 133-9. 
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had converted from anarchism. The China Incident marked a turning point for him, as 
well as for other Korean intellectuals. He began collaborating with the Japanist 
organization called Ryokki renmei ("#$%, the green flag league) founded by the 
Japanese inhabitants in Korea such as Tsuda Katashi, the professor at the preparatory 
school for Keijō Imperial University, Morita Yoshio and so on. In July 1938, when 
Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen renmei (the Korean league for the total mobilization 
of national spirit) was created in the first anniversary of the Incident, Hyun became the 
chief of this organization. Moreover, what made him most infamous was the fact that 
he enthusiastically advocated the abolition of Korean language.179 Quite naturally, 
after the collapse of Japanese empire and the subsequent liberation in 1945, he was 
denounced not only for collaborating with the colonial rule, but for attempting to 
annihilate cultural identity of the Korean people or minzoku. He is said to be a 
                                                                                                                                            
In this context, it is important to note that Takagi was the person who invited the linguist Tokieda 
Motoki to the university. As is well known, Tokieda was the major theorist of kokugo or the national 
language. Needless to say, the idea of kokugo had an essential connection with the ideology of kokumin. 
Obviously, Hyun’s proposal to abolish the Korean language was strictly in line with both theory and 
policy of kokugo. As for Tokieda’s kokugogaku and its fundamental criticism, see Naoki Sakai, Voices 
of the Past. The Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 320-336. Also, for its relation to Japanese colonialism, see the following 
numerous studies: Kawamura, ibid., 148-155 and 223-257; Yasuda Toshiaki, Shokuminchi no naka no 
‘kokugogaku’ and Kokugo no kindai shi [A modern history of the national language] (Tokyo: 
Chūōkōron, 2006), 90-132; Fukuma Yoshiaki, Henkyō ni utsuru nihon [Japan mirrored in the 
periphery] (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2003), 230-259; Tomiko Yoda, Gender and National Literature: 
Heian Texts in the Constructions of Japanese Modernity (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2004),146-81. There are several important points to make about Tokieda’s theory and its relation to 
Japanese imperialism. First, as Fukuma’s study emphasizes, the notion of kokugo was necessitated 
precisely because of Tokieda’s encounter with the colonized in the periphery and the felt need to 
linguistically integrate them. My argument in this paper demonstrates a similar problematic in the case 
of Yasuda Yojūrō. Second, as Yasuda Toshiaki’s recent work pointed out, in the context of Japanese 
empire as a whole, “kokugo” was employed in a way that is both differential from and complementary 
to the notion of “Nihongo” or the Japanese language. In Japan proper and its colonies such as Korea and 
Taiwan, the term kokugo was predominant; however, in other areas within the so-called Greater East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, such as Manchukuo and South East Asia, the name Nihongo was used to 
refer to the Japanese language as a common language for diverse minzoku. A similar parallel can be 
said to exist in the relation between kokumin and minzoku in the empire as a whole. That is to say, both 
kokumin and minzoku functioned as different but closely connected technologies for Japanese imperial 
rule.  
179 For Hyun and Ryokki renmei, see Takasaki Sōji, “Chōsen no shinnichi ha” [Pro-Japanese 
collaborators in Korea] in Kindai nihon to shokuminchi [Modern Japan and the colonies], vol. 6 (Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 1993), 123-147.  
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forgotten figure today. In spite of this, his influence in the kōminka period is indicated 
by the fact that Hyun’s book, Chōsenjin no susumu beki michi (The Path that Koreans 
Should Take), was a bestseller of nearly twenty thousand copies.180 As Yasuda 
admitted, however, this fact was not well known in the metropole of Japanese empire. 
Yasuda never relented in celebrating this work. “Here the Japanist stance among the 
peninsular intelligentsias under the Incident is explained with clarity and vivid 
expressions.”181 Yasuda provided a succinct summary for his reader.  
The conclusion of this interesting book states that, in order to exercise their 
personal capacities and engage in a universal mission (sekai teki ninmu), 
Koreans must first become Japanese kokumin and have the awareness as 
Japanese.182  
 
What is remarkable in this passage is the fact that Yasuda reads Hyun as identifying 
the Japanese as kokumin (&), instead of minzoku (). While the latter tends to 
be used as a social category describing a collectivity according to its particular ethnic 
difference from others, kokumin primarily refers to the people that constitutes a 
political unity of a nation and shares an equal membership. If the colonial 
government’s imperialization policy sought to mobilize and integrate the colonial 
population in the empire, it did so by making them Japanese kokumin. In other words, 
kōminka (imperialization) practically meant kokumin-ka (nationalization). In the 
meantime, some Korean Japanists like Hyun read it as a symbol for achieving an equal 
status with the native Japanese. It is true that there were other Korean intellectuals and 
activists who pursued a different strategy that would resist complete assimilation 
trying to retain their ethnic language and culture, as I show shortly. However, as 
Yasuda rightly pointed out, Hyun’s take on kokumin was distinctive in his orientation 
towards its “universal dimension.” If Hyun tried to radically identify with the 
                                                 
180 Yasuda, “Chōsen no inshō,” 51. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid., 52. 
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colonizer through even abandoning his own language, he was driven by a desire for 
world historical universality. This also meant he was critical of the Korean ethnic 
nationalists. 
Yasuda not only recognizes Hyun’s claim as serious and genuine, but also 
makes a significant remark: “If Japan does not know how to answer this essential 
something, if it ignores this enthusiastic spiritual effort to become one with ‘Japan’, it 
will be Japan’s failure” (italic mine).183 Here he is far from cynical because he was 
aware that the attempt of these imperial subjects to become “real” Japanese implicitly 
questioned whether or not “Japan” was fully qualified as the leader for this “universal 
mission.” How then did Yasuda himself responded to this “essential something”?   
 
Japanese Colonial Policies in Korea: “Japan and Korea as a Single Body”  
Before going on to deal with this crucial question, let us here clarify the historical 
context of this encounter between Yasuda and the Korean intellectuals. As scholars 
such as Tobe Hideaki and Choi Jinseok point out, the current Japanese and colonial 
governments were forced to mobilize the human and material resources in Korea as 
the Sino-Japanese War since 1937 was becoming increasingly an all-out war.184 
Naisen ittai () or “Japan and Korea as one body” was the policy that the 
governor-general Minami Jirō implemented and which aimed to obtain the support and 
involvement of the colonial subjects in Japan’s war efforts by promising to realize a 
certain equality with the Japanese citizens. Specifically, the policy purported to 
                                                 
183 Ibid.  
184See Tobe Hideaki, “Shiryō to shōgen I. Nitchū sensō ki Chōsen chishikijin no Tōa kyōdōtai ron. 
Shiryō kaidai” [Materials and testimonies I. The discussions of the East Asian cooperative community 
by the Korean intellectuals in the Sino-Japanese War period. Introduction] in Quadrante, vol 6 (March 
2004), 339-352; Choi Jinseok, “Shiryō to shōgen II. Nitchū sensō ki Chōsen chishikijin no naisen ittai 
ron. Shiryō kaidai” [Materials and testimonies II. The discussions of Japan and Korea as a single body 
by the Korean intellectuals in the Sino-Japanese War period. Introduction]  in Quadrante, vol 7 (March 
2005), 291-308. 
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guarantee certain social rights such as compulsory education and universal suffrage. In 
exchange, the colonial government sought to open up military careers to Koreans, first 
by a volunteer soldier system in 1938 and then in the form of a draft system in 1942. 
As Yasuda noted in the above quote, the first volunteer soldiers had been gathered in 
April 1938 right before he visited Korea. Furthermore, the government planned to 
make Korea into a “military and logistic base for the continent” ('()*+, 
tairiku heitan kichi), which aimed to mobilize the human and material resources in 
Korea for the sake of the Japanese war effort. 
There were two different responses on the part of the colonized toward this 
move. One was the enthusiastic embracement of this policy called tettei naisen ittai 
(,-) or “Japan and Korea as a complete single body.” Hyun Yong Sup 
was known as one of the representative ideologues of this standpoint that insisted that 
Koreans become Japanese by abolishing the Korean language and acquiring the 
Japanese one. Another reaction was the so-called theory of “Japan and Korea as a 
cooperative single body” (./0, kyōwa teki naisen ittai), as advocated by 
the converted Marxists such as In Jeong Sik and Kim Ming Sik. As Tobe and Choi 
demonstrate, the latter was a strategy chosen in order to intervene into the discourse of 
the “East Asian Cooperative Community” (1.2, Tōa kyōdōtai). Despite the 
fact that this idea was originally addressed to China and Manchukuo, these Korean 
intellectuals endeavored to transform it to include colonial Korea, which was 
envisioned as a step towards greater autonomy and possible decolonization in the 
future. While the tettei naisen ittai sought to improve the status of Koreans by 
becoming the same imperial subjects as the Japanese—that is, kokumin—, the strategy 
of the kyōwa teki naisen ittai, I argue, was to create a wider space for autonomy and 
cultural difference by being recognized as a different minzoku. In so doing, the latter 
aimed to retain their ethnic and cultural identity including the Korean language. 
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Needless to say, they were highly critical of the attempt at complete unification by the 
Japanists.     
However, this latter intervention was a risky project in that it would actively 
collaborate with the wartime regime of total mobilization. In particular, the move for 
the “military and logistic base for the continent” was appealing to the proponents of 
the kyōwa teki naisen ittai, because this policy had the potential to modernize Korea 
through increased investment in heavy industry and implementation of compulsory 
education. However, this strategy of intervention was a double-edged sword in that it 
would inevitably implicate Korea in the Japanese war regime and colonialism in 
relation to Manchukuo and China in a more intensified manner.185 Obviously, this is 
the danger inherent in what I called the peninsula-bridge regime of Japanese 
colonialism. In this respect, despite the different strategic stakes, both agenda on the 
part of Korean intellectuals ran the risk of ending up reinforcing, and being 
incorporated into, the colonial regime.  
In spite of all this, however, it is important to notice that these categories of 
kokumin and minzoku were never fixed labels that are merely applied to a given 
population by the imperial power. Instead, I would rather claim that not only the 
application, but the articulation, of these social categories in their specific signification 
was contingent upon a complex, performative field of hegemonic power-relation, as 
well as negotiation, between the colonizer and the colonized. Later in my discussion, I 
will evoke the third aspect in the trope of hashi, which I call the periphery as the site 
of encounter, because I would like to emphasize this process of interaction. 
                                                 
185 For more detailed treatments of the discourse of the East Asian Cooperative Community and 
“kyōwateki naisen ittai ron” in particular, see Hong Jeong-uk, “Sen kyūhyaku sanjūnen dai ni okeru 
shokuminchi Chōsenjin no shisō teki mosaku” [Intellectual search by colonial Koreans in the 1930s], in 
Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbun shū  [Essays in the studies of the Korean history] no. 42, 2004; Tobe 
Hideaki, “Tenkō ron no senji to sengo” [The wartime and postwar theories of conversion], in Dōin teikō 
yokusan [Mobilization, resistance, and collaboration] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 315-322; 
Yonetani Masafumi, Ajia/Nihon [Asia/Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006) 114-152. 
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Japanese Colonialism and Yasuda’s Romantic World History 
These are the developments of the kōminka policy after Yasuda visited Keijō. Yasuda 
did not refer to the phrase “naisen ittai” yet in the 1938 essay, “Impressions of Korea,” 
nor did he meet with the advocates of “Japan and Korea as a cooperative single body.” 
But he continued his keen interest in what was going on in colonial Korea. In order to 
look at Yasuda’s response, here let me turn to his essay entitled “Ruins of Asia.” 186 
This piece, published in January 1940, is a recollection of his trip. Here we can see 
most clearly how Yasuda’s rhetoric of irony is at work in his romantic colonialism. 
Yasuda mentions the new developments in colonial Korea:  
I heard that it was around September 1939 that the governor-general in Korea 
began to speak of “the military and logistic base for the continent” and “the 
simultaneous development of agriculture and industry” (nōkō heishin), with 
“Japan and Korea as one body” as its ground. 187  
 
Yasuda did not hide his admiration for these policies.  
I realized that something like one’s country and its independence, as Korean 
nationalists considered it, was nothing but a mere theoretical notion associated 
with the former old regime. Today the historical thought of Japan has brought 
home to me that history will transform the basic system of the world, just as it 
did for the people at the time of the French Revolution. 188 
 
In this way, he insisted that “Japan and Korea as one body” and “the military and 
logistic base on the continent” meant nothing less than a final rejection of Korean 
ethnic nationalism and the separatist movement. If he dismissed Koreans’ struggle for 
independence, he did so from a putatively higher instance of a regional order that went 
beyond the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of peoples. In his view, the 
                                                 
186 Yasuda Yojūrō, “Ajia no haikyo” [Ruins of Asia] in Yasuda Yojūrō zenshū, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 
1986), 141-158.  
187 Ibid., 144. 
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Japanese colonial regime represented something new in history. It is crucial to 
recognize that Yasuda justified these projects through a narrative of world history that 
located the current engagements of the Japanese empire in the peninsula and the 
continent within the genealogy of world historical events such as the French 
Revolution. In the twentieth century, the Manchurian Incident, he claimed, represented 
a historical break that began a whole new process.  
There may be various comments on the concept of “the military and logistic 
base for the continent.” But, frankly, this is a pleasant thing to hear. In spite of 
some criticism against the cognition of the colonial government, both Japanese 
and Koreans can be proud of this, in that neither Britain nor the Soviet Union 
could take up such a world policy. Thus, such thoughts as “Japan and Korea as 
one body” and the oneness of Koreans and Manchurians, when concretized as 
the military and logistic base for the continent, can be said to be one of the 
greatest Romanticisms among the thoughts of the current Incident.189 
 
It would make an imperialist feel very pleasant, for sure, if the colonized people so 
spontaneously collaborated with the imperial project, as he believed. In making this 
sort of “frank” comment, he is affectively identifying himself with the positionality of 
the metrople, about which he does not show the slightest doubt. But why does the 
“military and logistic base” excite Yasuda’s imagination so much? Is it merely 
because of his militaristic excitement or the imaginary of pan-Asianist expansionism? 
As I have already suggested, the two tropes of mutually related forms of hashi 
characterize his view of world history: the civilizational ladder and the bridge of 
imperial expansion, which I also called the peninsula-bridge regime of Japanese 
colonialism. In this configuration, this military and logistic base can be regarded as 
one concrete instance of the second hashi, as a bridge or boat to the continent. If the 
idea of the “military and logistic base” incites his “Romanticism,” it has much to do, I 
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claim, with the tropic imagination of hashi that underlies Yasuda’s literary 
imperialism.  
Undoubtedly, this whole narrative of world history is based on his imperial 
conceit that Japan represented something new in history, which neither capitalist 
Britain nor the communist Soviet Union could ever realize. By the same token, he 
believed that the Japanese empire has finally made ethnic nationalism an obsolete idea, 
a remnant of the nineteenth century. But what provided the ground for these seemingly 
wild assertions? 
The legitimation of the military and logistic base in the continent has been 
made possible through the formation of kokumin. I was very moved, reflecting 
upon the status of Korea in history. When in its two thousand years was there 
ever a day when Korea became a truly independent country? Or, was there 
ever a day in which the land and people of Korea emerged as a road of world 
historical intercourse such as we see in the current form of the military and 
logistic base? When the imperial way of Japan expands, it alters the concept of 
the road of intercourse (kōtsūro) in world history, and this was not brought 
about by a Soviet type theory of control. This fact delights me as one of the 
grassroots people (sōmō no tami) because this was a history created by 













Again, as this quote shows, Yasuda’s “world history,” while inciting the sublime 
feeling of “Romanticism,” is still conceived of in terms of the civilizational mission 
that is vertical or hierarchical in nature. Another, closely related aspect is the figure of 
kōtsūro, or “the road of intercourse,” as the horizontal expansion of this world 
historical project. Furthermore, the last passage makes clear the agent of world history. 
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The subject who would accomplish this project is the figure of kokumin or the people. 
Therefore, his kokumin does not imply ethnic nationalism, but should be taken as 
“world historical” in its ambition. Most importantly, he claims that the “military and 
logistic base” was not a product of the control from above as in the Soviet Union. On 
the contrary, it is the subjective participation of the kokumin in Korea that enabled this 
world historical project. 
 
Yasuda’s Romantic Irony and Ambivalence of Empire 
Although he celebrates kokumin as if the population in colonial Korea had become 
equal members of the community, Yasuda could not conceal his deeply rooted 
imperial unconscious. Here it is crucial to analyze his rhetoric of irony, a hallmark of 
Yasuda Yojurō’s style. This sort of ambiguous rhetoric represents his version of 
“Romantic irony.” As I have discussed in the previous chapter, Yasuda adopted the 
notion of Romantic irony first and foremost from German romantic writer Friedrich 
Schlegel. Schlegel described Romantic irony as “permanent parabasis,” which Paul de 
Man explained as “the interruption of a discourse by a shift in the rhetorical 
register.”191 It is a form of self-reflection in which the writer doubles itself as the main 
narrator and a “buffo” who interrupts and undoes what the former is saying. In 
practice, it can take a number of forms. For instance, de Man also relates it to another 
rhetoric called “anacoluthon,” which means “a break in the syntactical expectations of 
the pattern.”192 Yet, I do not mean that Romantic irony is a form of conventional 
rhetoric, as de Man, along with Schlegel, pointed out that it is not a rhetoric in the 
limited sense of a sentence pattern, but a deep tropic structure. Nevertheless, as long as 
it is a form of writing, it would still need to be practiced in a manner that is 
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identifiable as such. How, then, is Romantic irony as parabasis identifiable in this 
specific case? How is it disrupting the main narrative line?  
Here is Yasuda’s problematic sentence again: “When in its two thousand years 
was there ever a day when Korea became a truly independent country?” As a 
rhetorical question, this quote naturally anticipates a negative answer. Therefore, it 
says that there was no independence of Korea. Yet, the sentence only negates 
independence in a past history. In fact, the passage prior to this quote suggests that the 
“status of Korea” has improved. This may be said to represent a sort of “anacoluthon,” 
i.e., “a break in the syntactical expectations of the pattern.” If this is the case, Yasuda 
does imply as a second meaning, that the present Korea has now become an 
independent country. However, this would contradict what he has just said in the 
previous paragraph: independence was “nothing but a mere theoretical notion based on 
the past old regime.” Here we can see a profound ambivalence, if not a contradiction. 
This is precisely why he has to say “Or,” to rephrase his sentence. He says: “Or, was 
there ever a day in which the land and people of Korea emerged as a road of world 
historical intercourse such as we see in the current form of military and logistic 
base?” This is the very moment in which Yasuda the “buffo” intervenes in his main 
narrative. While he may seem to be just paraphrasing the previous sentence, he is 
actually saying something completely different. Now he insists as if the “military and 
logistic base” would mean real “independence.” This is the modified new meaning of 
“independence.” After all, he is saying that Korea can be a “truly independent 
country,” only by being incorporated into Japanese empire—this is nothing but “semi-
independence,” “independent but not quite.”  
In this way, Yasuda as the main narrator in his rhetorical question gives rise to 
the expectation that he negates the “independence,” but he does imply a present 
independence, albeit implicitly. Yet Yasuda the buffo further undoes this evocation by 
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saying “Or.” In so doing, however, his rhetoric not only suspends the phrase 
“independence,” but splits its literal meaning to create its simulacrum. The 
“independence” he evokes in the passage turns out to be no more than “semi-
independence,” which he in fact employed in the essay, “Impressions of Korea.” 
Nevertheless, he cannot negate independence outright, precisely because without 
evoking some sense of “independence,” the empire cannot mobilize the colonized.  
Furthermore, however, the almost scandalous ambivalence would be concealed, 
rather than overcome, by the movement of the uneven oneness of kokumin towards the 
continent. I claim this represents the Romantic moment in his rhetoric that points to a 
certain open-ended universality or infinity. Although de Man claimed that irony as 
permanent parabasis destroys a system of narrative or history, Yasuda’s version, I 
argue, serves for romantic world history because it enables a history in which the 
empire emerges out of constant negation of particularities, that is to say ethnic 
nationalisms. What Schlegel called “romantic poetry” as “progressive, universal 
poetry” should be taken at its face value here as something that has affinities with 
empire.   
At the same time, however, I am not saying that this irony is reducible to 
Yasuda’s intentional operation. Instead, I am claiming that the rhetorical structure of 
irony was not confined to Yasuda’s rhetoric, but rather corresponded to the 
“objective” structure of Japanese imperialism. Significantly, this is the very question 
that Walter Benjamin had in mind in The Concept of Criticism in German 
Romanticism. He claimed that irony as the “absolute form” is not a mere subjective 
phenomenon, but represents an objective idea of art. Formal irony is not “an 
intentional demeanor of the author.” He continues: 
It cannot be understood in the usual manner as an index of a subjective 
boundlessness, but must be appreciated as an objective moment in the work 
itself. It presents a paradoxical venture: through demolition to continue 
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building on the formation, to demonstrate in the work itself its relationship to 
the idea.193  
 
Through demolition of a visible work, that is, through “the storm blast that raises the 
curtain on the transcendental order of art,” irony opens up “the realm of the invisible 
work,” i.e., the “indestructible” idea of art.194 To be sure, Benjamin’s discussion of 
Romantic irony belongs to a different register than my argument that critically 
addresses the political function of irony for empire and, conversely, the ironic nature 
of empire itself. But the movement of irony that Benjamin describes, I claim, is 
suitable to illuminate that of empire. If this is the case, one might be tempted to 
compare empire with the work of art that is universal, invisible, and indestructible. As 
I discussed in the previous chapter, Yasuda described a work as a “lie”: “the lie of a 
work, a lie that is not false.” If there is any validity to this analogy, one would be able 
to say that empire as the work is a “lie.” Yasuda’s irony then can be interpreted as 
seeking to create the empire as a lie: the lie of an empire, a lie that is not false.   
Or rather, following Winfried Menninghaus, one might be able to say, more 
straightforwardly, that the Romantic theory of absolute self-reflection undermines the 
very distinction between subjective and objective. If so, it becomes possible to argue 
that this Romantic irony mirrored, and was mirrored by, the discourse of Japanese 
empire. In fact, the rhetoric of Romantic world history “reflected”—in its reciprocal 
sense—the Japan’s colonial policy of kōminka in that ambivalence of semi-
independence was displaced and replaced by expansion and mere anticipation of the 
beyond, that is, the continent. What is cunning about this political and rhetorical 
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structure is that it implicates the colonized in what I call the semi-independent 
peninsula-bridge regime of Japanese imperialism. 
 
The Genesis of Kokumin as an Imperial Signifier 
At the same time, however, Yasuda’s encounter with the colonial intellectuals in Keijō 
affected his own national identification. Although he sought to contain the 
ambivalence inherent in this relationship by appealing to the imperial temporality of 
world history and the trope of the peninsula, he could not ignore what he called the 
“essential something” in Hyun Yong Sup’s interrogating address to the colonizer. 
Precisely because Hyun reflected and repeated the universalistic claim of the Japanese 
empire, Yasuda was forced to alter the signification of what is called “Japan.” In other 
words, the ambivalence of “independent but not quite” is not confined to the colonized, 
but also inevitably comes back to haunt the colonizers. 
Here let us return to the 1938 essay, “Impressions of Korea.” The key question 
I am asking here is how a national identification is made possible and what happens 
when the colonized seeks to identify with the colonizer or, better yet, its nation as the 
ultimate object of identification. To this end, it is important to see how Yasuda 
described the Japanism of Hyun and others who had converted from leftist movements 
as follows:  
After all modern thought had lost its ideals and faced disillusionment, the sole 
thing that appeared as ideal was Japanism, that is to say, the “national polity” 
(3&4, kokutai) as such of “Japan.”195 
 
First of all, this discovery of Japan by Korean Japanists, in fact, represented a parallel 
psychological process to converted leftists in Japan. This was precisely the experience 
of the members of the Japanese Romantics such as Kamei Katsuichirō and Hayashi 
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Fusao. Therefore, Yasuda’s passage does not only refer to the colonized, but holds 
true for the colonizers. That is to say, it represents a quite common pattern of 
conversion to nationalism. Moreover, in spite of Yasuda’s apparent conviction that the 
supreme Japanese essence goes beyond “modern thought,” such a strong sense of 
nationhood does not seem to be especially unique to “Japanese nationality.” On the 
contrary, this sentiment describes a quite common element in any nationalist narrative. 
His remark then can, and should, be understood as referring to a phenomenon that 
doubtlessly describes the national identification process in general. If this is the case, 
this psychological structure of conversion as such is hardly particular to the Japanese 
nationality. 
Yasuda himself might have noticed such commonality and generalizablity of 
nationalism. In fact, Yasuda put quotation marks around “Japan” and the “national 
polity.” Obviously, he was not unaware that these signs, by being used by those new 
kokumin, were now no longer the same as what they used to signify. The designation 
of “Japan” was different in its extension from what most Japanists in Japan proper 
meant. This was the actual reality of the “world historical,” multi-ethnic empire, as he 
described:  
…it was finally demonstrated that the culture that Japan transferred to the 
peninsula was not only the Western clothing and buildings, but indeed 
Japanese spiritual culture. Its appearance might be minute yet. It must be 
nurtured further. This will mean a challenge to the universal (sekai teki) 
Japanese spirit.196 
 
This new “Japan” has now become worldly and universalized with its spirit and 
culture transmitted to its colonies. It was in this context that he made the following 
remark I have already quoted: “many of the people of the peninsula have understood 
the world and Japan in world history, apparently obtaining their self-awareness of 
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being Japanese from that of having been Japanese.” Yasuda, as it turns out, really 
meant it. 
Thus, not only “Japan,” but also the “Japanese” must be put in quotation 
marks.197 The latter could never be ethnically determined. Significantly enough, the 
sovereign figure of Japanese nationality, i.e., tennō or the emperor was not exempted 
from the effect of de-ethnicization. Yasuda narrates the stories that were circulating 
among the common people, seemingly suggesting that the anecdotes were somehow 
empowering for them. 
A driver from the peninsula wanted to tell us the legend that the Japanese 
imperial household has a blood relation with the kings who first developed 
Korea; also, in the South, they said that the people of Silla belong to the same 
tribe (shuzoku) as the Japanese. This is what we believe, too. The way they told 
us the legends had something different from servility and subservience.198  
 
In this passage, it may seem somewhat vague here whether or not he affirmed that the 
Japanese emperors had a blood relation with Koreans, but Yasuda, in another 
travelogue on Korea, did acknowledge that the mother of the emperor Kanmu, who 
inaugurated the Heian court, was a descendant from Baekje’s monarchical family.  
Meanwhile, Yasuda carefully avoided using the phrase “Chōsenjin” (Koreans) 
in the essay “Impressions of Korea.” Most of the cases in which the word appears are 
either employed by Hyun himself or refer to the Korean people before the Japanist 
movements. Instead, Yasuda favorably used “hantōjin” or the “peninsular people,” as 
I have already discussed. To be sure, Yasuda, on the one hand, would never abandon 
the hierarchy between the Japanese and the Koreans, insisting on the supremacy of the 
Japanese tradition of culture over that of the Koreans; the difference between both 
ethnic groups is retained primarily in the realm of art and culture. On the other, in the 
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narrative of world history, he was pleased with the formation of the new Japan, 
emphasizing that the Japanese spirit was transmitted to the people in colonial Korea. 
Here the figure of kokumin played the crucial role. It was kokumin that both enabled 
and was created by “Japan and Korea as a single body.” Thus, the new “Japanese” in 
quotation marks could never represent a biological racism. In fact, he never subscribed 
to the “pure blood” theory, but rather presupposed the “mixed nation” theory.199 In 
addition, it is noteworthy that Yasuda continued to support the latter theory into the 
postwar.200 
Yasuda’s use of the signs as put in quotation marks—“Japan,” “Japanese,” the 
“national polity”—suggests that “kokumin” or the people, as articulated in the contact 
zone, does not refer to any fixed entity that is determined by the past history, which 
Homi Bhabha called “pedagogical object,” but are exposed to the continual process 
and movement of signification as the “performance of narrative, its enunciatory 
‘present’ marked in the repetition and pulsation of the national sign.”201 That is to say, 
a national identification as based on the agency of the subject of enunciation is not 
only susceptible to the play of difference in signification, but always already split 
between the double time of the “pedagogical” and the performative. At the same time, 
however, the figure of kokumin would have been impossible without the desperate yet 
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disrupting practice of identification by the “Japanists” in Korea. If this is the case, this 
articulation of the national signs—Nihon, Chōsenjin, kokumin, minzoku, and so 
forth—was made possible through the colonial encounter in the periphery—hashi—
between Yasuda and the Koreans. Bhabha also describes such a periphery as 
“temporality of ‘in-between’” and “a liminal signifying space.”202 “The boundary,” 
thus Bhabha says, “that marks the nation’s selfhood interrupts the self-generating time 
of national production and disrupts the signification of the people as homogeneous.”203 
This statement on “dissemi-nation,” however, must also be read as describing how the 
people constitutes itself as a hybrid and also imperial nation at the boundary. This is, I 
argue, what the genesis of kokumin at the periphery suggests.  
To be sure, it would be easy to dismiss the efforts of the colonized subjects as 
acts of “collaboration” with Japanese colonial rule, arguing that the kokumin notion 
was a mere instrument for mobilizing the colonial population on the part of the 
governor-general’s office. I argue, however, that it is not only fairer, but more 
productive, to detect within this complicity certain critical stakes, on the part of the 
Japanists such as Hyun Yong Sup. Through their discursive strategy, I claim, they 
sought to generalize, de-ethnicize, and hybridize the “Japanese.” 
 
Hyun Yong Sup and the Doubling of Imperial Irony  
Here let us take a look at Hyun Yong Sup to see the critical political stakes. In his 
essay, “‘Japan and Korea as a Single Body’ (naisen ittai) and the Question of the 
Individual Character (56, kosei) of the Koreans,” published in March 1940, Hyun 
argued for “tettei naisen ittai” or “Japan and Korea as a complete single body,” 
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emphasizing the necessity of participating in the empire.204 It is true that he was not 
only involved in Japanese colonialism, but also denied Korean cultural “identity” by 
notoriously advocating the abolition of the Korean language.205 As a matter of fact, 
however, Hyun was far from simply celebrating Japanese colonial rule. I claim that it 
is important to take a serious look at potentially critical aspects of his discussions, 
which have not been paid much attention.206 As I show, he was committed to a certain 
universalism and that this was the very reason why he endorsed Japanese empire.207 I 
will interpret Hyun’s strategy as overcoming the colonial structure of discrimination 
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and segregation by appealing to the very promise of universality. Here I will detect his 
hidden critical agenda of radical humanism. In so doing, I will also suggest how irony, 
inscribed in the mechanism of empire, reveals its real doubling effects. 
Hyun begins his essay by debating with proponents of so-called “kyōwa teki 
naisen ittai” or Japan and Korea as a cooperative single body. As I have discussed, 
this strategy was advocated by those activists and intellectuals who sought to secure 
relative autonomy of the Korean minzoku within the empire. Hyun describes it as a 
“friendly” attitude that only “shakes hands” with Japanese.208 He disagrees with them, 
because they still regard Koreans and Japanese as two distinct minzoku. Instead, he 
insists on the “complete singly body,” openly supporting the governor-general Minami 
Jirō’s problematic statement saying that Japanese and Koreans must “ultimately 
become one in terms of everything, from blood to shape to body and soul.”209 When 
looking at this sort of statement, one might be tempted to denounce Hyun as having 
completely submitted to the colonial regime.  
I argue, however, that there are two mutually related agendas implied in this 
polemic. One is his polemic with the other Korean activists in terms of the minzoku 
notion, and another is his implicit criticism of the Japanese empire.  
First, Hyun seeks to undermine the minzoku concept by pursuing, at least 
theoretically, the ultimate fusion of different minzoku, including, but not limited to, 
Koreans and Japanese. He criticizes kyōwa teki naisen ittai by projecting a quite 
radical future of human history. He first argues that Koreans and Japanese will be 
gradually unified through both cultural exchange and marriage. Importantly enough, 
the Japanese minzoku itself, he points out, is a product of long-term miscegenation of 
heterogeneous minzoku. In this respect, Hyun shared the same view with Yasuda 
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Yojūrō who believed in the mixed nation theory. However, Hyun further claims that 
the “direction of development of the humanity” lies in fusion and mixing of 
minzoku.210 Once Koreans and Japanese are unified, they will mix with Chinese, and 
then with Indians. And ultimately, Asians and Europeans will be unified. “I see Asian 
and European worlds as non-duality,” he maintains. “The world is one. The whole 
world must become one minzoku.”211 If there is only one large minzoku in the world, it 
would not make any more sense to talk about minzoku. The term would mean the same 
thing as the “humanity.” Hence, Hyun is seeking to undermine minzoku by pushing it 
to its extreme possibility. To be sure, this line of argument that seeks to relativize 
ethnic difference was not contrary to, but rather quite affine to Japanese colonial 
discourse at the time of the kōminka period. However, Hyun’s discussion was 
distinctive in that it was based on a radical, potentially subversive standpoint.  
In spite of its perplexing appearance, he was not endorsing Japanese colonial 
regime as it is. Rather, he was seeking, I claim, to exceed it precisely by appealing to 
its promised ideals. What makes his strategy possible is the premise, or rather 
postulate, that Japan represented sekaisei or universality. Comparing it with other 
global movements such as Christianity and Communism, he insisted on the spiritual 
and even religious character of the Japanese empire. “The Japanese spirit never 
represents ethnic nationalism (minzoku shugi), but is a God-centered faith that is of the 
same type as Christianity.”212 He then describes “Japanese emperor” as the “symbol of 
God.” What is interesting is the fact that he calls the emperor not as the living deity, 
but as the symbol of God. This would not only differ from the official doctrine of 
kokutai in the State Shinto, but he conceives of “God” itself as something higher than 
the emperor, if not a transcendent deity. In this theological hyperbole, he not only 
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clearly denies ethnic particularism to Japan, but goes beyond the existing Japanese 
nation-state. He performs a confession of faith, as it were:  
I believe that the peninsular people can become perfect Japanese minzoku, and 
that peoples all over the world can form one minzoku and one state. Although 
this is a modern fantasy (kūsō), it will come true when humanity has a 
thorough faith in God. The time will come when genus humanum becomes one 
big family. This is expressed by the Divine Rescript of the Eight Worlds under 
One Roof.213 
 
This statement may sound like a fanatic ideology of a global imperial and military 
expansion. But he deliberately propose it as a utopian ideal, since he describes it as a 
“fantasy.” This is primarily a radical act of confession addressed to the colonizer who 
promised to realize through the naisen ittai policy a true unity and equality of both 
peoples. Hyun’s performance, moreover, reflects and repeats, rather than merely 
represents, the universal claim of the Japanese empire in an excessive and hyperbolic 
manner that modifies and remolds what it is reflecting. In so doing, he demanded, 
rather than pleaded, that this ideal be realized. Or rather, under the disguise of loyal 
imitation, he pressured the colonizer and even interrogated whether or not the 
Japanese were willing and able to carry out this universal mission.  
Here one might see Hyun’s version of ironic revolt that transforms the official 
narrative. In this respect, Hyun’s strategy might represent a case of what Homi Bhabha 
called “colonial mimicry.” Bhabha describes this ironic ambivalence as the desire for a 
reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but 
not quite.”214 “[I]n order to be effective,” he continues, “mimicry must continually 
produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.”215 While the excessive character of 
mimicry does apply to Hyun’s performance, his aspiration does not seem to stop at 
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becoming a subject of partial presence or “metonymy of presence.”216 Instead, Hyun 
seems to pursue full presence by seeking to eliminate and erase any particular ethnic 
characteristics. It is certainly possible to argue that this desire is precisely an effect of 
the metonymic being of the colonized. “The desire,” Bhabha says, “to emerge as 
‘authentic’ through mimicry—through a process of writing and repetition—is the final 
irony of partial representation.”217 Nevertheless, Hyun’s attempt at radical imitation 
and identification boldly intends towards a moment that exceeds the universality that 
the colonizers are supposed to represent. In fact, Hyun did not idealize the actual 
Japanese as it was, but was committed to a much higher dimension called genus 
humanum, thereby demanding the colonizer to both obey and realize these ideals. This 
can be called radical humanism. Here it might be possible to find a trace of his earlier 
anarchism, which he officially abandoned. But it is also true that this form of 
universalism was made possible by his commitment to the religious and utopian 
dimensions.  
Hyun’s universalism contained profound ambivalence, which introduced a 
certain difference. One might observe that modern Japan faced a similar situation vis-
à-vis the so-called “West” as the representative of the universal. It was Japanese 
philosophers, especially the Kyoto School, who conceptualized their version of 
philosophical humanism in terms of Japan’s “world historical” standpoint which is a 
narrative based on broadly Hegelian dialectics between master and slave. By contrast, 
Hyun Yong Sup, under the conditions in which an openly political, dialectical struggle 
was forbidden, had to appeal to a strategy that secretly disrupts the dominant narrative 
by faithfully or rather hyperbolically imitating it. In this respect, one might identify 
Hyun’s project as pursuing a line between master-slave dialectics and colonial 
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mimicry. In this sense, too, Hyun reflected, repeated and doubled Japanese imperial 
universalism by revealing that it was itself a double.218  
Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, his strategy of radical humanism 
was not free from risks and problems. First of all, as a result of negating particularities, 
Hyun insisted that the peninsular people must abandon their ethnic identity, including 
the Korean customs and their language. Retaining their ethnic language was not 
essential, he says, because, even if they use different signifiers, for example, “maze 
gohan” for “bibim pap,” the referent would have the same “taste.”219 Instead, he 
advised his fellows to universalize and modernize their entire way of life. This meant 
assimilating the essence of spiritual and material cultures represented by Japan.  
You will have the qualification of a Japanese kokumin in a true sense, only by 
assimilating the culture of Western science and technology and the religions of 
Buddhism and Christianity, that is to say, all of the global culture. Modern 
Japan will synthesize the entire global culture and create a new culture.220 
 
Interestingly enough, he employs the term kokumin here. This is one of the few entries 
of the word in this essay, which aims to launch a polemic against the proponents of the 
minzoku concept. When he speaks of the “qualification of a Japanese kokumin in a true 
sense,” it may appear that kokumin is a sort of a status symbol for being Japanese. Yet, 
here again, he does not consider it to be any qualities or properties that are particular 
to the Japanese nation. Rather, he defines it as a membership for those who have the 
                                                 
218 At the same time, however, one might also hear in Hyun’s notion of genus humanus an echo of the 
discussion by the Kyoto philosopher Tanabe Hajime who developed a very similar idea of human 
universality called¬ or “genus.”  In his “logic of species,” he claimed that individuals (h) can be 
universal and thus belong to the ideal state, by negating their particular identity and cultural values 
called  or “species.” Naoki Sakai compellingly argued that Tanabe’s imperial universalism was most 
appealing to those marginalized subjects who suffer from the structure of the colonial rule and 
discrimination but who wish to be the first-class citizens of the imperial nation. See Naoki Sakai, 
“Subject and Substratum: On Japanese Imperial Nationalism,” Cultural Studies, 14 (3/4) (2000), 462-
530. 
219 Here one might be tempted to say that his argument points to another important dimension of hashi, 
that is, “chopsticks,” which my essay could not address but that is fundamental to understanding 
political economy of the colonial rule.  
220 Ibid., 325. 
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capacity to assimilate, develop, and create global culture and civilization. In other 
words, kokumin is but a form that is filled with universal contents of the human 
development. He claims that the identity of individual Koreans or kosei would prosper 
here. This is what he meant by the “Japanese who have universality (sekaisei),” which 
include Koreans.221 In this sense, he was an individualist who believed in modernity. 
Therefore, Hyun never dismissed the kosei of individual Koreans, but tried to elevate 
it to the level of a world culture, albeit within the confines of the Japanese empire. 
Thus, he claims, 
Not the language, but the special technology of the peninsular people will be 
our uniqueness. Even our customs and family system are not important aspects 
of kosei. Only such technology and thought that the people in Japan proper and 
Manchuria are not capable of are the aspects of kosei we should be proud of.222 
 
While this passage betrays Hyun’s hidden agenda to exceed Japanese in the future, he 
could not conceal his sense of superiority over other Asians here. “The peninsular 
people,” he maintains, “have a grave responsibility: they have more awareness and do 
more practice of the Japanese spirit than the people in Manchukuo and the Chinese, 
and therefore, assume the mission for the next global advancement of the Japanese 
spirit in the future.”223 
In this way, Hyun’s radical humanism, which desperately sought to overcome 
discrimination, was not exempt from a hierarchical thinking. On the one hand, this sort 
of order of ranking was undoubtedly imposed on him by the imperial structure of 
repression. If he advocated modernization through imperialization, it means that he 
had to accept the rules of the game designed by the metropole, under which the 
colonized nations had to compete with each other. On the other hand, however, his 
argument implied that the contemporary Japanese happened to be superior, not 
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because of being native Japanese, nor even because of the hegemony of empire, but 
merely as a result of their stage of development. If this is the case, it was precisely his 
deep-rooted faith in, and valorization of, universal modernity that made him yield to 
authority and hierarchy, thereby supporting and collaborating with the colonial regime.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed Yasuda Yojūrō’s colonial Romanticism, focusing on 
his narrative of “world history” in his travelogues on colonial Korea. I demonstrated 
how his Romanticism was inherently motivated by the idea of world history. In this 
narrative, the rhetoric of Romantic irony played a central role. By negating, or better 
yet suspending, “independence” or separation of Koreans, it worked to integrate this 
colonial population into universal but uneven kokumin thereby creating continuity 
with empire, which I described as “empire as a lie,” using Yasuda’s phrase. That is to 
say, irony proved to be constitutive of imperial world history, rather than destroy its 
narrative.   
In this way, the Korean peninsula became Japan’s “bridge” to the continent in 
this rhetorical scheme of romantic colonialism. I am not merely using the term 
“bridge” as a simple metaphor in a spatial and physical sense. Rather, the figure of 
“bridge” in Yasuda is deeply associated with Romantic irony, because irony not only 
suspends meaning, but always intends towards somewhere else or the beyond as the 
reverse side of the negation. This is why in Yasuda, the “bridge” served as a privileged 
figure that symbolizes the Romantic irony in the first place. Precisely for this reason, 
the trope motivated his romantic imperialism at a profound level. 
I would like to conclude by describing how the figure of hashi in its polysemic 
elements serves as an allegory for the structure and movement of Yasuda’s romantic 
world history. First, Yasuda’s world history was characterized as a civilizational 
 134 
mission that is vertical or hierarchical in nature. This moment is represented by hashi 
as a “ladder” of civilization. Another, closely related aspect of his world history is the 
figure of kōtsūro, or “the road of intercourse,” as the horizontal expansion. This means 
for imperial expansion would correspond to another hashi as “bridge” or “boat” to the 
continent. More specifically, the “military and logistic base” can be regarded as one 
concrete instance of the second hashi. In this sense, Korea for Yasuda was Japan’s 
bridge to the continent, which I call a peninsular-bridge regime of Japanese 
colonialism. 
However, the bridge not only allowed the imperial movement back and forth 
between Japan and the continent, but was itself a margin or periphery of the empire. 
As such a marginal but also in-between place, it exposed Yasuda to the encounter with 
the colonial intellectuals such as Hyun Yong Sup. This moment is figured in a third 
dimension of hashi, which I call the “periphery as the site of encounter.”  
In this way, the threefold trope of hashi articulates the internally heterogeneous 
structure of Yasuda’s imperial project. In other words, the peninsula-bridge regime 
and its progressive narrative of world history were confronted with and interrogated 
by the performative acts of radical identification at the margin of empire. Such present 
encounter at the periphery gave rise to the figure of kokumin that is constituted by 
Yasuda’s ironizing on the one hand, and the colonial mimesis, on the other. This 
means, however, that kokumin thus produced is not only heterogeneous and 
ambivalent, but always already imperial. To be sure, the bridge as an in-between place 
would be crossed over while being mobilized and implicated in the regime of imperial 
expansion. But, by exposing Yasuda to these colonial others, the bridge as an irony 
undermined self-identity of “Japan” and “Japanese.” The Korean peninsula was 
Yasuda’s “Japanese bridge” in all these senses. 
 135 
CHAPTER 4 




In the previous chapters, I have discussed Yasuda Yojūrō and his notion of Romantic 
world history. I especially focused on how Romantic irony as continual alternation and 
reflection effectively undermined binary oppositions and suspended ethnic and gender 
identities. In so doing, I have shown that irony was at play in the discourse of world 
history on both sides of the colonizer and the colonized, which also suggests that 
ironic ambivalence was inherent and inscribed in the imperial formation. Ambivalence 
implies certain tensions, and the empire was always filled with tensions. In this 
concluding chapter, I will examine another, more explicit form in which the internal 
tensions of the empire and its world history manifested itself, that is to say, war. Here I 
will thematize the wartime discussions of “world history” by the Kyoto School of 
philosophy and seek to show how their conception of war as “total war” revealed the 
essential tensions of imperial world history. Just like Yasuda described “war and 
peace” as “irony,” the Kyoto scholars, too, sought to undermine the distinction 
between what is war and what is not. 
 
At a critical time in the Asia Pacific war, the second generation of the Kyoto 
School of philosophy engaged in a discourse on war as represented in Sekai-shiteki 
tachiba to Nihon (The World Historical Standpoint and Japan).225 This book consists 
                                                 
224 "Antinomies of Total War," from positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, Vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 97-125. 
Copyright 2009, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. 
225 Kōsaka Masaaki, Suzuki Shigetaka, Nishitani Keiji, and Kōyama Iwao, Sekaishiteki tachiba to 
Nihon [The world historical standpoint and Japan] (Tokyo: Chūōkōron, 1943). The three roundtable 
discussions are “Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon” [The world historical standpoint and Japan], Chūōkōron 
(January 1942):159–92; “Tōa kyōeiken no rinrisei to rekis-hisei” [The ethicality and historicity of the 
East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere], Chūōkōron (April 1942): 120–61; and “Sōryokusen no tetsugaku” 
[The philosophy of total war], Chūōkōron (January 1942):54-112. All citations in this article are from 
the original journal transcripts. References to the third roundtable are cited by page number in the text. 
Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are by the author. 
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of three roundtable discussions organized by Kōsaka Masaaki, Nishitani Keiji, and 
Kōyama Iwao — all of whom had studied with Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime at 
Kyoto Imperial University — as well as the historian Suzuki Shigetaka. These 
discussions aimed to legitimate Japan’s war efforts through a “philosophy of world 
history.” The last session was titled “The Philosophy of Total War”; here the 
participants provided a philosophical determination of the current warfare as “total 
war.” 
Today’s situation sheds new light on these discussions because we are once 
again confronted with the spectacle of war. In Multitude: War and Democracy in the 
Age of Empire, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt claim that the current “war on 
terrorism” is a global civil war taking place within the so-called empire.226 War has 
now ceased to be an exceptional phenomenon and has become general and permanent. 
This global war has no boundaries, spatial or temporal, nullifying the traditional 
distinctions between war and other areas of social life. It has thus come to have an 
“absolute, ontological character,” that is, “biopower,” which is “a form of rule aimed 
not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of 
social life.”227 
Despite certain differences, these descriptions are surprisingly similar to the 
discourse of total war as developed by the Kyoto School. As such, a reexamination of 
the Japanese discourse on total war should help historicize the current discourse on 
war. In my view, the significance of the Kyoto School’s discussions consisted in the 
fact that their philosophical language systematically developed the implications of 
total war to the limit thereby revealing its internal contradictions. 
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In the following, I first critically examine the current debates on this topic, 
touching in particular on newly discovered and published documents attesting to the 
wartime collaboration of the Kyoto School with the Japanese Navy. I then analyze 
how the Kyoto School conceived of the notion of total war and sought to philosophize 
the Asia-Pacific war in its terms. In reference to previous theories of war as discussed 
by the Kyoto School, I call attention to both the novelty and the hyperbolic nature of 
total war, laying out the particular issues involved in this problematic. Here it is 
crucial to show that each aspect of total war was haunted by a specific kind of self-
contradiction that I call antinomy. Specifically, I focus on the temporal aspects of this 
kind of war, its beginning and end, in order to reveal how the Kyoto School 
philosophers negotiated their own historical present. 
 
The Kyoto School’s Wartime Involvement 
The symposium “Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon” (The World Historical Standpoint and 
Japan), together with another roundtable discussion, “Kindai no chōkoku” 
(“Overcoming Modernity”), has long been criticized in terms of the Kyoto School’s 
involvement in the war.228 However, there have recently appeared two works in a sort 
of collaborative effort on the part of American and Japanese scholars that seek to 
                                                 
228 “Kindai no chōkoku” was organized by the Bungakkai (Literary World) group in the summer of 
1942 and appears in book form in Kawakami Tetsutarō et al., Kindai no chōkoku (Overcoming 
Modernity), ed. Matsumoto Kenichi (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1979). Nishitani Keiji and Suzuki Shigetaka also 
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Takeuchi's 1959 essay "Kindai no chōkoku," in ibid., 273–341 (translated as "Overcoming Modernity" 
in What Is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi, trans. and ed. Richard F. Calichman [New York 
Columbia University Press, 2005], 103–47). While recognizing the importance of the task of 
"overcoming modernity," Takeuchi points out that both conferences failed to question or resolve the 
aporia that "the Greater East Asian War was at once a war of colonial invasion and a war against 
imperialism" (124). Takeuchi also renders a strongly negative judgment against the Kyoto School 
philosophers: "The war itself began as an attempt to 'conceal this nature of invasion.' It is an 
overestimation of the Kyoto School to claim that its dogmatism was able to conceal it. The Kyoto 
School did not produce war and fascist ideology; they merely expounded official thought, or perhaps 
they interpreted it" (134). 
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rehabilitate the school’s wartime commitment as such. These works are Ōshashi 
Ryōsuke’s Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun: Shin shiryō “Ōshima memo” wo megutte 
(The Kyoto School and the Japanese Navy: On the Newly Discovered  “Ōshima 
Memorandum”) and David Williams’s Defending Japan's Pacific War: The Kyoto 
School Philosophers and Post-White Power.229 
   As the title of his book reveals, Ōhashi discovered and published the 
memoranda and records of the wartime “secret meetings” between the Kyoto School 
and the navy. From a critical standpoint, the memoranda serve as evidence of the 
Kyoto School’s deep involvement in Japan’s war effort. However, Ōhashi insists that 
the school’s activities should be interpreted as “anti-regime cooperation with the war” 
(hantaisei-teki na sensō kyōryoku), “for these secret meetings did not so much ‘assist’ 
military rule as they were ‘anti-regime’ actions that tried to rectify its policies.”230 
Before examining this claim, let us briefly touch on the contents of the 
meetings. Ōshima Yasumasa had transcribed the discussions at these meetings and 
retained possession of the transcriptions long afterward. A disciple of Tanabe Hajime, 
Ōshima was an assistant at Kyoto Imperial University during the war and participated 
in the meetings as secretary. The meetings were secret because the cabinet was then 
under the rule of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki of the army, and the army maintained 
very tense relations with the navy at the time. Kōyama Iwao represented the Kyoto 
School as the main coordinator of these meetings and was officially appointed as a 
commissioned researcher for the navy. Discussions were held based on the materials 
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230 Ōhashi, Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 22. Apparently it was Takagi Sōkichi, an officer in the 
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discussion. 
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provided by the navy, and the results were reported to the research division. In 
addition to the four participants of “The World-Historical Standpoint and Japan” 
symposium, the regular participants of these meetings included the philosopher 
Kimura Motomori and the scholar of Chinese history Miyazaki Ichisada. Significantly, 
even Tanabe attended several times.231 
Ōhashi’s reading of these new documents relies on Ōshima’s 1965 testimony 
about the Kyoto scholars’ wartime activities.232 Ōshima explained the course and 
contents of this organization as follows: (1) “During the first stages, the theme [of 
these meetings] consisted in how to prevent the outbreak of war.” The Chūōkōron 
discussions were first organized with this secret aim in mind. Soon after the first 
session, however, war broke out. (2) The next topic then discussed concerned “how to 
favorably conclude the war as soon as possible through rational persuasion of the 
army.” To this end, attention focused on how to “overthrow” the Tōjō cabinet. (3) 
From the end of 1944 until Japan's surrender in August 1945, the Kyoto School 
philosophers discussed how to prepare for the postwar situation, “as the secret 
information brought by the navy already made the defeat apparent.”233 
However, major discrepancies exist between this testimony and the actual 
documents discovered by Ōhashi. First, the latter include only eighteen meetings from 
February 1942 until November 1943 This figure differs slightly from that given in 
                                                 
231 At the ninth meeting, held on September 29, 1942, Tanabe delivered an important lecture clarifying 
the logic of the co-prosperity sphere. See ibid., 227 – 44. 
232 Ōshima Yasumasa, "Daitōa sensō to Kyōto gakuha: Chishikijin no seiji sanka ni tsuite" [The Greater 
East Asian War and the Kyoto School: On the political participation of the intellectuals], in Nishida 
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Ōshima's testimony. Given these dates, obviously these materials do not contain 
anything that would testify to the Kyoto School’s prewar efforts to prevent the Pacific 
war. Second, the memoranda do not tell us much about any specific actions to 
overturn the Tōjō cabinet, yet the other documents that Ōhashi groups in the second 
category do include reference to the army. Clearly, the argument here is to ascribe 
responsibility for the war strictly to the army, thereby exonerating the navy.234 Third, 
the documents of the third category, which include miscellaneous materials, are not 
published in Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun. Ōhashi suggests that other related 
materials may exist that have yet to be found.235 
Thus the value of Ōshima’s memoranda needs to be critically reexamined as 
historical material. In addition, his 1965 essay, despite its importance, is very much a 
recollection from the postwar perspective. In fact, serious contradictions can be found 
between these intentions, as represented by Ōshima, and the secret wartime 
discussions.236 For these reasons, I view these materials as auxiliary documents in 
examining the Kyoto School’s wartime symposia. 
Despite these problems, however, Ōhashi reiterates Ōshima’s narrative, 
insisting that the Kyoto School intended through this involvement to “rectify the 
course of the war of invasion” on the basis of its “philosophy of world history.”237 
Based on its intentions, Ōhashi tries to defend the school’s problematic statements. If 
these philosophers employed in their discourse such official symbols as the Greater 
East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and “eight worlds under one roof” (hakkō ichiu), this 
was done strictly in order to change their meanings. Ōhashi describes this “tug-of-war 
                                                 
234 See Ōhashi, Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 326–29. 
235 Ibid., 16–20. 
236 See note 265. 
237 Ōhashi, Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 24. 
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over meaning”238 through another contemporary keyword, shisōsen (“thought war”), 
which constituted one of the major topics discussed by the Kyoto School thinkers in 
their roundtable sessions. 
Along with the philosophers’ intentions, Ōhashi emphasizes, the politico-
intellectual context at the time must be considered. Specifically, one needs to focus on 
the various disagreements between the army and the navy, just as one must remember 
that these philosophers were vigorously attacked by such ultra-rightists as the Genri 
Nippon (Japan Principle) group of Minoda Muneki. With this in mind, Ōhashi states, 
“Any criticism [of the Kyoto School] on the basis of the horizon of meaning first 
established in the post-war period that ignores the [wartime] thought war must be 
described as a hermeneutic error.”239 However, Ōhashi’s understanding of 
hermeneutics appears somewhat dubious here. One must agree with Iwasaki Minoru’s 
criticism of Ōhashi: “This amounts to saying that hermeneutics involves reducing 
things to the past context of their meanings, which represents a reality that exists in 
and of itself.”240 There is little doubt that Ōhashi seeks to affirm the Kyoto School’s 
activities in order to rehabilitate them “just as they were.” 
Apparently what motivates Ōhashi's claim to vindicate the Kyoto School is the 
transferential relation with his mentors, including Nishitani Keiji, who expressed his 
resentment that “during the war we were struck on the cheek from the right; after the 
war we were struck on the cheek from the left.”241 Ōhashi insists that postwar critics 
have judged the Kyoto School unfairly in an ex post facto manner, that is, without 
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sufficiently taking into account the political context at the time. This context was one 
in which the Kyoto School thinkers were in fact heroic, self-sacrificing, and 
antiregimist and worked hard to move Japan in a more reasonable direction. However, 
this view is problematic because, in its exclusive attention to the Kyoto School’s 
relative change of positionality, it effectively obscures such important questions as 
what sort of regime these philosophers presupposed and what kind of ideas they 
proposed as alternatives within the regime. Moreover, by focusing solely on the so-
called domestic thought war, Ōhashi simply ignores its international aspects. This 
exclusion results in a failure to question both the significance and the responsibility of 
the Kyoto School’s wartime discourse from a global or “worldly” perspective.242 
Ōhashi's overall reading strategy derives from his belief that those utterances 
made during the symposium that affirmed or even promoted the war regime were not 
meant literally but were in truth merely tactical or strategic. In short, he suggests that 
these philosophers’ words and deeds should be regarded as irony. However, Ōhashi 
seems blind to the fact that with the disclosure of these secret meetings, it becomes all 
the more important to examine the public discussions. In the final analysis, it is 
through the exoteric rather than esoteric thought war that these scholars could 
influence the public. 
Let us now turn to David Williams, Ōhashi’s American counterpart. 
Interestingly, we can detect a symptomatic complicity between these two writers. As 
with Ōhashi, Williams does not conceal his “revisionist” desire to criticize the United 
States’ so-called Pacific war orthodoxy, which holds that Japanese military expansion 
was wrong whereas the American war effort was necessary and morally justifiable. In 
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this context, he states, the Kyoto School in particular has been labeled as “fascist.” 
Taking these philosophers' wartime discourse at face value, Williams insists that 
despite Japan's defeat, they proposed and anticipated the formation of a “post-white” 
world in which western supremacy comes to an end. Provocative as this thesis may be, 
Williams’s basic standpoint remains in several ways extremely confused and 
problematic. 
First, the Kyoto School philosophers (with the notable exception of Nishitani) 
would never have been so careless as to employ such a racial metaphor as “post-
whiteness.” Williams’s rhetoric of this sort only serves to distort the politico-
philosophical project of the Kyoto School. Second, by emphasizing the philosophers’ 
internal conflict with the Tōjō regime, Williams fails to analyze how their discourse 
effectively supported that regime and helped mobilize Japanese citizens as part of the 
general war effort. Is this not ultimately a rather “orthodox” view of the school, one 
that ignores the role of imperial Japan as victimizer? Third, and above all, Williams 
does not criticize but indeed actually admires the Kyoto School’s imperial nationalism. 
In spite of his supposed criticism of what he calls the “White Republic” (i.e., the 
United States), which because of radical demographic changes has become 
increasingly less white, his intent is clearly stated: “With the decay of the White 
Republic, the challenge of nurturing non-White agency, the post-White subject, what 
the Japanese call ‘shutaisei,’ that is individual and collective self-mastery, must be 
met if the society is to continue to work, and only if it works for the whole society will 
we outflank the final sorrows of empire.”243 Here we can see that Williams’s aim is to 
help the American empire survive on the basis of the Kyoto School’s logic of 
subjectivity. To this end, he affirms the necessity of mobilization. In fact, Williams 
professes a high regard for the German writer Ernst Jünger’s essay on total 
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mobilization, which lies at the heart of fascist thought.244 One might thus be tempted 
to suspect that Williams’s revisionism is actually a desperate attempt to rescue 
American imperialism by way of its former enemy. This would mean that the Kyoto 
School’s theory of total war has now, sixty years after the fact, finally achieved its 
ideological triumph over the United States, thus realizing in dialectical fashion the 
ultimate identity of opposites. 
In the following section, I examine the fundamental standpoint and essential 
features of the Kyoto School concept of total war. 
 
Philosophizing the War: The Idea of Total War 
The transcripts of “The World Historical Standpoint and Japan” symposia were first 
published individually in the journal Chūōkōron. The first session was held on 
November 26, 194, thirteen days before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Although this 
timing greatly enhanced the prestige of the discussions at the time, it is necessary to 
remember that Japan had already been at war with China for more than four years. 
The discussions dealt with various topics from the theoretical and practical 
standpoint of the philosophy of world history, but they were most centrally informed 
by their critique of the constraints of western modernity and concerned with 
illustrating Japan’s world historical position in forming a new world order. The second 
and third sessions took place the following year on March and November 24, 
respectively. After the excitement over Japan's early victories had abated and 
perception grew of the defeats suffered by the army in several subsequent major 
battles, the discussions became increasingly focused on the ongoing war. In fact, the 
last session, “The Philosophy of Total War,” sought to provide a philosophical idea for 
the war. At the same time, this issue of war had constituted the basic problematic of 
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the symposium from the very outset. In this regard, Kōsaka Masaaki’s concluding 
statement at the first roundtable session was symbolic because it announced the key 
note of the following two sessions: “When man becomes indignant, his indignation is 
total. He is indignant in both mind and body. This is the case with war: both heaven 
and earth become indignant. In this way, the soul of humanity comes to be purified. 
This is why it is war that determines the crucial turning points in world history. Hence 
world history is purgatory.”245 War as purgatory: the Kyoto School came to name this 
“total war” (sōryokusen), that is, a world historical conflict between competing 
worldviews that would ultimately overcome Western modernity and lead to the 
construction of a new world order. 
As the title of the third session shows, the Kyoto School's discussions of 
Japan’s world-historical position culminated in its discourse on war. In hindsight, one 
can see that this third and last roundtable session included all the points discussed in 
the previous two meetings. It sublated these points, as it were, because the current total 
war was the very process that would realize Japan’s world-historical position. These 
thinkers were dealing with the war and its singularity not as a mere scholarly object 
but subjectively and in the very midst of it, because this war was unfolding before 
their eyes. In short, the importance of the Chūōkōron discussions lies in the fact that 
these philosophers were speaking about the war in an explicitly performative fashion. 
As Kōsaka insisted at the beginning of the discussion, war has presented itself 
as a highly philosophical phenomenon. War is not simply one historical phenomenon 
among others, however, but possesses a unique ability to provide insight into the very 
essence of history itself. Kōsaka’s remark does not concern war in general but is 
instead a specific reference to the “Greater East Asian War.” It is specifically this war 
                                                 
245 Kōsaka et al., “Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon,” 192. It should be mentioned that this view of history 
as purgatory derives from Nishida. 
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that must be understood as philosophical: “We now encounter a period in which 
worldviews themselves must radically change in a world historical manner. However, 
such change is mediated by war, or takes place alongside war. Thus war comes more 
broadly to include the meaning of a war of worldviews — a philosophical war, so to 
speak” (56).  
Behind this conception is the recognition that modernity as a whole had come 
to an impasse. The emergence of the current world war was nothing other than a sign 
that the “modern order” of the capitalist West was collapsing. As Suzuki Shigetaka 
argued, as total war, the current war did not merely derive from such advances in 
military technology as airplanes and submarines. This war was instead a necessary 
consequence of the entire historical transformation of social structures, state regimes, 
worldviews, and technology. “In short, total war represents the overcoming of 
modernity,” as Suzuki declares (57). Other participants, such as Kōyama Iwao, agreed 
that total war was “a unique, historically unprecedented war” (57) whose goal is the 
overcoming of modernity. Kōyama also referred to the new mode of warfare as a “war 
of transformation” (tenkansen) (57). This war was thus both subjective and objective 
in that it was necessitated by historical and social changes while at the same time 
functioning to realize these changes itself. 
The symposium participants all agreed that the war must be understood strictly 
as total war. In order to clarify the nature of the prevailing theories of war that they 
sought to overcome, the scholars contrasted their conception of war with two major 
theories put forth by Carl von Clausewitz (1780−1831) and Erich Ludendorff 
(1865−1937). 
Clausewitz’s On War (Vom Kriege) was the first systematic refiection on 
modern warfare since the establishment of the nation-state and its attendant popular 
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army during the French revolution.246 Here Clausewitz first introduces the notion of 
the “pure concept of war” as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” that 
is, to overthrow, disarm, and render the enemy defenseless.247 In this regard, “There is 
no logical limit to the application of that force,” that is, war can go to any extreme 
necessary.248 However, this represents a mere theoretical notion of “absolute war.” 
Although the Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century approached this concept 
for the first time in history with the employment of absolute war, war in practice is 
necessarily restricted by innumerable conditions imposed on the belligerent and thus 
has never been realized in its pure form. A crucial condition here is the political aims 
of war. In this regard, Clausewitz’s famous remark on such aims must be regarded as a 
dialectical synthesis of the pure concept of war and its real conditions: “We see, 
therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a 
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”249 
In the twentieth century, Erich Ludendorff, a former general who had led the 
Prussian military during World War I, declared that Clausewitz’s theory of war was 
now obsolete. Ludendorff proposed a new notion of war as total war in which all the 
physical and moral elements of the nation come to be mobilized.250 In marked contrast 
to Clausewitz, Ludendorff asserts that politics represents an extension of war rather 
than the reverse. By rejecting the argument that war represents an extension of politics, 
he specifically denied the notion of civilian control. Clearly, Ludendorff’s theory was 
based on the unprecedented scale of destruction in World War I, in which the 
                                                 
246 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984). 
247 Ibid., 78, 75. 
248 Ibid., 77. 
249 Ibid., 87. 
250 Erich Ludendorff, The Nation at War, trans. A. S. Rappoport (London: Hutchinson, 1936). 
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traditional distinctions between home front and front line, civilian and soldier, etc. had 
been violently overthrown. 
Translating the German term totaler Krieg as zentaisen, the Kyoto School 
philosophers tried to differentiate their concept of sōryokusen from these theories.251 
They argued that the current total war possessed an unprecedented nature that would 
drastically change the received ways of understanding war in general. They insisted 
that this total war exceeded the dimensions of all wars between nation-states since the 
French Revolution. In this regard they criticized Clausewitz, because the present war 
involved the much larger regions of East and West. They also rejected Ludendorff, 
whose conception was likewise limited to the nation-state and was created out of the 
context of imperialist war. In spite of the disagreements between Ludendorff and 
Clausewitz, both were judged to be ultimately similar in their conception of war as an 
exclusively military affair. In contrast, according to the Kyoto School thinkers, the 
present total war was such that the military did not need to integrate the otherwise 
distinct spheres of politics, economy, society, and culture because the very boundaries 
among these spheres were now fundamentally disappearing. As Kōyama writes, 
“[These] individual divisions each contain the other moments within themselves, and 
are unified in the monistic total war” (73). Kōyama calls such a condition 
“interpenetration” (gogu gonyū or sōsoku sōnyu). It is in this sense that he firmly 
rejects both Clausewitz and Ludendorff: “In the current total war, war is not an 
extension of politics by other means, nor is politics an extension of war by other 
                                                 
251 These circumstances have encouraged some scholars to translate the notion of sōryokusen as "all-out 
war." However, it is important to remember that this Japanese term, which literally means "war of 
general force," was originally the translation of the German totaler Krieg. If the Kyoto School sought to 
intentionally alter the meaning of these terms, as several commentators have argued, it becomes all the 
more important to investigate the political context of this discourse. Let me also note as an aside that 
David Williams translates the notion of sōryokusen as "total resistance" (Defending Japan's Pacific War, 
64-6). However, this translation seems impractical given that sōryokusen was also used at the time in 
reference to the enemy. 
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means. Instead, military, diplomatic, thought, and economic wars are expressions of a 
single total war throughout each of their particular spheres and functions” (73). 
What Kōyama and others were seeking to accomplish with such statements 
was a presentation of a radically new system that could overcome the divisions of 
modern society. At the heart of this functionalist or holistic view of society lies a 
unique conception of dialectical logic that sublates all binary oppositions, unifying the 
one and the many, individuals and the whole through the notion of “absolute 
nothingness.” As Kōyama argues in his Philosophy of World History, absolute 
nothingness as ultimate universal transcends the world as objective totality. This 
notion also transcends time and is thus defined as eternity.252 As absolute, however, it 
is neither other nor opposed to the relative and specific entities of the world; it is 
instead immanent in these things. Absolute nothingness as mediating force thus makes 
possible the interpenetration of opposites, allowing them to assume their proper place. 
Kōyama calls this logic “organizational universality” and describes it in terms of the 
Kegon Buddhist notion of “one-and-yet-all, all-and-yet-one” (issoku issai, issai soku 
ichi) (77). This concept, at once monistic and pluralistic, describes both the structure 
of total war and world history itself. In fact, Kōyama claims that the ultimate purpose 
of total war is the realization of a world order in which one “universal world history” 
and many “specific world histories” exist harmoniously and interpenetratingly.253 
As a matter of fact, however, the primary concern of the roundtable discussion 
was the monistic nature of total war rather than its pluralistic ideal, because the 
participants wished to create a strong total war regime by mobilizing all human and 
natural resources. In this respect, the dialectical logic of total war not only allows for 
the mediation and mobilization of various spheres, it undergoes an expansion of both 
                                                 
252 See Kōyama Iwao, Sekaishi no tetsugaku [The philosophy of world history] (1942; Tokyo: Kobushi 
Shobō, 2001), 443-56. 
253 See ibid., 387-99,443-56. 
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spatial and temporal dimensions. As Nishitani Keiji describes the vitalistic dynamism 
of the current war: “Nullifying the distinction between wartime and peacetime, the 
total war represents a force that has welled up from the profound ground [of history] to 
unify military power, the economy and culture. This force becomes aware of itself in 
the form of a power to wage war. As the energy for combat, such power essentially 
transcends ‘war’ in its narrower sense and continues into the so-called postwar” (62).  
The disappearance of the distinction between wartime and peacetime has two 
important consequences. First, as Kōyama remarks, “The distinction between the 
frontline and home front is abolished” (72). Second, the war and postwar are now seen 
as continuous. Although these thinkers occasionally touched on the postwar, as if 
implying that the current war did have a definite end, they nevertheless stressed that 
there is no end to total war as such. Thus total war represents an indeterminate, endless 
war. Here the Kyoto School's dialectical conception of total war fundamentally 
transformed the received notion of war into a universal medium of world history. It 
unleashed the uncanny essence of total war, thereby rendering it permanent. 
 
Aspects of Total War and the Antinomies 
In this way, we can see that the aim of the third Chūōkōron discussion was dedicated 
to developing the totalistic nature of the total war. The notion of total here refers to a 
system that exceeds all distinctions, determinations, and boundaries (or what the 
Kyoto School thinkers critically referred to under the general rubric of modern 
rationality). In my reading, this third session contains several key themes or ideas that 
are not only closely interrelated but central to the two earlier discussions as well. 
Before proceeding to these themes, let me first explain my critical standpoint. 
Despite the Kyoto School's dialectical attempt to go beyond modern binary logic, I 
believe that their idea of total war fails to avoid the problem of antinomy as examined 
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by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. According to Kant, human reason 
that seeks to transcend all possible experience so as to determine the unconditioned 
totality or first cause produces two opposing propositions about the world as 
totality.254 The essential ground of the antinomies, which appear between such poles 
as finitude and infinity, necessity and freedom, lies in the opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity. 
As is well known, however, dialectical thought since Hegel criticized Kant’s 
dualistic solution to antinomy that separates empirical and transcendental realms, 
thereby making totality a merely “regulative idea.” In the early twentieth century, the 
Kyoto School philosophy of absolute nothingness, along with Hegelian Marxist Georg 
Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness (1923), represents one of the major forms 
of dialectical philosophy of history that will overcome the split and contradictions in 
modern Western (bourgeois) thought. 
Here it is crucial to show that in its generalization, the Kyoto School’s idea of 
total war inevitably produced a series of unsolvable contradictions without truly 
mediating Japan’s subjective position with objective world history. I argue that this 
attempt to overcome the fundamental problems of modernity falls into similar 
contradictions. What I mean by “antinomy” is precisely this paradoxical situation. In 
other words, the Kyoto School's antithetical argument regarding the contradictory 
thesis of Western modernity ultimately turns out to be self-contradictory. As “world 
war,” total war can thus be described as the explosion of the dialectical or antinomic 
moment of the idea of “world.” 
                                                 
254 Specifically, the antinomies concern such questions as whether the world has a beginning and end in 
time and space, whether everything in the world is determined by natural causality, and whether there is 
a free starting point of action. According to Kant, antinomies occur when pure reason applies the 
transcendental idea of the world to the empirical realm, using it as something objective and related to 
the "things in themselves." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 496-550 (B 490-595). 
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A. Transforming Capitalism through a New Subjectivity 
First, the Kyoto School philosophers stress the importance of transforming the 
domestic social structure in order to prosecute the war, because total war is not 
exclusively a military issue but instead radically reorganizes every social sphere. Total 
war is literally “total” in that it abolishes the received divisions between home front 
and front line, wartime and peacetime. It mobilizes not only the army but also, more 
generally, politics, the economy, everyday life, and thought. Such total mobilization is 
regarded as essential to the task of overcoming the capitalist regime.255 As Suzuki 
observes, this task involves at the economic level the transition from a liberal 
economy to a “planned economy,” which represents the “process of overcoming class 
struggle” (62). Such recognition represents both an appropriation of the Marxist 
critique of capitalism and protection from that critique. This process, however, is a 
global trend in which the “national defense state” emerges as a centralized power that 
intervenes in class conflicts. Suzuki maintains that even such democratic states as 
England are likely to become increasingly totalitarian (87–88). We see here that the 
so-called welfare state originates from the warfare state. 
Such socioeconomic change requires a transformation of the modern 
worldview in general. Kōyama insisted that the idea of homo economicus underlying 
modern economics must be transformed because it adheres to the low-level dimension 
of “desire,” thereby resulting in the social contradictions of exploitation and alienation 
                                                 
255 In their secret meetings, the Kyoto School philosophers discussed the issue of overcoming the liberal 
economy. According to Ōhashi, the second meeting focused on "how to make the capitalists understand 
the historical necessity of establishing the East Asian Sphere and theoretically convince them that the 
current situation is in no way temporary, that the war will not be concluded soon, thereby disallowing 
any return to the former liberal economy, and that now, therefore, new ideas are necessary" (Kyōto 
gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 184). Such a seemingly socialist critique was in no way unusual at the time, 
given the configuration of social discourse. On this point, see Yasushi Yamanouchi, "Total War and 
Social Integration: A Methodological Introduction," in Total War and ‘Modernization,’ ed. Yasushi 
Yaman-ouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryōichi Narita (Ithaca, NY: Cornell East Asia Program, 1998), 
1-39; and Yonetani Masafumi, Nihon/Ajia [Japan/Asia] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006). 
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(73). Henceforth economic behavior must above all be mediated by ethical 
considerations. What Kōyama and others proposed here is the creation of a new type 
of “ascetic” ethos based on “moral energy” (moralische Energie) that is both more 
productive and better able to serve one’s organization in a responsible manner. In 
connection with this, one must now abandon the bureaucratic organizational order that 
is solely concerned with maintaining equilibrium. As Nishitani states, “The 
fundamental problem of total war is not rationality in the sense of mere equilibrium or 
harmony within and between sectors; instead it is the irrational leap and its rationality, 
what can be called irrational rationality” (74). Thus the total order created by such new 
“elemental subjectivity” must, in its transcendence of modern “formal rationality,” be 
more organic and dynamic. 
Yet here a strange paradox arises. In its criticism of the principles of capitalism, 
this project seeks to revitalize and mobilize what can be called a productivist ethos, a 
capitalism in which there would be neither ownership of private property nor class 
struggle. 
 
B. Overcoming Imperialism and the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere 
The discussion of the Kyoto School thinkers inevitably touches on the issue of the 
wartime enemy, that is, the imperialist order of the modern West. The current war, 
they believed, involved at its core Japan's world-historical destiny to transform the 
world order created by Western modernity and subsequently imposed on the rest of the 
world so as to establish a new world order. The West no longer represents the 
universal; instead it is Japan that will realize what Kōyama calls “universal world 
history.” The total war was not merely a regional war between nations but a global 
war between large geopolitical entities that transcended the borders of the nation-state. 
In other words, it was a “war between one order and another,” the newly emerging 
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East and rapidly decaying West. Accordingly, the aim of the current war, repeatedly 
referred to here as the greater East Asian war, was to liberate East Asia from the 
burden of Western imperialism, thereby building the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere. Through this war, then, the regional order that is to be built functions at the 
same time as the subject that actually wages total war. The Kyoto School philosophers 
dwelled at length on their criticisms of the contradictions so abundantly apparent in 
the West, as caused by such Western principles as liberalism, popular self-
determination, and sovereignty. Of these criticisms, Kōyama’s remarks, which were 
made against the background of the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter signed by 
Roosevelt and Churchill, are perhaps the most powerful: “When popular self-
determination (minzoku jiketsushugi) comes to the fore, its reverse side is inevitably 
the colonial empire. Such self-determination and imperialism represent the two sides 
of a shield that comes from the same source, as is unmistakably revealed by the 
historical facts of modern Europe” (82). As Kōyama concludes, “The same principle 
of liberalism brings about such incompatibilities as, on the one hand, popular self-
determination and the colonial empire and, on the other, abstract ethics and 
authoritarian rule” (82). 
Without question, this criticism carries a certain validity. According to the 
Kyoto School philosophers, virtually any idea produced by the modern West, such as 
liberalism, democracy, or humanism, is never free from such inherent contradictions. 
What these thinkers are pointing to here is the inscribed conflict between the notions 
of freedom and equality. 
However, their alternative seems to be as dubious as the ideology they so 
rightly reject. Rather than presupposing a complete human being from the outset in the 
manner of individualism, these philosophers assert the necessity of “guiding” other 
dependent nations and “allowing each nation to take its proper place” (tokoro wo 
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eshimeru) according to its own developmental stage. This represents their unique 
interpretation of the infamous code word of Japanese imperialism, “eight worlds under 
one roof.” Yet it is easy to see that this interpretation involves restricting the 
sovereignty of other under-developed Asian nations, thereby subordinating them to 
Japanese colonial rule. As such, the difference between Western imperialism and the 
Kyoto School's own attitude toward these nations seems to disappear.256 Thus the 
attempt to overcome the contradictions of modern society, as caused by capitalism and 
imperialism, ends up repeating and reproducing the same problems, which I call 
antinomies.  
 
C. Thought War Strategy and the Regime of Truth 
At issue here are the strategy and tactics of the prosecution of the total war. The Kyoto 
School thinkers saw the task represented by the “thought war” or “war of ideas” as an 
extremely urgent one. Apparently the Chūōkōron discussions constituted a form of 
practice in this thought war, in addition to the thinkers’ secret meetings with the Navy. 
It is important to observe that the target of this thought war was not simply Japanese 
nationals. The practice sought to mobilize the masses both within and outside Japan in 
order to construct a new regime; it also worked to form a new kind of subjectivity, one 
whose “moral energy” would help enable this world-historical empire to come into 
being. In other words, these philosophers called for a new ethos and discipline that 
would inform the entirety of everyday life and infiuence both the outer behavior and 
inner lives of the peoples of the Greater Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere. This is what 
the Kyoto School called “guidance” (shidō). 
                                                 
256 In their fifth secret meeting, these thinkers discussed the issue of plural sovereignty within the Co-
prosperity Sphere. They proposed to "divide sovereignty" by placing Japanese leadership and the 
sovereignty of other nations in a hierarchical relationship. However, they failed to find an answer to the 
contradictions inherent in such a hierarchical order of sovereignties because these sovereignties are 
supposed to be absolute in and of themselves. See Ōhashi, Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 205-13. 
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Nishitani Keiji notoriously insisted on the possibility of turning those Asian 
peoples with superior qualities into what he called “half-Japanese.” As possible 
candidates for this group, he mentioned the Malays, Filipino Moros, and Taiwanese 
aborigines. Nishitani proposed this notion of half-Japanization as the means not only 
to increase the Japanese population but also to awaken “national self-awareness and 
moral energy” among Asian peoples. He presupposed a strongly hierarchical 
relationship between authentic Japanese and half-Japanese. The other participants of 
the symposium actually warned him against such statements because they could easily 
be interpreted as racist.257 At the same time, however, Nishitani insisted in reference to 
the Korean people that the notion of the Japanese nation should become broader: 
“Military inscription has now been implemented in Korea and what has been called 
the ‘Korean people’ (Chōsen minzoku) have entered Japan in a completely subjective 
form. In other words, these people have become subjectively Japanese. As such, isn't it 
possible to say that the small idea of the ‘nation’ (minzoku) as a fixed entity has now 
fused into a larger notion? Can’t the Yamato and Korean people be said to become one 
Japanese nation, as it were?”258 While Nishitani clearly endorsed the policy of 
Japanese-Korean unity (naisen ittai), he did not conceive of a mono-ethnic 
nationalism but rather a multiethnic one. Nevertheless, such an inclusive, imperial 
conception of nationalism by no means precludes racial discrimination. Here it is 
important to understand how closely the Kyoto School’s universal — that is, world-
historical — standpoint was bound up with their attempt to interpellate other Asian 
peoples as Japanese. 
The members of the school were certain that they were fighting the war of 
truth, which should in and of itself possess the authority to convince the enemy as well 
                                                 
257 Kōsaka et al., "Tōa kyōeiken no rinrisei to rekishisei," 161. 
258 Kōsaka et al., "Sōryokusen no tetsugaku," 78. 
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as other Asian nations of the purity of their own intentions, without the use of force. 
Here we may understand that the aim of the thought war was to convince the enemy 
and the Japanese people of the objective truth of Japan’s subjective standpoint. 
“Japanese eternal truth” of “the national body” (99) possesses the force to subject 
other peoples to it, thereby constituting them as subjects. Thus truth makes people 
“subjective” in the dual sense of this term. 
Yet the only reason that these philosophers referred to in explaining why Japan 
is in the privileged position to guide other nations was the fact that Japan was the sole 
Asian nation to have successfully modernized. It was this modernization that 
constituted the apparently objective truth of their standpoint. In this way, their thought 
war discourse reveals a certain complicity between truth and forms of hegemonic 
power. 
 
Eternalizing War—The Temporal Dimensions of Total War 
Thus far we have been concerned with the ideal aspects of total war and its antinomies. 
Now let us turn to the question of time within its process. Because the total war 
effectively negated the separation between wartime and peacetime, it possessed an 
extraordinary character in terms of its beginning and end. The nature of totality is not 
only related to the objective time line of total war but clearly involves in it the 
subjective (shutaiteki) dimension, or the relation between historical time and 
subjective time. Hence the war’s “beginning” has a double sense: a certain starting 
point in historical time and the freedom to begin. By the same token, the “end” refers 
to both an endpoint and practical purpose. Here it is crucial to recognize that these 
distinctions are essentially related to three modes of temporality, that is, the present, 
the past, and the future. Significantly enough, it is in this context that the philosophers 
speak of one of their most fundamental notions, namely “eternity.” 
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The question is whether or not the Kyoto School could mediate these 
dimensions of time through its philosophy of history and the narrative based on it. 
What is at stake here is the unity of time as well as the totality of the world. 
 
A. The Beginnings of War 
The Chōūkōron symposium participants repeatedly stressed that the war had neither 
beginning nor end in the usual senses. They insisted that one must abandon the 
commonplace understanding that, as Kōyama Iwao remarked, “‘war’ begins with a 
declaration of war and ends with negotiations for peace, thereby reestablishing in the 
postwar the original order of peace” (58). Thus total war seems to become a kind of 
undeclared war with no definite end. 
First, let us examine the discussion of the war’s beginning in the objective time 
line and as subjective decision. Regarding the lack of any proper beginning of the war, 
the participants referred to the oil embargo imposed on Japan by the United States as 
well as the various economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain, China, 
and Holland. From this perspective, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, 
1941 (Japanese Standard Time), was viewed as a necessary consequence of the 
economic war and moreover marked the beginning of the military phase of the war. 
This account, which still has currency today among Japanese conservatives, displaces 
Japan’s responsibility in initiating the war onto other countries. Yet the Kyoto School 
thinkers are more concerned with the reality of world history as it concerns Japan and 
seek to construct a narrative that mediates objective necessity with the free beginning. 
According to this narrative, the greater East Asian war had actually begun long 
before this point. As Kōyama Iwao stated, “We must understand that the Greater East 
Asian War began together with the China Incident” (58 – 59). In fact, the “solution to 
the China question” had been one of the key focal points from the first roundtable 
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onward. All the participants agreed that its origin could be traced back not only to the 
1937 China Incident, but further to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 It should be 
noted that in the course of the second roundtable discussion, Kōyama and others 
acknowledged that Japan's behavior toward China could easily be misunderstood as 
imperialist. Apparently these thinkers were somewhat uncomfortable with the 
“extremely opaque duality” of Japan's behavior vis-à-vis China.259 They were forced 
to admit the absence of any genuine cause of the incident. Instead “it was only after it 
had actually broken out that the significance and idea of the [China] Incident emerged. 
This is the way history works in general.”260 This remark is related to the recognition 
that “Japan has directly encountered the world since the Manchurian Incident. The 
pressures of the new world-historical reality preceded domestic reform.”261 These 
statements suggest, first, that the symposium participants were fully aware that Japan's 
historical actions were already “thrown” into a certain historical situation and took 
place as a response to this facticity, or even as a deferred effect. Second, they 
acknowledged that Japan was from the beginning exposed to the external world in the 
form of its invasion of China and that this in turn affected Japan's internal affairs. 
Yet how then does one explain Japan's “free” beginning of this war, for such 
freedom is required for its subjective standpoint in world history? In the first 
roundtable discussion, Kōyama suggested that Japan's surmounting of its economic 
sanctions would create a new world. “The true meaning of war is created by actually 
waging it. Whether we can make the past live or die depends on the present work.”262 
                                                 
259 Kōsaka et al., "Tōa kyōeiken no rinrisei to rekishisei," 131. Nevertheless, Suzuki insisted that Japan's 
"special relation" with China was fundamentally different from imperialism because Japan aimed to 
protect it from partition and colonization by the West (132-34). In contrast to Japan's success as the 
only modernizer in Asia, China's antiquated consciousness of itself as the center of the world led it to 
wrongfully resist modernization, i.e., the "guidance" offered by Japan. In this respect, Kōyama 
criticized China because "it possesses a subjective consciousness as center but lacks the objective 
consciousness of the world" (129). 
260 Kōsaka et al., "Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon," 191. 
261 This remark is Kōyama's, in "Tōa kyōeiken no rinrisei to rekishisei," 140. 
262 Kōsaka et al., "Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon," 191. 
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Kōsaka's description of war as “purgatory” appeared precisely in this context. 
Obviously these statements were made in anticipation of the impending war with the 
United States, at which time Japan would make a truly subjective beginning. Here the 
subject of this decision is, as Kōsaka termed it, the “state-nation” (kokkateki minzoku). 
Thus, after Japan finally went to war with the United States, Kōyama declared, “The 
Idee of the Greater East Asian War justifies Sino-Japanese relations.”263 In fact, the 
name Dai Tōa sensō was a new designation for the entirety of the war — including the 
Sino-Japanese war since 1937, which began without any formal declaration of war. 
For Suzuki, December h revealed that necessity in history is nothing but subjective 
and practical necessity.264 Nishida Kitarō would describe such a moment of decision 
as a turn “from what is made to what makes” (tsukurareta mono kara tsukuru mono 
he). In this way, the Kyoto philosophers believed that the antinomy between necessity 
and freedom as two beginnings would be mediated and thus solved through the 
temporality of resolution. 
However, it is highly dubious that the subjective beginning of decision making 
by the state can retrospectively purify the first beginning of war in which Japan was 
caught up. Obviously Japan’s conflict with China was merely displaced as part of 
Japan’s extended war efforts with the West. At the very least, the success or failure of 
Japan’s subjective standpoint depended entirely on its ability to “convince” other 
nations. In any event, whether or not such narrative can bridge the gap between past 
and present is fundamentally open to the dimension of the future. Therefore let us now 
examine the ends of war. 
 
 
                                                 
263 Kōsaka et al., "Tōa kyōeiken no rinrisei to rekishisei," 131. 
264 Ibid., 122. 
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B. The Ends of War 
Just as the notion of total war reveals a fundamental ambiguity about the war’s 
beginning, so too does its end possess certain characteristics that need to be analyzed. 
To be sure, the symposium participants were concerned with their strategic vision of 
how to conclude warfare in a specifically military sense. However, the ends they 
spoke of were far from univocal but referred to several different points of the future. It 
is important to ask what the philosophers were doing by talking about the future. 
First, the war’s current situation emerges as an issue in both its tactical and 
temporal dimensions. Here the philosophers reintroduce the distinction between 
military warfare as part of the entire war and total war at the meta level. Let us quote 
Kōyama: “The present war cannot be understood on the basis of the conventional 
concepts of war, for it possesses elements that transcend the limits of these concepts. 
Hence military warfare, which constitutes the most central feature of these 
conventional concepts, is not necessarily the decisive element now, as this has been 
replaced by the total war as such” (61). He continues: “The question of which aspects 
of total war come to the fore and which follow it depends partly on the war’s objective 
conditions and partly on its strategy” (63). These quite realistic remarks could be read 
as implying future diplomatic negotiations with the Allied nations, that is, a possible 
cease-fire. While the dialectical argument here essentially contradicts the static 
distinction between the military and other aspects of total war, it also seems likely that 
the participants sought to shift focus away from its military aspects onto other 
seemingly less bellicose dimensions, thereby minimizing the weight of the military. 
Did they thus attempt to guide the war in a more rational direction, as for example 
both Ōhashi Ryōsuke and Ōshima Yasumasa suggest? In fact, one key to reading “The 
Philosophy of Total War” is to understand that the issue of the postwar is already 
explicitly raised there. A close reading of the dialectical argument on the temporality 
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of war will reveal that the participants were acting in a way that actually runs counter 
to their so-called secret intentions.265 
Speaking of the postwar in the midst of war means that the symposium 
participants anticipated a point of time at which the war would end. This is the first 
“end of war” that the philosophers were concerned with. As we have seen, however, 
Nishitani stressed the continuity between the war and the postwar: “We must 
understand that the peacetime elements operating within the war will be extended to 
the so-called ‘postwar,’ where they will continue to develop” (60). In other words, the 
postwar means nothing but a continuation of total war. 
Moreover, the participants emphasized the permanent nature of war. As 
Kōyama remarked: 
The present war cannot be understood as ending in the form of a peace treaty, 
as in [previous] total and modern wars. Yet even if the war does end this way, 
it would be merely a temporary conclusion, as war would resume after a few 
years. What then are the circumstances under which the war will end? Both 
sides have certain limitations with regard to military warfare. It is absolutely 
certain that we won’t be defeated if the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere is 
gradually established during the fighting, regardless of how long the war 
continues. (59) 
 
Significantly, this statement refers to three different futures: (1) a temporary cease-fire 
which corresponds to what Nishitani called the postwar; (2) the inevitable resumption 
                                                 
265 We cannot take at face value the Kyoto School's hidden agenda, as testified to by Ōshima after the 
war, according to which the school early on anticipated Japan's defeat and subsequently engaged in a 
plan to prepare the nation for this eventuality. Indeed, the records of the secret meetings suggest that the 
opposite was the case. At the tenth meeting, held in November 1942, the philosophers avoided all 
discussion related to a possible cease-fire. On the contrary, they focused on expanding Japan's industrial 
and military production through eliminating such obstacles as bureaucratic formalism and fanatic 
spiritualism. Regarding the "global trends of the war," they were fully aware of the difficulties faced by 
Nazi Ger-many in its war against the Soviet Union and offered the following remarks on the United 
States: "America must distribute its products not only to [its troops fighting against] Japan, but also to 
the Soviet Union and Britain. As such, the European question, i.e., whether Germany can stand and 
continue the war in Europe, will influence the war in Japan and its race of production against the U.S." 
(Ōhashi, Kyōto gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 245-46). It thus seems undeniable that a cease-fire was never a 
real agenda at this point. 
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of military warfare and the ensuing long-term process of total war; and (3) ultimate 
“victory” as the true end of war. Hence the postwar belongs to the near future and is 
not considered the ultimate end. In addition, this second future is seen as a necessary 
process — despite, or rather precisely because of, the virtually ungrounded slighting 
of the military aspect. What must be emphasized here is that mention of the post-war 
is immediately canceled out by the temporality of the second future. It is impossible to 
defend this argument on the basis of the participants’ intentions. 
 
C. Eternity at War 
In this way, their conception of total war reveals itself as indefinite, almost permanent 
warfare. What is significant in this context is that the Kyoto School thinkers appealed 
to the notion of eternity — again, albeit in several different senses. We thus need to 
ask the questions: Is the end merely indefinitely delayed by this recourse to eternity? 
Or will the aporetic gap finally be unified among past, present, and future, between 
subjective time and objective history? 
Essential to the idea of total war is that it attempts to transform the entirety of 
world history through the construction of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. 
Just as Kant had to postulate “immortality” in order to secure the possibility of 
practical freedom, so too does the purpose of total war assume an ideal character.266 
Thus “victory” as the ultimate future ceases to be an empirical and disjunctive 
possibility in the objective order of time and becomes instead the absolute vanishing 
point. 
To this ultimate end, “endless progress” will be necessary. This is the meaning 
and function of the second future as the long-term process of total war. It is precisely 
                                                 
266 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 102. 
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in this context that the Kyoto School thinkers spoke of three different kinds of eternity 
or endlessness. Suzuki insisted on the necessity of eternal war: “It is impossible to 
conceive of a state in which war has ceased. Indeed, war is necessary, it is eternal. 
Particularly today, as we have just mentioned, an idea is required that will abolish the 
distinction between wartime and peacetime, thus so to speak eternalizing war” (64). 
This statement represents less a speculative than a radically positivist point of view. 
Suzuki stressed that a “final world war,” as advocated by Ishiwara Kanji, a military 
officer of the Kwantung Army, would be an impossible idea. Instead the cause of war 
lies in peace itself. History is nothing but the infinite alteration of war and peace (63 
65). For Suzuki, however, eternity means a continual, indefinite, and therefore 
perpetual succession of time. To use Hegel's term, this is a “spurious infinity,” an 
endless, relative process in which one empirical endpoint is negated only for another 
to arise in the same way. It is important to recognize that negative infinity performs an 
essential dialectical function for total war: although it negates any empirical end in 
war, it provides a necessary, and perhaps the only, mediation for endless progress 
toward the ultimate goal. As a desperately endless process, however, this mediation 
points to an aporia within futures, an impassable path between the absolute end and 
the relative movement toward it. 
Here emerges another kind of eternity, which Kōyama believed would be 
capable of mediating not only these two different kinds of endlessness but also the 
historical past and the future. This is the “eternal present,” which is one of the central 
concepts of Kyoto School philosophy. Kōyama remarks, “Beginning time while being 
in time, standing at the origin of time while being in the passage of time, that is to say, 
touching eternity — history begins from here” (98). In this conception, eternity is not 
time itself but rather the origin of time. Nonetheless, eternity can appear in time in the 
historical act of beginning. Kōyama thus rejects the ordinary notion of eternity that is 
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opposed to time and history: “There is no history for a merely eternal truth. The 
Platonic Idea has no history. Things like free, equal personality and ‘absolute spirit’ 
have no history” (97). Whereas these ideas are considered objective, Kōyama’s 
conception is fundamentally subjective. 
Here let us refer to Kōyama's magnum opus, The Philosophy of World History, 
since it is in this 1942 text that he developed his argument of the eternal present in 
connection to world history. As he writes, the “relative facticity of the past” and the 
“absolute ideality of the future” are connected as opposites in the eternal present of 
resolute action.267 Therefore “the act of construction always touches absolute eternity 
and realizes eternal absoluteness in the instant of the present. Creative construction in 
the present is the absolute fact that touches absolute nothingness.”268 Based on this 
subjective temporality, Kōyama criticized the objective conception of time, which 
regards time as a mere linear succession from the past through the present to the future. 
This objective standpoint results in a dichotomy between causal and teleological views 
of history. For this reason, Kōyama rejected the notions of means and purpose. One 
must understand, he claimed, that each action contains its own “self-purposiveness.”269 
In other words, history as the trace of such action is complete at each time without 
either development or progress. 
However, this absolute view of historical time and action, which constitutes the 
principle for all world history, specific and universal, past and present, makes one 
suspect that such a philosophy of world history is trans-historical and formalistic.270 If 
this is the case, it is quite dubious if even this eternal present can provide an effective 
principle for historical transformation that mediates beginning and end, relative 
                                                 
267 Kōyama, Sekaishi no tetsugaku, 428, 430. 
268 Ibid., 430. 
269 Ibid., 452. 
270 Ibid., 453. 
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processes and the goal of objective history. Moreover, by regarding the resolute act of 
historical construction as self-purposive and complete in itself, Kōyama excludes not 
only the strategic dimension of war but also the very possibility of questioning the 
consequences and responsibility of such actions. 
As a result, Kōyama's following argument in the roundtable discussion seems 
more or less inevitable: “The notion of eternal peace is wrong, but so too is the notion 
that war is to be glorified, for these two positions are the same, albeit opposites. In 
short, these positions represent a vulgar kind of thinking in which one chooses either 
war or peace in the context of their oppositionality. But this oppositionality disappears 
when we realize that war is essentially guidance…. A truly profound peace is not 
opposed to war. A truly great peace — ‘Yamato,’ the great peace. Here the opposition 
between war and peace will ‘find its proper place’ for the first time” (67).271 
 
Conclusion: The Dialectics of Total War 
We can thus observe various dialectical contradictions in the Kyoto School’s notion of 
total war: anticapitalism intensified exploitation and mobilization, anti-imperialism 
concealed domination and hierarchy, universal truth contained hegemonic power, war 
possessed an end but was endless, and war was peace and peace was war. 
The Kyoto School’s determination of total war was such as to absolutely 
sublate the opposition between war and peace. In this way, the philosophers negated 
the distinction between war and nonwar. In particular, it became impossible to 
meaningfully speak about the end of war, that is, either victory or defeat. The notion 
of war thus lost all definite meaning. As such, it would have been possible to interpret 
Japan’s actual defeat in 1945 as an ultimate victory in some dialectical sense. 
                                                 
271 As translated by Richard Calichman in Takeuchi, What Is Modernity? 133. 
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Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to neglect the practical or performative 
aspects of the Chūōkōron discussions. Indeed, a contradictory discourse often 
generates much stronger rhetorical effects than more reasonable language. It is thus 
crucial to determine the performative meaning of these practical antinomies vis-à-vis 
the wartime readership. 
The central antinomy of the total war lay in destroying the signification of the 
term war. Once the border between war and nonwar was abolished, war was disclosed 
as indeterminate or even infinite. All-inclusive total war annihilated any oppositional 
logic and thus was absolute rather than relative. Thus it performatively produced a 
sense of the sublime, which was, in actual fact, realized through the operation of the 
wartime regime. War was to be expanded throughout all society in order to effect the 
mobilization of every social domain. Spatially, this mobilization was achieved not 
only in the domestic realm of the Japanese empire; its expansion was also sought 
throughout the greater areas of East and Southeast Asia, which were to be the 
Lebensraum (or “living area”) of the empire. The duality between the imperialist war 
and the anti-imperialist war must also be regarded as an antinomy. In this way, the 
contradictory totality at once destabilized and restabilized the boundaries of the empire. 
We must also call attention to the project of developing a productive subjectivity as 
one of the war’s decisive conditions. Specifically, imperial subjects came to be 
measured and defined by their resolution vis-à-vis the war efforts taking place in every 
social field. These subjects were to be disciplined through a sublime state of mind, as 
affected by the antinomic infinity of total war. The war was thus omnipresent, not only 
in military affairs but in all places and at all times. Temporally, this indeterminacy had 
the effect of making the war eternal; it mobilized people in an endless war that 
putatively aimed to liberate East Asia from the West. In particular, the colonized at the 
margins of the Japanese empire faced the most intense double bind in terms of their 
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ambiguous status as Japanese/non-Japanese. Although this status was properly seen as 
contradictory, it had the effect of forcing the colonized into making an impossible 
identification as Japanese. While destroying the confines of reasonable thought, the 
antinomic operations of the wartime regime gave way to both ethical and aesthetic 
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